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I draw from the identity economics, skill development, network theory, and peer effects
literature to advance new research questions around educational attainment. Theoretically, I ex-
plore the role of competition between own tastes and social group identity for choices, and I ex-
tend the theory to the case of two group influences that may combine or compete. Specifically, I
apply the extended theory to adolescent choice of effort in school, when adolescents have a family
and peer group. Empirically, I study the impact of family and peers on adolescent attitudes about
school and their performance in school, using spatial econometrics. The results show that family
educational expectations impact attitudes about school and spill-over through a school by the pres-
ence of peer effects in attitudes. The results also show that performance in school is affected by
attitudes, that peer effects in performance exist, and that spill-overs from changes in attitudes af-
fect the performance of adolescents in a school. The implication from my study is that programs
working with both families and adolescents in a school on attitudes about school can generate pos-
itive influence, which spreads over the school social space. I contribute to the literature on identity,
skill development, and peer effects drawing research questions from insights of all three, providing
a theoretical synthesis, and empirically showing evidence consistent with the role of multiple social
constraints on the development of attitudes about school and performance in school.
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Identity, skill development, and social networks play important parts in educational suc-
cess. I draw insights from across the economic literature in each of these subjects to develop new
research questions, and I empirically study how families and peers influence adolescent effort
in school through their influence on identity and skill development and across social networks.
Schooling has long been important in the field of economics.1 The insight that social influences
can affect educational choice has been recognized for some time (Becker 1994; Akerlof 1997; Ak-
erlof and Kranton 2002), but how families and peers impart incentives for effort in school that
may combine or compete has not been closely studied.
Consider an adolescent student who has attitudes about school that define their academic
aspirations and how they think about their school. These attitudes draw influence from a number
of sources: family inputs and transmission of expectations, friends’ (or peers’) attitudes, environ-
ments, and individual aspirations that are possibly independent of social influences. This student
takes part in a school social space through social links with peers in the school. As students share
their attitudes about school and their parents’ plans and goals, attitudes can spill-over handed
across social link from social link in the social space.
The primary emphasis of this dissertation is to study how malleable attitudes are shaped
by families and peers and how such attitudes, family expectations, and spill-overs affect academic
outcomes. I relate attitudes to the noncognitive skill development literature and suggest that atti-
tudes may be influenced by the group identities surrounding an adolescent. Noncognitive skill is a
term in the literature used to capture dimensions of skill that IQ tests and achievement test scores
miss. Examples of non-cognitive skills noted in the literature are perseverance, impulse control,
1. See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) for an extensive discussion on the rates of return to schooling. Also, see
Becker (1994) for an extensive theoretical treatment of human capital acquisition.
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trust, self-efficacy, empathy, motivation, goal setting, behaviors, and more (Heckman and Kautz
2014). Often researchers have used personality scales, such locus of control or conscientiousness,
to capture these skills (Humphries and Kosse 2017).
Attitudes with relation to education have been broadly considered a part of noncognitive
skills (Lipnevich, Gjicali, and Krumm 2016). In a review, Lipnevich, Gjicali, and Krumm (2016)
note that attitudes in general can be stable once set but evidence suggests that various attitudes
and beliefs are being shaped through multiple dimensions to include socialization and that inter-
ventions may be able to divert negative trajectories. Causal evidence on the role of attitudes for
educational outcomes is currently limited. Research has, however, consistently found a positive
association between attitudes and educational outcomes (Lipnevich, Gjicali, and Krumm 2016)
and there is evidence of a substantial causal effect from noncognitive skills in general on future out-
comes linked with education—for example, wages (Heckman and Mosso 2014). Because research
into noncognitive skills is relatively new, the literature has not entirely determined all the compo-
nents or how they relate to each other. Evidence does suggest that in general noncognitive skills
produce more skill over time (Cunha and Heckman 2008), but this is still a black box. Thus, in
this study I do not attempt to address these important nuances; rather, I focus on attitudes as an
established component of noncognitive skills and provide the first step in understanding how both
family and peer influences contribute together to their development and then impact academic
outcomes.
I contribute to the literature on attitudes and noncognitive skills by theoretically discussing
the role social identity may play in the development of attitudes about school and then influence
academic outcomes, an area not previously discussed in the literature, and I provide the first study
to consider whether there are peer effects in attitudes among adolescents. I suggest that identity
economics can inform research on the development of noncognitive skills and their role in aca-
demic success. As a secondary emphasis, I draw from the literature to put forward new research
questions and theoretically explore the implications group identity has even in the face of individ-
ual disagreements with ideals.
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The research questions at the center of the empirical analyses in this paper are drawn from
the combined insights offered by the identity, skill development, and peer effects literature and are
described in a simple model of family and peer group identities. Those questions are as follows:
do family educational expectations affect an adolescent’s attitudes about school and performance
in school, do adolescent attitudes affect performance, do peer effects in schooling attitudes and
performance exist, and do peer effects in attitudes and performance create spill-over effects from
changes in family expectations. Overall, I study whether there are combined effects from families
and peers that are separate from more permanent background characteristics.
To summarize the overall story drawn from the literatue and captured in the theoretical
model, an adolescent chooses effort in school, influenced by the ideals on schooling transmitted
from the family—educational expectations in my study—and the prototypical behavior—proxies
an ideal in the peer group—among peers. In this way, immediate returns to schooling are created
through identity utility, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2002). Including families and peers as two
social influences slightly extends the framework and implies there are two group inputs to the cre-
ation of social incentives for effort rather than only one. Also, it serves to motivate conforming
incentives separate from the affects of environments or backgrounds. The key insight here is that
if the ideals between groups differ then there are competing social incentives for choice of effort.
When families and peers both transmit low educational ideals, then there are strong social incen-
tives for low effort, and when both transmit high ideals, there are strong incentives for high effort.
Effort in school is also influenced by an adolescent’s malleable characteristics, which I frame as
attitudes about school. For the empirics, I use GPA to proxy effort.
I hypothesize that attitudes about school manifest a form of malleable characteristics that
are shaped by social group conforming incentives, an adolescent’s surrounding environment, and
by individual academic aspirations. In turn, they impact academic outcomes. Malleable charac-
teristics may reasonably be both cognitive and noncognitive, but as I will discuss reviewing the
literature, cognitive skills may be less shapeable by the adolescent period, while noncognitive skills
may be quite shapeable and informed by group ideals. As far as adolescent attitudes about school
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are malleable, family and peer attitudes may play a role in shaping them. The literature on noncog-
nitive skill finds “psychic” costs explain underinvestment in education that may be determined by
these noncognitive type characteristics (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006). Thus, improved at-
titudes may reduce the cost of effort for the adolescent, thereby improving effort. Empirically, I
ask whether attitudes impact school performance, as a proxy for effort, but the literature provides
us a sense of why such a relationship may exist and a direction for modeling the input of attitudes.
Also, I extend to look at the relationship between later life educational attainment and these sha-
peable attitudes and performance. This extension also allows exploring a longer term outcome that
I relate as measure of long term effort.
Peer groups form a network structure across a school that allow changes in ideals or at-
titudes to send effects over the network handed across social link from social link. Thus, I study
both the impact of family educational expectations on an adolescent’s attitudes about school and
the spill-over effect that changes in family expectation may have over a school network through
the presence of peer effects. Finally, I turn to study whether attitudes may influence performance
in school and whether changes in attitudes also spill-over effects on performance through the
school social space. From an identity perspective, school peers, or more specifically the peer’s one
identifies with, may create incentives to conform based on the attitudes and expectations in the
group. In this sense, both the schooling attitudes and performance in the group proxy the group
identity conforming incentives.
In summary, adolescent attitudes about school may be influenced by family educational
expectations and likewise by the typical attitudes in their peer group that form ideals of action.2
Ultimately, shifts in attitudes among adolescents in school and among families can work together
to create large effects across a school if social interaction effects exist around attitudes and perfor-
mance.
Overall, I find results consistent with a model of family and peer identity influences on at-
titudes about school and performance in school. I find families and peers influence own-attitudes
2. Norms of action is another way to think of this. I take ideals and norms to be interchangeable here.
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about school, and I find that spill-overs in attitudes occur from changes in an adolescent’s family
expectations. Peer effects exist for schooling attitudes and performance. Own-attitudes strongly
and positively influence performance, and spill-overs occur in the network for changes in attitudes
and family expectations.
The results suggest that working with both families and students in schools on attitudes
about school and education can positively impact performance and send effects across a school
network. This study is only a step towards understanding the combined influence of family and
peer transmission of educational expectations—or educational ideals. It does, however, suggest
that interventions in schools that combine treatments for both families and groups of adolescents
in the school, with a focus on attitudes and expectations, can generate strong, positive influence
across the school.
To study family and peer effects on adolescent attitudes and performance in school, I
first review the literature in economics on identity, skill development, and peer effects. Chapter
two provides reviews on each of these literatures and then a discussion to lay out new research
questions. I do not attempt to answer all of the questions motivated from the literature in this
dissertation—only that related to combined family and peer influence. Therefore, chapter two
both motivates the questions for this dissertation and a future research agenda.
In chapter three, I introduce a theoretical extension to Akerlof and Kranton’s identity util-
ity framework. I consider two models. In the first, I explore the tradeoff that may occur between
social group benefits and one’s own personal identity, or one’s own tastes, if the group prescriptions
for action—or ideals for action—do not agree with one’s own tastes. This is a model of conflict be-
tween an individual and their primary social group. The person decides how close to be to their
group and when they do not agree with the group, they can gain utility by moving away at the
expense of utility from social goods. If the cost is too high, then the individual may stay close to
the group and suffer the lose of utility from complying with the group ideals. This model suggests
that seemingly willing participants of an intervention may have treatment effects dampened by the
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group they belong to, if the treatment runs counter to the group ideals and valid alternative groups
cannot be offered to replace the group benefits provided by one’s current group.
In the second model of chapter three, I explore two group identity influences on the choice
of academic effort. This model is an explicit model of adolescent choice of effort when families
and peers form two groups imparting social incentives. Both groups create conforming incentives
from transmission of ideals. Additionally, drawing from the skill development literature, I build
in own-attitudes about school as a malleable characteristic that decreases the cost of effort from
school as it increases. Transmission of family and peer ideals also plays a role in producing these
attitudes. Because attitudes are malleable during adolescence (discussed later in chapter two), the
environments surrounding the adolescent will affect their attitudes, which includes the family and
peer identity influences. I derive this model into a classical network based model of peer effects.
Chapter four introduces the data, defines the variables, and describes the empirical meth-
ods implemented for this study. The data is from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
to Adult Health (Add Health). This data provides detailed social information and friendship nom-
inations within school so that peer networks can be constructed. I use spatial econometrics and
directly link the partial effects to the second theoretical model in chapter three. Chapter four cov-
ers the estimation methods for the spatial models and describes interpretation of the partial effects.
I close chapter four with discussion of the identification requirements for the key variables in the
model.
To identify social interaction effects, I use network data with spatial methods (as exposited
in econometric theory by Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009, Lee 2007a, and Lee, Liu, and
Lin 2010 among others).3 Spatial models with network data take advantage of the network struc-
ture to identify the social interaction effects. I consider two seperate methods for dealing with un-
observed heterogeneity that may confound estimates of peer effects—estimation of the correlation
in the errors between peers and using peers of peers characteristics as instruments.4 Additionally,
3. See Epple and Romano (2011) for a thorough review of identification strategies employed in the study of peer
effects that are not related to spatial and network data studies.
4. I give discussion of the common issues for estimation of peer effects, such as selection, in a later section.
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the partial effects from spatial models easily allow testing for spill-overs in variables of interest.
Lesage and Pace (2009) have pointed out that applied work with spatial econometrics has often
failed to properly explore the partial effects, which can lead to erroneous inference when testing
for spill-over effects.5 This paper employs the partial effects suggested by Lesage and Pace to study
spill-overs from changes in family expectations and changes in attitudes.
In chapter five, I turn to a brief exploration of descriptive relationships. This chapter graph-
ically displays the associations between the key variables of interest to study family and peer in-
fluence on performance and attitudes. Also, I show the association between own-attitudes about
school and performance in school. Overall, the descriptive analyses are consistent with my expecta-
tions from the theory.
I explore the results of the spatial models in chapter six. I present models exploring own-
attitudes as the dependent variable and performance in school. Subsequently, I examine the par-
tial effects for each of these models to test for direct effects and spill-over effects resulting from
changes in model covariates. Chapter six closes with robustness and extended analyses of the key
concepts and estimation results. Finally, in chapter 7 I discuss the results and give last remarks.
5. Ajilore (2015) is the only example I am aware of where spatial econometric partial effects are reported in an ap-
plied peer effects study.
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CHAPTER II
DERIVING NEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS FROM THE IDENTITY, SKILL
DEVELOPMENT, AND PEER EFFECTS LITERATURE
Here I survey the identity economics, skill development, and peer effects literatures and
discuss research gaps and questions motivated from a synthesis. These questions are: does family
influence reach across networks through the presence of peer effects? Do social groups create last-
ing influence with impacts on later life economic outcomes? If so, is it through creation of beliefs
and ideals, for example “don’t be like the out-group”, through the production of lasting traits, for
example conscientiousness, or both? Finally, under what conditions are peer effects generated?
The answers may vary by context and impact the direction of policy and intervention efforts. At
this point, the literature cannot provide a full answer to each of these question, but it can shed
light on their relevance and point towards a research agenda.
Attitudes have been considered as a component of noncognitive skills in a broad literature
on the subject across disciplines (Lipnevich, Gjicali, and Krumm 2016). In this dissertation, I em-
pirically focus on the combined role of family and peer effects on adolescents and provide evidence
that both influence attitudes about school. The entire set of research gaps and questions motivated
in this chapter serve to set forward a research agenda and as a contribution by way of synthesizing
new insights out of multiple literatures. For adolescent development, family and peer effects have
been studied separately for some time. Only recently, however, have noncognitive development
and social identity influences been considered for adolescent outcomes.
Families and peers may compete or impart similar incentives to adolescents. Peer groups
in school form networks. Changes originating at one point in the network may spread effects
over the school. Additionally, noncognitive skills, or traits, and social identity are two impor-
tant elements that may intertwine and motivate the study of attitudes about school. Social iden-
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tity incentives—or ideals for action transmitted from groups that once followed produce identity
utility—from families and peers create channels for group influence on behavior by establishing a
code for action. Noncognitive skills are thought to be malleable into adolescents and young adult-
hood. Thus, families and peers may influence the development of such traits through transmission
of academic expectations and ideals. The broader social network plays a role in this development
through spill-over effects. These concepts have yet to be intertwined and studied in the literature.
Noncognitive skills affect life outcomes from the labor market to criminality (Heckman
and Mosso 2014). Noncognitive skills are emerging in the literature in recognition that ability
is not necessarily a singular dimension nor entirely captured by test scores or intelligence tests.
Examples of non-cognitive skills noted in the literature are perseverance, impulse control, trust,
self-efficacy, empathy, motivation, goal setting, behaviors, and more (Heckman and Kautz 2014).
We may also call these skills characteristics. The literature has used several terms interchangeably.
Noncognitive skills among young children and adolescents are malleable (Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach 2010; Heckman and Kautz 2012; Heckman and Mosso 2014). Much attention has
been given to the role of parents in the production of these skills, or formation of such characteris-
tics, especially at younger ages. Not much attention has formally been applied to exploring the role
of social identity and peer effects on noncognitive skill development.
Social identity forms an important avenue for social incentives often discussed in terms of
actions such as effort (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2002). Effects from these incentives can spread
over a social-network structure, such as in a school. Beyond effort social identity may transmit
ideals for behavior over a variety of actions such as attitudes and beliefs about education, career
paths, or substance. Moreover, given the malleability of noncognitive skills social group influences
are likely important to their development. Families and peers represent two groups that may be
especially pertinent, where complementary or competing group identities can exist that impact
educational attainment and may partially shape overall development.
Peer groups form networks. Changes originating at one point in the network may spread
effects over the network (Belhaj, Bramoullé, and Deroïan 2014). Noncognitive skills, or traits, and
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social identity are two important elements that may intertwine. Social identity incentives—or ide-
als for action that once followed produce identity utility—from groups, such as families and peers,
create channels for social influence on behavior by establishing a code for action. Given the sha-
peablity of noncognitive skills, important groups may influence their development. The broader
social network plays a role in this development through spill-over effects. These concepts have yet
to be fully intertwined and studied in the literature.
It is an open question whether shocks to group ideals or the composition of noncognitive
skills in the group can create spill-over effects across a social-network. The network structure may
also play a role in enhancing or mitigating spillovers from changes to ideals. This may especially be
true if sub-groups within a network have opposing identities and contain few bridges between the
sub-groups. Intervention efforts in one sub-group may fail to diffuse to the next or, worse, create
conflict between the groups from resistance to identity change. Negative reaction in a sub-group as
a response shocks over networks that potentially threaten the group identity have not been consid-
ered anywhere in the literature. However, a combined reading of the identity and network litera-
ture suggests this more nuanced hypothesis on social network spillovers.
Because noncognitive skills affect later life outcomes, social identity influence on their de-
velopment may create lasting effects. Peer effects may have long term effects through formation of
lasting characteristics. This a hypothesis yet to be tested in the literature. Yet, another issue arises
from studying social identity and peer effects: what are the conditions under which strong causal
peer effects are generated? As we will see, this also is not well understood. It may be that sufficient
group identification is needed for strong peer effects to be generated.
In this chapter, I first review the literature on identity economics, skill devleopment, and
peer effects. The goal of the reviews is to frame what we have learned from each literature. Finally,
I discuss the research gaps and questions outlined above in light of the insight from these litera-
tures. The discussion weaves together what we know and do not know from each of these litera-
tures to motivate the theoretical and empirical work of this dissertation. Also, I contribute to the
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field by using these three literatures to point out gaps and derive new research directions for con-
tinued work.
2.1 Review of the Identity Economics Literature
2.1.1 Identity Theory in Economics
Identity economics—where identity is tied to “sense of self ”—formalizes the production
of identity utility through choice of action by self and action by others conditional on the structure
of social categories, prescriptions for action in each social category, and personal characteristics
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000). While admittedly agnostic to the conditions giving rise to ideals that
form prescriptions for action, identity theory by Akerlof and Kranton provides a framework to
model social constraints resulting from non-monetary payoffs.
In theory, identity economics points to a possible mechanism creating peer effects in ed-
ucation. Akerlof and Kranton (2002) model how personal characteristics can sort a student into a
group and this can result in differing incentives for effort. They begin with a high school contain-
ing only the classic stereotypes of nerds, jocks, and burnouts. A student is sorted into the jocks or
nerds if their personal characteristics are closest to one or the other and into the burnouts if their
characteristics are too far from the other groups. Each group exerts differing ideals for effort in
school. Once in a group, identity utility increases the closer one’s effort aligns with the ideal.
Families and other groups, of course, may also transmit ideals and in essence form another
group identity. The effect of multiple group ideals jockeying for position has not been closely stud-
ied. Akerlof and Kranton do provide some insight by extending their model of identity in educa-
tion to consider the role of school policy—or possibly school identity. They suggest that school
policy can influence the distribution of group types in the school and the characteristics accepted
into group identities that promote effort. This implies that there may be a trade-off between a sin-
gular school identity driving high effort for those who belong to it but lower overall effort for a
larger share of the school. Alternatively, a more inclusive school identity may not push effort as
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high for any one group but reduces the number of opposing groups with low effort. Such tradeoffs
may also occur along other dimensions but this a gap in the literature.
Beyond education the identity as incentives concept extends to effort in organizations.
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) highlight how individuals can be motivated to give various levels of
effort in an organization based on identity payoffs and not simply wages. Non-conformity to stan-
dard prescriptions in the labor market may result if taking the alternative choices would decrease
one’s identity utility. This can lead a rational actor to exhibit behavior opposite what traditional
economic models predict.
Research since Akerlof and Kranton’s initial work has endeavored to explore how social
identities arise. In this sense, elements of social identity become endogenous and develop over
multiple periods. Examples of this are found in a growing literature highlighting paths for specific
identity formation (Battu, Mwale, and Zenou 2007; Bénabou and Tirole 2011; Bisin et al. 2011a;
Darity, Mason, and Stewart 2006; Hanming and Loury 2005; Horst, Kirman, and Teschl 2006).
Much of the theoretical literature on identity has focused on how identities may evolve
over time to create long term behavior that can be seemingly irrational. Moreover, these may lead
to long term effects from the surrounding group(s) one resides within and is culturally bound
to. Discrimination from a majority group to a minority group is theorized to form oppositional
identities—group identity opposed to the majority group norms. When the majority holds access,
for example, to better jobs, an agent from the minority group is faced with a tradeoff between los-
ing identity utility if adopting majority group norms or losing wages if rejecting the norms. The
stronger the discrimination and the stronger the oppositional identity the more likely a person
takes wage penalties to avoid identity losses (Battu, Mwale, and Zenou 2007). Bisin et al. (2011a)
develop a model showing that racist preference diffusion in the majority culture is a dynamic com-
plement with oppositional identities in the minority culture. As identities become entrenched,
members of a group may experience competing incentives where the social becomes increasingly
more important.
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Theoretically, how identities develop over time affects between group conflict. For ex-
ample, identity may serve as a mechanism for transmitting personal history in an early period
where common identity choice allows risk sharing (Hanming and Loury 2005). The group one
is around during this period will be important to the choices one makes in the future. In Hanming
and Loury’s model, identity choice is impacted by the degree of segregation in social interaction.
Sharp cultural differences lead to less interaction between groups and create more separated iden-
tity choice. Common choice of identity by people in one group allows different degrees of risk
sharing. This can lead to later outcomes such that Pareto improving options are available. Darity,
Mason, and Stewart (2006) modeled in-group and out-group altruistic behavior. They show when
this behavior is oriented toward one’s group but excludes others the long run externalities created
can lead to entrenched racial privilege in the market place. Thus, the social groups around people
may generate strong effects over time through group interactions that produce identities.
In theory, joint investments in identity by people in society evolve ideals. The social incen-
tives from groups evolve as people move about groups and jointly produce social ideals and values.
An individual’s choices create externalities on their social groups. The social groups create exter-
nalities on the individual, which then lead to changes in both their own and the group’s identity
and across society as people move about groups (Horst, Kirman, and Teschl 2006). Agents own-
choices can result in the development of norms, mores and the variety of social groups existing.
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) frame investments in a stock of identity that are responsive to acts,
threats, or taboos around beliefs considered to be invaluable. The individual builds their ideal im-
age rather than taking it as given. Norms and mores in society develop out of the interaction of
everyone’s identity investments. Combined, these theoretical studies imply that the groups which
may matter most to an individual’s choices are the groups with whom one has the most identity
investment and transmission. A point that bears noting in the study of peer effects. Also, this sug-
gests that important groups such as families and one’s social network of friends can exert stronger
social influence than random groupings.
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2.1.2 Experimental Identity Studies in Economics
Experimental evidence indicates that social identity impacts equilibrium selection of effort.
Also, it yields both negative and positive effects on a range of outcomes as different social identi-
ties become more salient. The group, or groups, that one identifies with matters, giving weight to
the hypothesis that peer effects may matter most when there is sufficient group identity. Social
incentives are created in part through the identity effects of group membership.
Group identity appears to affect social preferences. One stream of research suggests that
this affects one’s treatment of others who are either in-group or out-group, particularly when this
may create conflict with self-interest (Chen and Li 2009). Chen and Li’s study found that par-
ticipants treated in-group members with greater charity when their payoffs were higher and less
envy when lower. Participants also exhibited greater tolerance for bad behavior from in-group than
out-group members and extended greater rewards for good behavior. An immediate application of
these points is redistribution.
Group belonging influences preferences for redistribution (Klor and Shayo 2010). Even
when wealthy Klor and Shayo’s participants voted for positive redistribution for their group when
their group is poor. When the group is rich and the individual poor, participants voted for low lev-
els of redistribution. The evidence suggests that social identity has a role in determining social pref-
erences. This in turn can impact economic outcomes. Thus, factors interacting with group identity
will be important to individual choice. A recent turn in this literature has been to study whether
there are heterogeneous effects for in-group/out-group treatment from group belonging.
The degree of group centric behavior towards an out-group exhibits heterogeneity. Kran-
ton et al. (2016) study a lab experiment in a university setting and find some participants behave
‘groupy’, supporting their own group against others. Some even acted to destroy out-group mem-
bers income at an expense to themselves, while others did not always respond to group treatment.
A set of participants responded to any group division, others only did so under a salient division—
political affiliation—, and another set did not change their treatment of others based on group di-
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vision. Kranton and Sanders (2017) explores “groupy” behavior with a larger, more representative
set of participants and find the previous results are robust. Moreover, they find that “non-groupy”
behavior does not correlate with any of the Big-Five personality traits and that “groupy” behavior
in the US appears to correlate with areas that have experienced significant negative effects from
deindustrialization.
Overall, there appears to be heterogeneity in the effect that group division has on the
treatment of out-groups. This may predict how individuals will respond differently to policy shifts
and to what degree group belonging will determine social preferences. The research on ‘groupy’
behavior also implies that some people may respond to peer effects along group divisions more
readily while others will not, creating heterogeneity in group effects. An open question, which
Kranton and Sanders (2017) point out, is whether group centric behavior becomes more impor-
tant as people feel their identity is under threat. Moreover, this research also raises a question as to
whether intervention or policy efforts to shift social incentives in networks—for instance, in a high
school network—can have unintended consequence.
Beyond how one treats in-group and out-group members, social identity affects one’s own-
outcomes. Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2007) find evidence that norms impact discount rates
or risk aversion for ethnic and racial identities. Thus, identity may influence outcomes through
economic preferences. Social identity effects arise through differing cultural structures nevertheless
they can arise as externalities. Two similar studies illustrate this point. Hoff and Pandey (2006)
travel to India and study outcomes in performance based games where a cultural identity feature—
caste standing—was made salient prior to the games and a control where it was not. They find
performance decreased for those with a low caste standing when in the treatment compared to
the control when caste standing was not announced. Afridi, Li, and Ren (2015) follow Hoff and
Pandey with a similar study design specific to cultural identity elements of migrants around Bei-
jing, China. Their results were largely consistent with Hoff and Pandey’s. Identity effects can be
both real and persistent across different cultural groups and the effects can be similar. These stud-
ies indicate that negative identity features may lead to and reinforce outcomes below ability.
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Selection of actions such as effort is yet another choice impacted by social identity in
groups. Chen and Chen (2011) find that matching people with in-group members in a multiple-
equilibria minimum effort communication game raises their effort level. Relatedly, Gioia (2017)
finds that group identity increases the strength of peer effects. Thus, not only does the group one
identifies with impact preferences and choice of effort, the peer effects become stronger when
matched with fellow in-group members. This further implies that peer effects may be missed when
we do not identify the groups that actually matter to a person.
In sum, the experimental evidence implies social identity contributes to the development
of preferences and to choices. These influences arise in varying contexts across cultural groups and
impact a variety of outcomes. The groups we belong to can create strong incentives determining
choice.
2.1.3 Secondary Data Studies of Identity in Economics
The literature studying identity in economics with secondary data is nascent but has still
covered a wide range of topics. Many of the papers focus on ethnic identities and the economic
assimilation of immigrants in a host nation. Motivating and studying peer effects from identity
theory has received less attention and may be a useful direction for new research.
Identity effects may especially impact economic outcomes through education. Prescribed
behavior for career or social orientation within social categories has an effect on educational at-
tainment and field of study (Humlum, Kleinjans, and Nielsen 2012). Humlum, Kleinjans, and
Nielsen also find that a substantial wage increase is required to compensate an individual for a
change from their prescribed career path. Though their study is descriptive, their results are con-
sistent with social identity having a role in the distribution of skills. Also, the impact of multiple
group ideals prior to young adulthood may bear strong influence on the final decision to pursue
education and particular career paths.
Important group identity incentives may impact the way one thinks about school and both
the type and level of education one pursues. Imparted educational ideals impact educational out-
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comes and in the aggregate this implies it may influence the evolution of skills for a region or na-
tion. This implication has yet to be examined by the literature. The literature has shed some light
on the impact of oppositional identities and the role of education in identity formation.
Oppositional identity formation—theoretically discussed in the literature noted previously—
appears to negatively impact educational outcomes in line with theoretical predictions. Blacks and
Hispanics in the US who perform too well in school experience negative peer externalities not
found among white students (Fryer and Torelli 2010). In the US, having a higher percentage of
same race friends increases academic performance among whites but decreases performance among
blacks, while parental education enhances the positive effect among whites and mitigates the neg-
ative effect among blacks (Patacchini and Zenou 2016). This empirical evidence is consistent with
theoretical predictions on the effects of oppositional identity formation within a group that experi-
ences discrimination.
Education policy itself may impact national level, political outcomes through identity.
Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) find, for Catalan language exposure in Spain, that years of
compulsory exposure to school instruction in Catalan increased Catalan identity and this increased
the probability of choosing a Spanish political party with a Catalan platform. In essence, they ar-
gue the language in education reform made ethnic issues more important by increasing Catalan
identity.
Kato and Shu (2016) study the role of group identity on quality of work in the presence
of workplace production incentives meant to foster competition with data from a textile firm in
China. The Chinese Hukou system systematically classifies people into a rural or urban status. Mi-
grant rural workers are known to often face discrimination and rejection from those of an urban
status. The authors document how this gives rise to a salient group identification between rural mi-
grant employees at the textile firm and their urban counterparts. Kato and Shu (2016) find that an
in-group member’s ability level had no effect on a person’s quality of work. Out-group member’s
ability level, however, had a strongly positive effect. They suggest altruism for in-group members
may weaken incentive schemes meant to create competition and improve quality of work, while
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out-group competition may enhance the incentives from such schemes. This is suggestive, though
not generalizable from Kato and Shu’s study, that the direction on the influence from group iden-
tity will vary with context.
More broadly, some secondary data evidence also supports the role of identity on payoffs
and well-being. Using a novel data set drawn from the court records of Nazi Germany, Geerling,
Magee, and Brooks (2015) study what equates to a one-shot prisoners dilemma for those accused
of high treason under very real and significant payoffs. Some people cooperated with their group
and refused information to the Gestapo at all cost. Moreover, the authors find evidence that be-
liefs, identity, and community can be important in changing payoffs such that individuals cooper-
ate rather than defect even when the stakes are truly high. On well-being, Hetschko, Knabe, and
Schöb (2014) study the effect of social identity by examining self-reported well-being changes be-
tween reported well-being of the unemployed pre-retirement age and after retirement age. If the
identity status for pre-retirement age is to work and post-retirement to not work, then they ex-
pected an increase in reported well-being for the unemployed upon retirement age. Their empirical
evidence suggests that upon reaching retirement age the unemployed experience a strong increase
in subjective well-being. These are, of course, only two results. The empirical identity literature is
nascent, but it does point to identity playing a significant role on a broad range of outcomes as its
development in theory implies.
A number of studies have focused on ethnic identities and their influence on immigrant
outcomes in Europe. Current empirical studies support hypotheses around ethnic identities af-
fecting economics outcomes and the impact of immigrants’ acculturation as an important factor in
their outcomes (Casey and Dustmann 2010; Constant and Zimmermann 2008; Bisin et al. 2010;
Bisin et al. 2011a; Berry et al. 2006; Schüller 2015; Zimmermann, Constant, and Schüller 2014).
Many of these studies have focused on immigrants in Germany and it is not clear whether the re-
sults are generalizable. I focus only on those related to education and labor market outcomes.
In brief, immigrant parents are important in the formation of their children’s identity and
their educational and labor market outcomes. For immigrants in Germany, parents have been
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found to be important in the formation of their children’s identity, and some evidence points to
positive labor market effects from home nation identity for immigrant children that may relate to
ethnic network effects (Casey and Dustmann 2010). German identity for immigrants, working
mostly through mothers, appears to have positive effects on educational outcomes for the children,
while for fathers it is minority identity transmission that has some positive effects on education po-
tentially through improving self-esteem (Schüller 2015). Stronger ethnic identity in the aggregate,
however, has some negative effects on the labor market outcomes of immigrants in Europe (Bisin
et al. 2011a). Bisin et al. (2011a) also find that host nation labor market policies promoting flexi-
ble labor markets can mitigate the negative effect of ethnic identity, except when it is very strong.
Social groups and identity incentives appear to be important to a range of outcomes. The
strength of those incentives may be quite high, though the literature cannot yet quantify and pre-
dict just how high and when they are most pertinent. The early work in empirical identity eco-
nomics indicates that beliefs, identity, and community form strong incentives for educational deci-
sions, to the decision to stay loyal to one’s group at all cost, to the production of well-being, and to
labor market outcomes.
2.2 Review of the Skill Development Literature
Skill development is not merely cognitive. Noncognitive skill development matters too.
Moreover, environments and investments at different points of the life cycle matter to the devel-
opment of cognitive and noncognitive skill. Noncognitive skill encompasses a wide array of char-
acteristics, or traits, that develop over time rather than existing as fixed points. Below I note what
we have learned from this literature. An understanding of the influence noncognitive development
has on later life outcomes, will open a richer framework to explore the lasting influence of groups
and social identity at various life stages. These lessons have yet to be combined, which is, in part,
the point of this paper.
Character and personality traits that may be considered soft skills, or noncognitive skills,
are highly important and, until relatively recently, were often overlooked in the assessment of skill
19
development. Soft skills get returns in the labor market and they are, in general, associated with
future life success (Heckman and Kautz 2012). As noted in the introduction, these skills have
been found to consist of perseverance, impulse control, trust, self-efficacy, empathy, motivation,
goal setting, and many more (Heckman and Kautz 2014). Some of these deal with how well one
can control themselves and others relate to the very attitudes one forms about activities such as
work and education. During early life, cognitive and noncognitive skills are developing together.
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), however, find it is important to consider them separately, as
measures of cognitive skill—IQ tests and achievement scores—fail to capture the role of noncogni-
tive skills in determining future wages and a number of other life outcomes.
Heckman (2008) make the point that research on human development indicates it is a
mistake to see nature versus nurture as mutually exclusive. The two are overlapping arenas that
produce abilities. The context of abilities that affect future outcomes in both education and other
areas is explicitly plural rather than the singular focus on achievement test scores that has become
the measuring stick by which many teachers are graded. C. K. Jackson (2012) finds that a noncog-
nitive ability factor associated with a 9th grade teacher effect was important to high-school com-
pletion and college attendance and explained a significant amount of variability that test scores
did not. Achievement test scores explain only a small part of the variance in long-term outcomes,
while character traits are important to educational, labor market, and criminality outcomes among
others as well (Heckman and Kautz 2014).
Noncognitive skills are just as important as cognitive skills. Heckman and Mosso (2014)
discuss broad evidence from the literature on skill development that show noncognitive skills sup-
port cognitive skills. Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013) examine the mechanisms through
which the Perry Preschool program impacted adult outcomes focusing on the channels of cog-
nition, externalizing behaviors, and academic motivation. The Perry program was an early inter-
vention (begun at age 3) targeted at disadvantaged children in an African-American community.
It aimed to assist with the development of cognitive and noncognitive skills, and it followed up
with both those who were enrolled, and a control group who were not, until age 40. The effects
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were significant reductions in future criminal activity, poor health behaviors, and more positive
labor market outcomes. Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013) find that the strongest effects ran
through a reduction in externalizing behaviors—aggression, being antisocial, and rule-breaking.
While IQ was not strongly affected in the long-run, achievement test scores and academic motiva-
tion increased. The program increased life success for the treated even though cognition was not a
large part of the gains.
A literature has emerged tearing down notions of skill fixed by genetics. This literature
highlights the role of environments throughout the life-cycle in developing both cognitive and
noncognitive skill sets that are vital for academic and life success. For disadvantaged children, in-
tervention costs rise with age because effectively shifting skills becomes more difficult (Heckman
2008). Earlier interventions may be able to target both cognitive development and character traits
that are valuable in the labor market but after the age of 10 IQ becomes stable, while character and
personality are still malleable throughout the teenage and young adult years (Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach 2010; Heckman and Mosso 2014). Economic inequalities can arise and persist
through the existence of inequalities in early life that shape a person’s skill sets (Heckman and
Kautz 2014). Gaps in skill open early and effects from genes are correlated with environments
pointing to the conclusion that better environments correspond with better genetic outcomes,
thus educational outcomes may partly be a result of inherited environments (Heckman and Mosso
2014). The literature, however, has yet to ask how early life developments can sort one into differ-
ing group identities that may improve or worsen trajectories for later life outcomes.
The earlier the intervention the more effective environmental shaping from the interven-
tion can be, as the period for trait development is longer. Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016) eval-
uates age at time of move effects from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment. This ex-
periment randomly assigned some families a voucher to move out of a low-poverty area. Moving
prior to the age of 13, compared to those 13 and older, was found to have significant effects on
future economic outcomes. These outcomes include earnings, college attendance, college quality,
and neighborhood quality. Furthermore, they find the effect of treament dimished for every year
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older at the time of the move. These findings are in harmony with those of Chetty and Hendren
(2015) who study families moving over US counties. Their work finds children moving to bet-
ter counties—on economic and social measures—experienced increasing improvements in future
outcomes for every year of exposure. More specific to skills, (Cunha and Heckman 2008) show
that both cognitive and noncognitive skill development during childhood is dynamic. Both sets of
skills developed during very early life have some influence on their production later in childhood.
However, cognitive skills become set much sooner than the noncognitive and it appears to be the
noncognitive skills that remain the most malleable for the longest. Thus, interventions affecting
noncognitive skills early in life have a longer follow up for their dynamic influence to continue
building these skills.
A deeper look at skill development unveils the importance of the family and surrounding
environments to the production of multiple abilities. Disadvantaged families have less resources.
Less resources applied to child development can hinder both cognitive and noncognitive develop-
ment (Heckman 2008). The disadvantage is thereby reinforced potentially creating traps difficult
to escape.
Family resources as a source of disadvantage are not merely represented by credit con-
straints. Long-term credit constraints may play some role in development, as it diminishes the
ability for investments later in the child’s life, but family income is likely to capture a variety of
environmental effects such as parental ability, education, and peers that can strongly effect the de-
velopment of skills (Heckman and Mosso 2014). This point foreshadows my broader suggestion
that groups and identity play a role in skill development and that peer effects will inform us how
such development may spread over social networks. Family effects may build noncognitive charac-
teristics that then flow over a network through social interaction effects. However, this remains to
be explored.
Heckman (2008) indicate that disadvantaged children often face the most negative envi-
ronments with regard to parental health behaviors and that less educated mothers give less time to
activities for their children’s learning enrichment. Heckman and Mosso (2014) point out research
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that finds mothers of a socio-economic disadvantage typically underestimate the impact of invest-
ing in child development. Also, Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2013) find evidence that maternal
education impacts cognitive skill and especially behavioral problems, implying children of poorly
educated mothers may develop skill disadvantages over time.
Time inputs to a child’s development are highly important. Maternal time inputs to chil-
dren’s development during early childhood positively affects cognitive and noncognitive skills, ef-
fects that show persistence into later periods (Bono et al. 2016). Time investments into children
by both parents have been found to play significant roles in cognitive development. These roles ap-
pear to diminish with the age of the child highlighting the importance of early life developmental
inputs (Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall 2014). Furthermore, some research has emerged that indicates
brain development is dramatically diminished if a child experiences social and intellectual neglect
early in their life (Heckman 2008).
Given the importance of early life environments and the continued malleability of per-
sonality and character traits through adolescences, models with only two periods of human devel-
opment miss critical junctures in the life cycle (Cunha and Heckman 2007). Theoretical predic-
tions which take into account more than two periods along with the empirical evidence suggest
investments and endowments are dynamic complements and even substitutes at a very early age
(Heckman and Mosso 2014). Early investments complement with endowments to magnify the
development of skill sets in later periods of childhood. This implies the timing of investments is
important. Parental skill in timing investments to their children’s development at critical points
can establish intergenerational links in skill sets even without serious long-term credit constraints
(Heckman and Mosso 2014). Long term constraints compound the disadvantage.
Later life investments and interventions are less effective at skill development, but this
does not mean it is too late for those who lacked early life investments. Adolescent interventions
can help re-gain some of what is lost because of early childhood disadvantage (Heckman and
Mosso 2014). Heckman and Mosso particularly point out that successful interventions are ones
which support personality and character trait skill development—such as discipline and confidence—
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through mentorship, guidance, and offering information. Additionally and importantly, they note
that those interventions must not bore or discourage. Furthermore, Sampson (2016) argues that
institutional responses play a role in the worsening or improvement of gaps in anti-social and
socio-emotional skills. Early life disadvantage can produce poor noncognitive skill among ado-
lescents. Behaviors during adolescence caused by these developed skills lead to a response by insti-
tutions that can worsen the trajectory or reinforce the noncognitive disadvantage. Young adult de-
velopment then follows a similar process. He argues that while the emphasis on early life interven-
tions is surely appropriate, it is not necessarily too late to intervene much later in life. It remains
for empirical studies to test for causal effects from later life interventions or from policy shifts in
institutional responses.
In sum, the literature on noncognitive skill suggests that characteristics and traits are mal-
leable through the adolescent period and that the development of these skills have important influ-
ence on a variety of life outcomes. While much of the focus from a policy perspective has been
to suggest early life intervention, it is also apparent that during adolescence a variety of inputs
may affect noncognitive characteristics that form beliefs, attitudes and traits. These may then be
passed to surrounding group members or from those members. Families for one and peers for
another may play roles in this story. The evolution of ideals for action and skills of surrounding
group members will then be important to the noncognitive development process. Peer effects on
networks may help us understand how such skills spread or even create resistance to interventions
seeking to divert their trajectories.
2.3 Review of the Peer Effects Literature
The peer effects literature is an extensive literature. I will not attempt a comprehensive
review.1 Identification issues have been formidable, but the literature is gaining ground towards
the identification of peer effects on different dimensions. There are two emerging areas of work
that have not been directly pointed out. One asks whether there are peer effects at clearly divisible
1. See Epple and Romano (2011) and Sacerdote (2014) for extensive reviews.
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grouping levels such as a dorm, a classroom, or class. This may be of interest on two related fronts:
do peer effects at these levels exist and can policy manipulate groupings to improve outcomes. The
second area explores peer effects along lines where group identification is more distinct such as
nominated friends or groupings along salient identity features—common in the experimental lit-
erature. The policy implications may be less about manipulation and more about understanding
whether social interaction effects create spillovers and how these channels can be used to effec-
tively diffuse information. This literature is also more closely linked with a literature in network
theory.
It is not clear whether these two areas of peer effect studies are measuring the same type of
group effects. Moreover, when studies of the first type fail to find peer effects it is rarely discussed
whether this is evidence against peer effects or for the lack of group identification. Both types of
studies provide useful insight. How they relate and do not should be clearly identified.
The study of peer effects within the first type—as I have defined it—can be sorted into
sets. Sacerdote (2014) presents the following: studies exploring an exogenous shift of peoples from
an event or policy (for example Hurricane Katrina or the Boston METCO program), studies that
take advantage of random variation across cohorts within a school, random assignment of college
roommates or dormmates, and designed experiments. Sacerdote provides a review of the findings
in each of these arenas of study. To summarize, peer effects appear to exist; however, the literature
does not yet offer a consensus on how these effects vary by context, which peers matter the most
and when, and what outcomes are truly impacted by peers. Many studies find no effects from av-
erage peer ability on test scores, while some do. Non-linear peer effects do appear to exist, such as
differing influence from peers across the ability distribution, but we are still not clear on precisely
how to take advantage of this or whether this result differs by context. One example of this het-
erogeneity is evidence that high ability students benefit from high ability peers but low ability stu-
dents are hindered by high ability peers. Additionally, behavioral and social outcomes consistently
return stronger peer effects.
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Sacerdote (2014) also provides a thorough discussion of the identification challenges, and
the various strategies implemented in this literature. Self-selection into groups, neighborhoods,
schools, and the like poses a challenge to causal inference from any correlation between a person’s
outcomes and the groups they belong to. This point is likely even more concerning for studies
based on salient group identification. Manski (1993) presented peer effects in three components:
correlated effects from shared environments or similar characteristics among peers, contextual ef-
fects from peer backgrounds, and endogenous effects from peer outcomes. The presence of cor-
related effects introduces an identification problem. Additionally, Manksi illustrated that in the
classic linear-in-means model the endogenous effect cannot be separated from the contextual ef-
fects even in the absence of correlated effects (the well known “reflection” problem). This does not
necessarily hold in models of non-linear peer effects.
The “reflection problem” results from lack of variation in groups. When individual’s in
the data all share the same group, or are split between a small number of groups, the peer means
entering the linear-in-means specification do not vary. Most studies, as a result, have focused on
attempts to identify the reduced form peer effect (endogenous and contextual effects combined)
from the correlated effects. Lee (2007a) and Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) show that
we can break the “reflection problem” when there is sufficient variation in peer group means. The
central insight here is that when group means do not vary much a collinearity problem arises yield-
ing the “reflection problem”. This has prompted more work with network based data and studies
of the second type discussed above. Other concerns with estimating peer effects include measure-
ment error and peer group selection.
Measurement error is another threat to the estimation of peer effects. Angrist (2014) in-
dicates that in the case of peer effects measurement error can actually result in an upward bias, or
overestimation. Feld and Zölitz (2017) highlight, in the context of ability, that the upward bias
derives from mismeasured ability, implying not only is own-ability mismeasured but so to is peer
ability. When group assignment is “systematic”, measurment error generates an overestimation
of peer effects when, for example, individuals group together by ability. Feld and Zölitz extend
26
Angrist’s intution to show that when group assignment is random correlation in ability by group-
ing will be zero. In the random assignment case, measurement error in ability creates the classical
measurement error problem and leads to peer effect estimates that are attenuated.
Individual characteristics may lead to groupings that will drive upward bias in the peer ef-
fects even in the presence of a random sorting at some level (such as the class). Feld and Zölitz
(2017) study peer effects on grades among students at a university in the Netherlands who were
assigned randomly to sections within a course. Course selection, however, was nonrandom poten-
tially resulting in groupings at the course level. They eliminate upward measurement error bias by
controlling for course fixed effects, which they note removes correlation between individual abili-
ties that may result from the course level grouping. Their empirical results found a significant but
quite small positive peer effect. They also found that low ability students were actually hindered by
high ability peers. This study fits within my first grouping of peer effect studies. It further suggests
manipulation of groupings where group identification may not hold will not result in any economi-
cally significant results, at least on the average.
The second type of peer effect studies typically employ spatial models with network data.
Beginning with an assumption of exogenous network formation, spatial models and network data
break-down the non-linearity introduced by including a spatial lag of the dependent variable and/or
a correlation component in the error term and return the structural parameters (Lee 2007a and
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009). Estimators in the spatial literature have been developed
with quasi-maximum likelihood, GMM, and two stage least squares (see Kelejian and Prucha
(1998), Lee (2003), Lee (2004) Lee (2007b), and Kelejian and Prucha (2010) for examples and
more information). Linear dependence between endogenous and contextual effects is broken when
there exist sets of individual’s who share links but are not linked to each other (Bramoullé, Djeb-
bari, and Fortin 2009). The more variation there is in the peer reference groups the stronger the
identification.
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) formally develop the use of peers of peers in net-
work data as instruments for the endogenous peer effect. The network architecture provides the
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identification restrictions, whereby peers of peers influence a person only through their influence
on that person’s direct peers. Although, a concern is that identification rests on mathematical
structure and assumptions, which may or may not hold (Sacerdote 2014). Moreover, Blume, Brock,
and Durlauf (2015) shows that for an assumption of exogenous network formation knowledge of
who is not linked together in a network is key to identification and when this condition is met
identification holds. Of course, this information may be unobserved, even with friendship nomi-
nations, and peer effect estimates with the observed nominations may result in peer group selec-
tion effects. Put another way unobserved correlated effects resulting from self-selection into peer
groups—or endogenous network formation—and shared environments still render an identifica-
tion problem for spatial models applied to peer effects.
Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) introduce a spatial model that controls for group level fixed ef-
fects (shared environments) and controls for the spatial correlation in the error terms. They sug-
gest controlling for this correlation may capture variation due to omitted variables representing the
peer group selection process. However, we cannot know for sure that it captures all such variation,
rather they suggest it as step in the right direction. Lin (2010) uses their method with data from
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) to study linear-in-
mean peer effects in grade point average.
Add Health provides friendship nominations in schools. This allows constructing school
networks that capture both direct and indirect links to an individual. It also means that the peer
group varies by individual and is the group an adolescent claims to identify with, rather than a
group they are assumed to interact within. Of course, in this context peer selection is an even
greater problem. Lin (2010) finds strong peer effects from average peer school performance. Her
result applies to a small set of peers whom one identifies with. If one believes her estimates, then
peer effects may be strong from the individuals who matter to the person. This fits with the exper-
imental findings of Gioia (2017), covered previously, who finds peer effects to be stronger when
from a group a person identifies with.
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A number of peer effect studies have explored the Add Health data. Calvo–Armengol
and Jackson (2009) test game theoretic predictions around the Bonanich-Katz centrality (measure
of network centrality incorporating both direct and indirect links) that provide a profile of Nash
Equilibrium. They use self-reported high school grade point average, finding evidence positive
peer effects increasing in one’s centrality. Keeping with the education theme, Patachini, Rainone,
and Zenou (2016) find evidence of long lasting peer effects on educational attainment with the
Add Health data. Moreover, they take advantage of follow-up peer nominations collected in the
second wave for a small subset of the data, showing that it is the long-term peers who matter for
long-term effects.
Risky behaviors too have also been studied with Add Health data. Lin (2015), using the
econometric estimator in Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010), finds a positive relationship for adolescents
between own action and peers’ actions regarding risky behaviors such as alcohol consumption and
drug use. She also tests multiple iterations of defining peers by exploring a reciprocity assumption2
and taking advantage of questions about the frequency of activities with each nominated friend.
She finds consistently that peer effects from nominated friends are strongest and return the best fit
of the data. Fortin and Yazbeck (2015) use spatial methods to model peer effects in fast food con-
sumption, finding evidence for social multiplier effects in fast food consumption. Ajilore (2015)
uses spatial methods to explore peer effects from nominated peers on risky sexual behaviors, find-
ing a positive relationship.
Endogenous network formation still lurks in the background as a potential problem with
interpreting peer effects in studies with network data. A number of recent econometric papers
have suggested methods to better address network formation (Auerbach 2016; Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens 2013; Hsieh and Lee 2016; Johnsson and Moon 2015). These studies attempt to es-
tablish peer effect estimates with network data free of selection bias by jointly modeling the link
2. The reciprocity assumption assumes a link for persion i to person k if k nominates i regardless of whether i nomi-
nated person k or not.
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decision between individuals (nodes) and the peer effect. In practice, some of these estimators can
be computationally burdensome, especially in the first step, and limit the sample selection.
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2016) establish identifica-
tion under parametric modeling. The general principal is to control out unobservable determi-
nants of social-link selection and the outcome being studied. With Add Health data and friend-
ship nominations defining the peer group, (Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens 2013) do not find
evidence of bias from network formation on the peer effect from school grades. (Hsieh and Lee
2016), using the same data, do find some upward bias in the peer effect; however, they still find
significant and positive peer effects from peer grades that are entirely consistent with the model
assuming exogenous network formation. Their model is computationally intensive and places a
number of restrictions on the data potentially limiting its practical use. Another potential limita-
tion, is that underlying the Hsieh and Lee approach is an assumption on the joint normality of
the errors between the network link model and the outcome model of peer effects. Hasselt (2011)
shows that in the case of the classic sample selection model results can differ substantially when
departures from joint normality are accounted for.
Recently, two new approaches for estimating peer effects with social network data have
developed non-parametric methods. Johnsson and Moon (2015) allow the functional form of un-
observables entering the peer effect model to be unspecified and fitted by the data, thus they avoid
the assumption of joint-normality in Hsieh and Lee (2016). They establish a semi-parametric
two-stage estimator that utilizes a non-parametric estimation of the control function entering the
second stage estimation of peer effects. Thus, the second stage is conditioned upon the unobserv-
able fixed effect that determines link formation in a flexible manner. Additionally, they estabalish
asymptotic results for the estimator. Their identification assumptions are still parametric in na-
ture. Auerbach (2016) takes a fully non-parametric approach to identification, establishing iden-
tification in a matching type estimator based on matching pairs of individuals who have a similar
distribution of network links. One potential limitation, which he points out, is that his estimator
performs better with denser networks.
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In general, the evidence in the literature suggests that peer effects do matter and that they
matter more for social behaviors than test scores, while the strength of peer effects is not clearly
established. There is still more work to be done before we can use the peer effects literature as a
guide for policy (Sacerdote 2014).
Overall, studies using nominated friendships to establish the peer group networks point
towards strong peer effects emananting from peers one actually identifies with. A new area of
research is to directly deal with the possible confounding influence from endogenous network
formation in peer effect estimation. This approach requires carefully dealing with the determi-
nants of network formation. The early results suggest that peer effects indeed matter—at least on
school performance—after controlling for unobservables related to network formation (Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Imbens 2013; Hsieh and Lee 2016). The estimators to this point have a number of
limitations. New semi- and non-parametric estimators have recently been introduced to relax cer-
tain assumptions crucial to identification made in the previous attempts to handle endogenous net-
work formation. However, we do not yet know how well these estimators can be applied to actual
research questions and what results they will return.
Overall, the literature accounting for endogenous network formation is very young. It
first requires adequate estimation of group formation. An emerging area of study is to empirically
focus directly on the network formation process (Graham 2015). Estimation challenges can be
substantial and a fair amount of theoretical econometric work is still to be done. However, given
the myriad problems and difficulty with interpreting peer effects, the literature to some extent has
placed the cart before the horse. Without a better understanding on how social networks actually
form in varying contexts, it will be difficult to do much, from a policy standpoint, with our current
evidence on peer effects for outcomes of interest.
2.4 Research Questions and Discussion
I put forward a set of questions and directions from a synthesis of the identity, skill de-
velopment, and peer effect literatures. Do family and peer effects interact as differing group influ-
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ence in ways that combine or compete? Do social group effects create lasting influences? If so, is
it through creation of beliefs or a production of lasting characteristics? Finally, under what condi-
tions are peer effects truly generated?
Policy recommendations have been made in the skill development literature but we are not
there yet in the identity and peer effect literatures. As Sacerdote (2014) points out, the safe move
may be to use what we learn in interventions that attempt to impact non-treated social-network
members through social links with the treated. This still requires a better understanding of how
spillovers actually spread over networks and moveble dimensions generate spillovers on outcomes
of interest. I suggest that research drawing from the three main literatures discussed in this paper
is a step in that direction. Because of the malleability of noncognitive skills during childhood and
adolescence, identity, skill development, and peer effects will be overlapping sets during these pe-
riods. Understanding how all three work and interact will better our ability to construct workable
interventions that take advantage of existing channels of social effects.
Family and peer effects may interact through identity incentives and create effects that
spillover through a peer network. This process is likely important during childhood and adoles-
cence. It can create social incentives affecting choices. It may also play a role in building non-
cognitive skills that become lasting traits.
Family background itself is known to be one of the most important factors explaining
children’s educational attainment, but there are still significant gaps in our knowledge of what
composes those effects (Björklund and Salvanes 2011). The skill development literature suggests
that early childhood parental investments matter. These investments are often very ad hoc indexes
formed from questions such as the number of books in the home (Cunha and Heckman 2008;
Todd and Wolpin 2007). More work can be done to explore varying types of parental effort in skill
development, such as transmission of beliefs, in-school involvement, in-home involvement, and
heterogeneity in types of investments across socio-economic and cultural groups.
Peers form networks, such as a social network within a school or neighborhood. Where
peer influence exists, changes in family ideals and investments in child development may spillover
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in the network. Therefore, family identity incentives can be magnified through a school social
space in the presence of peer effects running across social links.
There is some early evidence in the literature consistent with an interaction of family and
peer effects. Avvisati et al. (2014) test the treatment effects of an experiment among disadvantaged
Parisian schools. Treated parents came to the school for a series of trainings that attempted to bet-
ter their ability to guide their children and to improve their attitudes about the school. They found
children of treated parents experienced positive treatment effects on a range of outcomes and that
untreated children in the same classroom experienced positive indirect effects. Fruehwirth (2016)
studies spillovers from parental education at the classroom level among elementary school students.
She finds that spillovers from peer parental education exist and differ by parental educational level
and across math and reading skill acquisition. Furthermore, she finds that classroom practices by
teachers may be sensitive to parental involvement in ways that vary by parental educational level.
In turn, this affects all the children in the classroom, though not necessary to the benefit of all
types of children in the class.
Family influence may impact the child (or adolescent) and indirectly impact the social
links of the child. A research question is whether interventions which work with both families and
peer groups on a similar treatment will generate even stronger effects by taking advantage of the
social channels between both groups. Alternatively, efforts in one sub-group of the network may
work to generate more divisions and opposing identities rather than positive spillovers throughout.
This combination of interventions between families and peers may be especially pertinent
if affecting one group will only place them in conflict with another group. The intervention may
still yield positive benefits, but the conflict may weaken the positive impacts or even reduce them
to zero. The theoretical identity literature predicts that oppositional identities are salient in the
face of tradeoffs—for example, when adopting the majority norms requires giving up the minor-
ity norms. Therefore, any intervention working with one group must consider how the changes it
proposes may be mitigated if those changes run counter to competing group identity influence.
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Social identity incentives are determined by the groups one identifies with. Families may
transmit ideals for action. Once in a peer group, peers may transmit ideals for action. This joint be-
longing may combine or compete and create utility incentives to conform with each group. The
empirical identity literature indicates that group identity can exert influence on a multitude of
choices from effort to risky behaviors to treatment of others and more. The skill development lit-
erature indicates that skill gaps open early in both congitive and noncognitive abilities, that cogni-
tive abilities become set by age 10 but noncogntive abilities remain malleable much longer, and
that both types of skill impact later life outcomes. The peer effects literature indicates, though
still fuzzy on the details, that peers exert influence and that influence appears strongest on social
choices rather than test scores. The groups one belongs to yield social utility incentives for behav-
ior that for children and adolescents take place during a time of cognitive and noncognitive skill
development.
Something as simple as attitudes and beliefs about the benefits of education may play a
role in determining choice of effort and building noncognitive traits, such as the “grit” that Heck-
man and his colleagues speak so much of. Whether interventions can target skill-development
through targeting attitudes, beliefs, and ideals within groups is an open question for future re-
search. Conversely, it may be that interventions can target identity conforming incentives from
attitudes, beliefs, and ideals by targeting noncognitive skill development. Do social groups, how-
ever, create lasting influences?
Lasting influence from social groups may work through forming beliefs that carry over
into later periods, development of noncognitive skills that affect one’s productivity, and the net-
works one has to draw upon for jobs and support. Patachini, Rainone, and Zenou (2016) connect
their study of long term peer effects on educational attainment to the formation of beliefs on the
returns to education within groups based on the information available to the group. This forma-
tion of beliefs impacts educational choices for an individual in the group, which then impacts final
educational attainment.
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Given the lessons from the skill development literature on the malleability of skills, so-
cial groups may influence the production of skills. Once skills become more or less set, the skill
development literature provides evidence that they influence later life economic outcomes. So-
cial groups during childhood and adolescence may generate lasting effects through cognitive and
noncognitive skill development. Under this hypothesis, effectively controlling for skills in the im-
portant social groups should capture some of the family and peer effects on later life outcomes, if
any exist. Theory tangentially consistent with this stems from Buechel, Hellmann, and Pichler
(2014) and Calvo–Armengol and Jackson (2009) who model how networks are highly important
in the passage of cultural traits across generations. Agents who gain benefits from passing on cer-
tain traits have incentives to strengthen ties with some networks and not with others. The network
provides a plethora of benefits potentially making it difficult for the individual to select opposing
traits.
Networks provide information on jobs and resources to rely upon. Letki and Mieri (2015)
empirically find evidence indicating even resource poor networks provide greater benefits than be-
ing isolated. Also, they find that those of a lower socio-economic standing rely more heavily on
their networks despite the fact that their networks are resource poor. In a broad literature review,
Perkins, Subramanian, and Christakis (2015) suggest networks create avenues for spreading be-
liefs, behaviors, and emotions along with financial help, job opportunities, information, and other
community resources. Thus, social groups may create lasting influence through the provision of the
network resources an individual can draw upon.
Whether and how social groups create lasting causal influence remains an open question.
Future work can draw from the literature reviewed here and study affects on later life outcomes
from formation of beliefs, the malleability of skills, and the resources a network provides. How
interventions are best targeted may depend on which of these channels is salient in a given con-
text. Efforts to improve information on returns to education may alter beliefs developed in groups.
Efforts to improve skill development may need to take all of the important social groups into con-
sideration to be effective and consider institutional responses to behaviors (Sampson 2016). Ef-
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forts to shift the basic set of resources available to networks may be able to alter long-term net-
work effects. Research on each of these points is needed to draw any conclusions on the effective-
ness of each channel. For network resources, positive shifts may dynamically interact with the de-
velopment of beliefs and skills in the network, implying positive network resource shifts may be
dynamic complements with later period interventions focused on network level information and
noncognitive development.
Finally, under what conditions are peer effects generated? Studies using network data use
very small peer groups of nominated friends. At the larger group level, class or cohort, effects from
norm transmission may be small or even non-existent, if only the specific groups one identifies
with matter. This may imply that the linear-in-mean peer effect models will not be useful as a
guide at higher levels of group specification. Moreover, coupled with lessons from the identity
literature on group identity effects, it may also indicate that random assignment into groups will
fail to generate strong peer effects unless actual group identification forms between people in the
group. This also makes it difficult to compare peer effect studies using salient group identification
with the literature exploring peer effects at the dorm, class, or course level.
Group level peer effects, at say the classroom or course level, may mask the impact from a
few individuals that a person bonds with. Future studies implementing random group assignment
should consider whether sufficient conditions for group bonding are met. When they are not, lit-
tle in the way of peer effects may be generated. This implication casts doubt on the usefulness of
manipulating peer groups as a policy mechanism for improving outcomes, at least without first un-
derstanding how social links are formed and which social links actually matter. More research on
these topics is needed to provide any policy relevant insights.
2.5 Final Remarks on the Literature
I have reviewed the literature in identity economics, skill development, and peer effects
and drawn from them to motivate several research questions. Do family and peer effects form in-
fluences that can combine or compete? Do social group effects create lasting influences? And, if
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so, what mechanisms can the current literature motivate as possible channels for lasting group
influences? Finally, under what conditions are peer effects generated? I put forward as potential
channels of lasting group influence the creation of beliefs, groups as inputs to skill development,
and network resources. Moreover, the literature will benefit from exploring how these channels
may dynamically interact. I also relate the lessons from the identity literature with the peer effects
literature to discuss how peer effect studies using networks and those using group assignment at
the dorm, classroom, or some other level relate. It is not clear at this time whether substantial peer
effects are generated unless one identifies with the group. Further understanding of these points is
needed for any relevant policy considerations.
The evidence in the literature does point toward social groups, especially for children and
adolescents, as important contributors to life outcomes. Incentives can be monetary and social,
where the social incentives stem from the most important groups in one’s life. Social incentives
develop as rational responses over multiple periods that can impact choices in ways that are seem-
ingly irrational if we neglect the social component. Skill development, cognitive and noncogni-
tive, during childhood and adolescence is highly important to later life outcomes. Families have
been shown to have a role. Peers may too but we need to explore this question in more detail. The
study of peer effects is broad, difficult, but making progress. Social behaviors tend to exhibit the
strongest peer effects. And, the evidence suggests that groups one actually identifies with tend to
generate strong effects. Bringing together insights from across these literatures is a step towards a
more cohesive picture on the determinants of development and overall life outcomes.
This dissertation delves into the role of families and peers for schooling attitudes and per-
formance among adolescents. Because non-cognitive skills are malleable these attitudes will be
shapeable and affected by the development of these non-cognitive skills. To the extent that fam-
ilies and peers influence skill formation, the identity literature provides a framework to consider
how such incentives are passed about and spread over school networks social link to social link.




A THEORY OF IDENTITY FOR CHOICE UNDER COMPETING INCENTIVES
In this chapter, I consider a theoretical model of conflict between personal identity and
group identity and then build on that to model two group identity inputs that may combine or
compete. The first is a model of social interaction where a concept of location in reference to one’s
group may impact choices through consumption of goods produced in the network and identity.
The model is a generalized model that links to both the identity economics literature and the net-
work economics literature investigating the role of peer effects and network structure on choices.
The individual is motivated by social interaction corresponding to how close or far away they are
from the group. Identity here is similar to the concept developed by Akerlof and Kranton in a se-
ries of papers showing how actions by the individual and those around them may affect the agent’s
sense of self and yield outcomes not apparent from traditional economic models lacking social
preferences (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2002, 2005). I show that the consumption benefits from
goods produced in the network and the identity effect can work together or in opposition. When
they work together, the incentives to be close to one’s group are strong, and when they are in op-
position, the individual faces a trade-off between the consumption and identity utility. This result
develops how a constraint can exist from the interplay between social groups, or networks, and per-
sonal tastes.
The second theoretical development builds on the potential personal/group identity con-
flict and considers a model of two group identity influences. This model is applied specifically to
adolescents and focuses on family and peer effects for choice of effort in school. Furthermore, I
draw from the skill development literature to include the role of a malleable trait, attitudes about
school, on effort in school and for families and peers in producing it. The empirical analyses of
this dissertation is focused on testing implications that are tied to the second theory development.
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Overall, the theory in this chapter as a whole continues the goal, began in the previous chapter, of
drawing from the identity, skill development, and network literature to motivate and explore new
hypotheses and research questions.
Drawing from both the peer effects and identity theory literature, I assume as one draws
closer to their group the pressure to conform to the prescribed actions for the individual’s assigned
social category become stronger. So, the individual who is closer to their group conforms their
actions by these prescriptions or else loses their consumption benefit of goods produced in the net-
work. Further, in the first model application I allow the individual to agree or disagree with those
prescriptions. In cases where one disagrees, the trade-off is between a positive marginal utility of
network consumption from moving closer to the group and the negative marginal identity utility
as increasing closeness implies conformity to the prescribed actions. In the second model of two
group influences, neither group must agree in the ideals transmitted.
The model suggests that even when an agent disagrees with the actions prescribed for
them by their group they may still remain close to the group and follow the actions prescribed,
when they would do otherwise absent their group. This result can lead to poor outcomes in situa-
tions where the group takes part in risky health behaviors, incentivizes low academic achievement,
and the like. Agents derive strong benefits from their social group surroundings and when strong
enough these benefits assimilate the individual to the behaviors consistent with the groups ideals.
Moreover, this suggests interventions designed to reach a target audience may, at times, find will-
ing receipts but for whom it is ineffective without taking the significant group in their life into
consideration. Likewise, the two group identity model suggests that taking the important groups
to an adolescent into account is important for any program aimed at motivating better attitudes
and effort in school.
Although the model in this section is simple and very general it unveils a potential con-
straint between networks and identity. The scarce resource is both the benefits one gains from
their peer groups, not available for purchase on a traditional market, and the production of one’s
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sense of self constrained by the interplay of personal characteristics and social assignments by the
group surrounding the individual.
3.1 Base Model Introduction
The base model is simply ui = ui(Xi, Ii) where the choice of closeness to the individual’s
social group gi produces both inputs. Let identity be Ii = Ii(gi,γi; ϵip) and suppose gi to be a
loosely defined, continuous measure of closeness to one’s group, γi is an individual specific vector
of any parameters impacting identity payoffs and ϵip represents whether an agent personally agrees
or disagrees with the assignment of social category and prescription for actions from their social
group. Let the network consumption good from interaction in the individual’s group be Xi =
Xi(gi,γi). These goods could be simply the company of other people, ethnic language, the safety
of community trust, and more. The following identifying assumptions are made on utility: ∂ui∂Xi >
0, ∂2ui
∂X2i
< 0, ∂ui∂Ii > 0,
∂2ui
∂I2i
< 0, which along with the continuity of gi implies utility is a well
behaved continuously differentiable function.
The interplay between personal preferences and social directions for action defined as
ϵip =

0 if i disagrees with category assignment and prescriptions
1 if i agrees.
Let gi ∈ [0, ḡ] be bounded from below by 0 and above by ḡ such that 0 implies having left the
group altogether and ḡ being as close to one’s group as possible. This insures solutions exist for all
cases and is sensible since one cannot increase their physical or mental closeness to others without
limit. The marginal impact of a change in gi on X is assumed to always be positive with diminish-
ing returns, so ∂Xi∂gi > 0 and
∂2Xi
∂g2i
< 0. The further one moves away from the group, the less one is
able to gain such benefits.









< 0. When ϵip = 0, then as agent i increases gi I decreases at
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an increasing rate so let ∂Ii∂gi
∣∣∣
ϵip=0




< 0. Agents who agree with their groups
norms and assignment of actions gain identity utility by moving closer to the network in some
space be it physical, time, or some other frame of reference up to some optimum. For agents who
do not agree, then moving closer to the network in some space lowers their identity utility, while
this agent still receives the increase in the consumption benefit X . Thus, they face a trade-off be-
tween I and X and their choice of g will depend on this relationship. Living apart from the net-
work would allow achieving a strong sense of self through making actions consistent with their
personal preferences available to them but would result in the loss of social consumption benefits,
or social identity. This loss of X can be understood as simply the requirement of X to be produced
by closeness or may be restated as a punishment inflicted from the members of i′s group as i low-
ers their conformity to the groups prescriptions. This brings up an important assumption for the
model.
Assumption 3.1.1. Let an agent i be conforming to the group’s specified actions as gi increases for
all ϵip.
The implication from this assumption, is that conformity in actions for the individual has
a positive linear relationship with closeness to the group. For the agent who disagrees, this implies
closeness to the group places more pressure to conform else be pushed out and lose X , and for
the agent who agrees, it implies being closer to a group who holds the same values makes it easier
to continue in the actions they already desire to take. Potentially, for the one who agrees moving
away from the network may place them around those with different values making it more difficult
to continue in their desired actions and increase identity.
Assumption 1 may be a strong assumption. One could suppose that individuals need not
necessarily conform as they move closer to their group. Given the literature discussed in chapter 2,
I think assumption 1 is a reasonable assumption. When it does not hold then the agent does not
interact with the constraints imposed by this model.
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I lay out possible criticisms of assumption 1 from the network literature and provide an-
swers from the same literature. Agents themselves will effect the prescriptions for action of the
group, so there is a simultaneous system at play, not considered in the base model. Research in
economic network theory by Ballester, Calvó–Armengol, and Zenou (2006) and Ballester and
Calvó–Armengol (2010) has found measures of individual centrality within the network are im-
portant to the profile of Nash Equlibria (NE) in games of social interaction played on a network
such that an agents NE is proportional to their Bonacich-Katz centrality.1 Some agents may im-
pact the prescriptions for action more than others so a conjecture is that as gi increases the agent
gains more ability to effect the groups ideals and that over time she may be able to move the group
closer towards prescriptions for action aligned with her preferences. In such a case, the key as-
sumption of this model may not hold, especially over time.
The results corresponding NE to Bonacich-Katz centrality break down in Belhaj, Bramoullé,
and Deroïan (2014). They bound the action space from above in network games of complements
arguing this is sensible to most situations. Now, the previous relationship does not always hold
and the best response function becomes a censored best reply. A clear relationship between posi-
tion and action is identified when the action space is bounded from above. When the agent has
fewer neighbors included in their set, then they play a lower action than an agent with more. This
fits well with the assumption of this paper. Furthermore, they find when an agent hits their upper
bound they cease transmitting shocks across the networks breaking interdependence. Agents who
are bridge agents between sets are especially important since once they hit their upper bound no
further effects from increased action pass across the sets. These agents often reach the most central
position the quickest and may be seen as hitting ḡ in my model. So, indirect effects break down
once one agent in the path hits their upper bound.
Those who hit the upper bound would not transmit indirect positive impacts to their
links. However, this is not a difficulty for the assumption of this model. When the individual
1. Bonacich-Katz centrality is a measure of network centrality that considers both direct and indirect links. See
Ballester, Calvó–Armengol, and Zenou (2006) and Ballester and Calvó–Armengol (2010) for more detail.
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moves closer to the group, their conformity in action does not rely on shocks transmitted across
the network. Shocks across the network are exogenous changes entering the comparative statics.
Although this may create some difficulty in the comparative statics for changes in action of other
group members. Agents who hold such a position may not effect other agents when a parameter is
changed unless that parameter lowers their closeness. This is not considered in depth at this time.
Network structure may also matter to this assumption. Theoretical research shows that
network structure is important to the existence of unique and stable NE. The network structure
matters to how the cross effects of one agents actions on others is amplified throughout the net-
work. Bramoullé, Kranton, and D’amours (2014) show this is important in games of substitutes
and characterized by the lowest eigenvalue of the network. Ballester, Calvó–Armengol, and Zenou
(2006) found convergence in the series of indirect effects of agents actions on others to a unique
NE depends on the cross effects of actions being sufficiently small compared to the largest eigen-
value of the network matrix describing how network structure amplifies these cross effects. When
the interaction effects are too large no equilibrium exists. Networks where amplification is very
weak may break Assumption 1. Thus, my model may be sensitive to the individual’s network cen-
trality and network structure.
Bounding the action space from above, as is done is this model, may help solve the issues
surrounding my main assumption and network amplification. Again, I turn to Belhaj, Bramoullé,
and Deroïan (2014) for guidance. Their work shows that in games of complements bounding the
action space from above yields existences of equilibrium for all linear and concave functions of peer
effects, and that even under convex functions of peer effects unique NE can emerge if it is not too
convex. In linear best replies, this implies the parameter describing cross effects need not be small
for uniqueness to hold. This provides strong support for bounding the action space in this model
as a precursor to linking the model to games on networks.
The structure of this model links games of peer effects with identity theory where the ac-
tions of others are contained in the vector γi and the combination of consumption and identity
determinants may allow mixed games of complements and substitutes to arise which pull the agent
43
in different directions under certain conditions. Furthermore, it provides a ground level starting
point to delve into the mechanism underlying why peers actions may enter an agents payoff struc-
ture rather than simply stating that they do and inserting them. This may be more important as
an explaining mechanism in the context of peer effects in school or health than on public goods
where one would only desire a certain optimal amount and need not put forth effort if their peers
put forward effort in its provision. Restriction the choice variable gi has both a sensible explana-
tion and a natural counterpart in games of complements where restricting the strategy space is
necessary to obtain results.2
The model serves first to motivate construction of hypotheses for empirical testing that
can be applied to a broad range of questions related to social groups and individual choices. Addi-
tionally, the following results are a step towards explaining why some agents may move away from
their network and a base to expand towards an explanation of how agents may be seduced out of
their current group into other groups.
3.2 Solutions and Results
In the base model outlined above, no other constraint is needed other than that which
arises from restricting gi and between consumption and identity when the individual’s personal
preferences do not agree with their prescriptions from the social group. The individual optimiza-
tion problem is simply given by
max
gi
ui = ui(Xi, Ii) s.t. 0 ≤ gi ≤ ḡ
The lagrangian follows as
L = ui + λ1(ḡ − gi) + λ2gi,
2. See Belhaj, Bramoullé, and Deroïan (2014) and Bramoullé and Kranton (2016) for further discussion on restrict-
ing the strategy space in games of complements.
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− λ1 + λ2 = 0
Lλ1 = ḡ − gi = 0; λ1 ≥ 0
Lλ2 = gi = 0; λ2 ≥ 0.
Again, the sign of ∂Ii∂gi depends on ϵip.
Proposition 3.2.1. If ϵip = 1, then g∗i = ḡ.
Proof. The proof is straightforward as ui is increasing at a decreasing rate in gi from both Xi and
Ii. 
In the absence of any other determinants to the utility function, this result is elementary.
Incentives are clearly aligned for the agent to maintain strong links to their group. Any other ele-
ment entering utility working opposite of social consumption and identity would have to compete
strongly with X and I to move the agent away from their group.
The more interesting case is when personal preferences do not align with the prescriptions
for action of the group. Now, ϵip = 0 and the agent will face a trade-off between social consump-
tion and identity. Notice that ∂Ii∂gi is negative in this case. For ease of exposition, define MXUg
as the marginal utility from X for a change in g ( ∂ui∂Xi
∂Xi
∂gi
) and MIUg is the marginal utility from
identity for a change in g (∂ui∂Ii
∂Ii
∂gi
). I now show the conditions for corner and interior solutions.
Proposition 3.2.2. When ϵip = 0, lower and upper bound results occur when either MXUg or
MIUg dominate the action space g ∀ gi or in the special case that they are equal to each other
at a bound (lower/upper) but the bound is non-binding. An interior solution occurs where the
marginal utilities of X and I from a change in gi are equalized, if and only if lower or upper bound
results do not hold.
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Proof. Consider first the following requirements from standard Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
λ1(ḡ − gi) = 0, λ2gi = 0.
(A) Upper Bound Results.
(i) Social group benefits dominate. Suppose λ1 > 0 then ḡ − gi = 0, which means g∗ =
ḡ and λ2 = 0. Thus, rearranging the first order condition from the lagrangian with




MIUg. Because λ1 > 0, it must be that
|MXUg| > |MIUg|. In this case, MXUg dominates the action space ∀ gi. For any
increase in ḡ, g∗i would increase until MXUg equaled MIUg.
(ii) Special Case. Suppose λ1 = 0 and ḡ−gi = 0 then g∗ = ḡ and λ2 = 0. This implies that
MXUg = −MIUg precisely at the upper bound. In this case, the marginal utility of
ḡ (λ1) is zero, thus an increase in ḡ would not result in a change to gi.
(B) Lower Bound Results.
(i) Identity incentives dominate. Suppose λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0 then it must be that g∗i =





MIUg. Because λ2 > 0, it must be that |MIUg| > |MXUg|. In
this case, MIUg dominates the action space ∀ gi.
(ii) Special Case. Suppose λ2 = 0 and g∗i = 0 then we must have λ1 = 0. This implies that
MXUg = −MIUg precisely at the lower bound.
(C) Interior Solution. Suppose λ1 = 0 and λ0 = 0 and 0 < g∗i < ḡ. In this case, for any g∗i we
have MXUg = −MIUg.

When one incentive dominates, the trade-off between social consumption goods and iden-
tity never equalizes inside the action space. The person is either willing to give up all the social
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consumption from their group and become isolated or pay a high cost in terms of their personal
identity. Of course, some people choose to maintain some closeness to their group that is less than
the upper bound and greater than the lower bound if the benefits from the group equalize with
identity costs within the action space.
Figure 1 provides graphical examples of the result for lower and upper bound solutions.
The solid line at the lower and upper bounds illustrates the result when either MUXg < MIUg or





MIUg > MXUg ∀g
ū
MIUg = MXUg at g∗ = 0
ḡ
ū
MIUg < MXUg ∀g
ū
MIUg = MXUg at g∗ = ḡ
Figure 1. Lower and Upper Bound Solution Examples from Proposition 2 Results
Given an interior solution MXUg = MIUg. Recall that this condition means the in-
dividual is engaged in a trade-off between social consumption and their loss of identity utility
from coming closer to their social group to the point where the marginal gain in social consump-
tion from g is equal to the marginal loss of identity from g. Figure 2 illustrates an interior opti-
mum. The trade-off between social consumption and identity contains the constraint that pulls the
choice of gi away from the lower or upper bound. A change in a parameter that effects only one of
47
social consumption or identity shifts g∗i by the impact of that parameter on the marginal utility of
gi.
































































Figure 2. Illustration of Interior Optimum when ϵip = 0
Exploring how a parameter γ impacts both social consumption and identity will also un-
cover how a parameter impacting only social consumption or identity will work. Considering a
change in a parameter γ four pathways emerge for which an increase in γ can work through so-
cial consumption and identity to move g∗i . One, an increase in γ may increase the social consump-
tion benefit of gi. Two, it may increase identity cost from gi. Three, it may decrease the social con-
sumption benefit of gi. Four, an increase in γ may decrease identity cost from gi. When γ works
through both social consumption and identity then two of these cases at a time combine to deter-
mine the movement of g∗i . For example, if γ increases social benefit and increases identity cost
from gi then the agent gets more Xi for all gi but greater identity cost for all gi. Now, the move-
3. To simplify notation, for the remainder of this paper ϵip = 0 unless otherwise noted.
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ment of g∗i could be down or up contingent on the strengths of these two moving parts. Further-
more, if a parameter increases the amount of Xi available at all gi then lowering gi may allow gain-
ing more identity utility back than social consumption lost until the marginals equal again. This
process could work in reverse where a parameter making identity losses even more costly may yield
an increase in g∗i since now decrease gi may not yield enough identity utility back to make up for
the loss in social consumption. This would imply the agent falls to an overall lower utility point
but the best they can do is increase gi, suffer the increased loss in identity, and take the increased
social consumption. The following explores these issues through comparative statics and the im-
plicit function theorem.
For a parameter impacting both social consumption and identity, the change in the agent’s




























The denominator is negative implying the sign of this derivative depends on the term inside the
bracket of the numerator. Without knowing something about a functional form it may be hard to
sign both the direct and indirect effects, ∂Xi∂γ and
∂2Xi
∂gi∂γ
for social consumption and ∂Ii∂γ and
∂2Ii
∂gi∂γ
for identity. However, for many examples that are sensible to this framework, such as the density
of the group or educational programs building openness and changing prescribed actions within
the group considering only the impact γ has on how gi effects Xi and Ii is a reasonable assump-
tion.
Assumption 3.2.1. Let ∂Xi∂γ = 0 and
∂Ii
∂γ = 0 so that the effect from a change in γ works entirely
through the impact of gi on Xi and Ii.

















The following proposition explores four cases possible for the impact of a change in γ on g∗i .
Proposition 3.2.3. Given assumption 2.1 and ϵip = 0 the following cases hold for a change in γ:
(i) if ∂2Xi∂gi∂γ > 0, and
∂2Ii
∂gi∂γ
< 0 then a change in g∗i depends on whether social consumption or
identity cost effects dominate,
(ii) if ∂2Xi∂gi∂γ < 0 and
∂2Ii
∂gi∂γ
> 0 then a change in g∗i depends on whether social consumption or
identity cost decrease more,
(iii) if ∂2Xi∂gi∂γ > 0 and
∂2Ii
∂gi∂γ
> 0, then g∗i is always increasing as γ increases,
(iv) if ∂2Xi∂gi∂γ < 0 and
∂2Ii
∂gi∂γ
< 0, then g∗i is always decreasing as γ increases.
Proof. Note, ∂2Ii∂gi∂γ > 0 implies as γ increases
∂Ii
∂gi
becomes less negative and ∂2Ii∂gi∂γ < 0 implies
as γ increases ∂Ii∂gi becomes more negative. A simple look at equation 2.4 shows that for case (i)
∂g∗i
∂γ > 0 when
∣∣∣ ∂2Xi∂gi∂γ ∣∣∣ >∣∣∣ ∂2Ii∂gi∂γ ∣∣∣ and less than zero otherwise. For case (ii), ∂g∗i∂γ > 0 results from∣∣∣ ∂2Xi∂gi∂γ ∣∣∣ <∣∣∣ ∂2Ii∂gi∂γ ∣∣∣ and it is less than 0 otherwise.









Figure 3, illustrates the results of proposition 2.2. At the optimal gi, the slopes of the so-
cial consumption and identity functions must be equal. To illustrate this point, the negative of
MIUg is taken to reflect the graph of MIUg across the g axis and g∗i lies at the intersection. The
movement of g∗i as a parameter γ is changing depends on how γ effects the marginal utility of so-
cial consumption and the marginal identity cost from gi. When the direction of the cross partials
differ, then g∗i can move in either direction. The consumption effect dominates when the impact
of γ is stronger on how gi effects Xi than it is for Ii, and the identity effect dominates when this
relationship is reversed. This results in the movement of closeness following the sign of the dom-
inate effect. For example, in case (i) if the identity effect dominates g∗i falls despite more social
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consumption being available at every gi due to the increased costliness on identity outweighing the
positive benefit. Next, cases (iii) and (iv) place strong incentives for the agent to move close to one















































































Figure 3. Illustrating Comparative Statics for Cases i and ii
Case (i) may be exemplified by the density of the social group. Suppose as the social group
becomes more closely knit it provides more, or easier, access to the social consumption goods.
However, it increases the identity cost for those with ϵip = 0 for all gi through the effect of as-
sumption 1.1 where closeness and conformity of action to the group’s prescriptions are moving
together. Now, the group can more effectively press for conformity to prescribed actions at lower
levels of the individual’s closeness.
An example of case (ii), requires some parameter that will both decrease the social con-
sumption benefit and decrease the identity cost from moving closer to one’s group. This could be
something like a policy that disperses the group or makes it more difficult for the group to operate
around its prescribed actions. The effect of dispersing the group would be to decrease the social
consumption benefit and the identity cost for all gi.
Case (iii) may be found through educational programs that impact the group towards
more openness and less pressure for stringent prescribed actions. This, of course, would be tied
to the actions of the other agents in the group taking part in the program and moving their own
actions or characteristics. Also, this case could be the addition of new group members who share
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notions of the prescribed action aligned closer to those with ϵip = 0. Though this example may
require showing a change in the ideals of the group over time rather what is currently modeled.
Finally, case (iv) could be a change in the level of ridicule the group targets towards a
member such that even when conforming an agent may find herself on the receiving end of ridicule.
This results in the agent losing social consumption benefit for all gi and an increase in the identity
cost for all gi.
Now, consider a simple extension of the model to evaluate how one’s social group may
impact an individual’s production of, for instance, health or education. Introduce f = f(gi; ϵi, ηi)
where this could be consider either a health stock or years of education and it is conditional on
personal characteristics and environmental factors surrounding the agent. A group may positively
or negatively incentivize healthy or unhealthy behaviors and more or less educational attainment.
This yields multiple cases for how the social group may impact these outcomes, but let us examine
the case where the social group incentivizes poor health behaviors or poor educational outcomes.




The utility function is still a function of gi where gi works through Xi, Ii, and fi. The first






















be called the marginal utility of f from gi (MfUg). When ϵip = 1, an interior solution
exists if MXUg +MIUg = −MfUg for 0 < gi < ḡ. Upper and lower bound solutions can exist
if MXUg +MIUg ≥ MfUg for ḡ or MXUg +MIUg ≤ MfUg for g = 0. Clearly, the incen-
tives are aligned for g∗i > 0 when ϵip = 1. The case where an individual receives such negative cost
through the f function from closeness to their group that they move away, despite positive impacts
from social consumption and identity, could relate to groups engaged in very dangerous behaviors
such that the individual becomes severely injured or addicted and ultimately decides the cost is to
great. Of course, a more realistic framework may allow this great cost to change the agents identity
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over time such that he no longer agrees with the groups actions giving him a further incentive to
move towards gi = 0. Clearly, the incentives are aligned for g∗i > 0 when ϵip = 1.
When ϵip = 0, then an interior solution over 0 < gi < ḡ is given by MXUg =
−MIUg − MfUg. Social consumption benefits have to make up for the cost to the individ-
ual’s identity and the cost working through f be it health behaviors or education. Upper and lower
bound solutions again can exist with a similar logic to the case where ϵip = 1. The individual may
desire to do well in school or to avoid an unhealthy behavior, such as poor diet, but find it diffi-
cult due to the influence of their group which is growing as they come closer to the group. In this
case, strong social consumption benefits then make it difficult for the agent to move towards better
education or better health behaviors.
Social groups promoting high education and healthy behaviors may have very positive ef-
fects on their members outcomes. So, the social group is not necessarily a bad in this model, rather
this model shows how, at times, it can impact the agent and incentivize actions regardless of the
individual’s personal desires. Importantly, even when desiring to take a different action the agent
may stay close and do otherwise in the presence of a social group providing positive social con-
sumption benefits. A student may desire to study and pursue their education, but if their friend
group(s) do otherwise, then benefits from having friends may outweigh their own identity and
they may suffer poorer educational attainment than when alone. The implication for interventions
is that it may find willing recipients to the course of action laid out by the intervention but a failure
in results if that intervention cannot also offer valid social relationships yielding social consump-
tion benefits.
3.3 A Network Model of Two Group Identities with Effort in School
I now extend and adjust the framework to consider the impact of two group identities on
choice of academic effort. Explicitly the model is applied to adolescents and the family and peers
are the groups of interest. In this extension, the potential conflict is not between individual tastes,
or identity, rather potential conflict exists in the group ideals that can lead to differing outcomes.
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Additionally, the focus is placed on adolescents in a school who have family and peers as their
primary groups and who have malleable attitudes about school that are produced by family and
peer ideals for education. It is to this model that the empirical analyses of this dissertation will be
closely tied.
Family and peer identity influences are modeled as a framework of social inputs to adoles-
cent academic effort. I draw from the theoretical work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Akerlof
and Kranton (2002) and shape it for two group inputs. Identity utility in their framework is pro-
duced as a function of one’s own action’s and the actions’ of others conditional on ideals for action,
social categories, and personal characteristics. For peers, once a person makes friends and enters
a group, the ideal informs the person how to behave in the group.4 Deviation from either fam-
ily or peer ideals diminishes identity utility, providing an incentive to conform with the ideal for
all group members.5 Own-attitudes about school are added as a malleable trait that family and
peer ideals shape and that impact performance in school. The model is framed in the context of a
school where changes to ideals and attitudes can also create spill-over effects. Finally, the frame-
work easily extends to a standard network theory model of social interaction.
An adolescent navigates their life choosing effort in school, influenced by the ideals on
schooling transmitted to them from the family and the peer group. In this way, immediate returns
to schooling are created through identity utility. Attitudes about school manifest a malleable trait
that is shaped by an adolescent’s surrounding environment. This includes the adolescent’s primary
social groups, which in this model are the families and peers.6 Improved attitudes reduce the cost
of effort for the adolescent, thereby improving effort. Thus, family and peer ideals may either influ-
ence the choice of effort through a conforming mechanism or indirectly through shaping attitudes.
Additionally, the peer groups form a network structure across a school that allow changes in ideals
or attitudes to send effects over the network handed across social link from social link.
4. I explicitly place the model post-peer group formation to focus on the affects of group ideals from family and
peers.
5. For the purposes of this paper, ideals and norms are considered interchangeable. Another way to conceptualize
ideals would be as aspirations.
6. The impact of teachers on attitudes may be an interesting extension, to apply with different data.
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Adolescent social links in a school of n students are mapped in an n × n matrix W. For
adolescents i and j, the element wij = 1 if i is linked to j and is zero otherwise; wii = 0 to avoid
self-links.7 Assume there are no isolated individuals, to focus the study on network effects. An
adolescent’s total set of peers, is given by the row sum and denoted as pi =
∑
j = wij .
Let the individual’s own attitudes on school and academics be ai ∈ [0, 1]. Tending to-
wards zero represents negative attitudes about school, and tending towards one represents positive
attitudes. For each i, average peer attitudes is given by āi = 1pi
∑
j wijaj .
Adolescent attitudes are produced by a function of family and peer ideals conditional on
environments, or other factors, (bi) given by ai = ai(αif , āi; bi). Following Akerlof and Kranton
(2002) the prototypical behavior in the peer group proxies the group ideal. Attitudes about school
are shaped in a production function but not chosen in my model. The family and peer inputs are
assumed to have a positive relationship with attitudes. For the family, αif is the transmission of
ideals on education, and for the peers, prototypical attitudes in the group is represented by the
average of peer attitudes.
The action space is ei ∈ [0, ê), where ei is the effort put forward in school bounded from
above at ê.8 Average peer effort is ēi. The choice is academic effort, ei, and the utility function is
Ui(ei) = ui(biei, SIi). bi capture all non-identity related inputs that affect the utility from effort.
SIi is the social identity function providing social identity utility.
The social identity function maps effort relative to the peer (p) group’s ideal and the fam-
ily (f ) group’s ideal. I assume the function to be additively separable in its components and draw
insight from Akerlof and Kranton (2002) to express the social identity function as



















7. Symmetry is not imposed.
8. I bound the action space since effort in school feasibly has a natural upper bound, and this becomes an important
topic for understanding social interaction effects on networks. See Belhaj, Bramoullé, and Deroïan (2014) for more on
this topic.
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Social identity utility from belonging to one’s family is given by Sf and from the peer group is
given by Sp. The cost to identity utility from deviating away from the ideals is captured by the
squared difference of effort from each group ideal. In the family, e(αif ) maps the family atti-
tude about education as ideals for academic effort. In the peer group, the prototypical effort in the
group proxies the ideal and is given by the average effort level in the peer group. The parameter δp
is a peer group social interaction parameter that captures the conforming effect.
A straightforward implication from the social identity model of effort for two groups
emerges. If the ideals between groups differ, then there are competing social incentives for choice
of effort. When families and peers both transmit low educational ideals, then there are strong so-
cial incentives for low effort, and when both transmit high ideals, there are strong incentives for
high effort. When the groups compete, the conflict creates incentives for a middling choice of ef-
fort unless one group dominates.
There is a cost from effort that is diminished or enhanced by an adolescent’s attitudes. Let
this be defined as ci = ci(ei, ai), such that better attitudes about school lowers the psychic cost
from effort.9 In terms of a standard network model, I define the cost function to be ci = 16e2i −
γaiei, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is parameter determining the strength of attitudes in diminishing the cost
from effort.
Adolescents choses effort to maximize utility constrained by group ideals and the cost of
effort. This occurs in the school network where all adolescents make their choice simultaneously.
Allow utility to be additively separable in the inputs, which leads to a model much like the stan-
dard network model of peer effects. Each adolescent in the school network chooses effort by maxi-
mizing
ui(bi, αif , ai, ei, e−i|W ) = biei + SIi − ci(ei, ai).
9. A point consistent with the literature on noncognitive skill, which finds “psychic” costs explain underinvestment
in education that may be determined by noncognitive skill development. See Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) for
notes from the literature and empirical evidence.
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ij wijej + γai(αif , āi; bi). The best response function for effort is derived from the identity
framework and depends on peer effort, family ideals, and an adolescent’s own-attitudes produced
by family ideals and peer attitudes. Families can impact the adolescent through both a conforming
effect derived out of the social identity function and their influence on shaping own-attitudes. If
δp is positive, then an adolescent positively responds to changes in the prototypical effort in the
peer group. Also, peer attitudes can influence the choice of effort through shaping own-attitudes.
Belhaj, Bramoullé, and Deroïan (2014) formally establish that a profile of unique Nash
Equilibria (NE) always hold for bounded games of complements with linear interaction effects.10
Effort is defined with lower and upper bounds in the model—as it is reasonable that effort is not
infinitely small or large. Thus, a profile of NE exists under the model conditions, and the vector of
best responses is e = b+αf + δpWe+ γa. Rearrange and solve for ei to consider the effect of a
change in peer effort, family ideals, or own-attitudes yielding:
e = (I − δpW )−1(b+αf + γa). (3.3)
The series expansion of the inverse term is








where the powers of W return second order links and so on.11 Thus, the inverse term accumu-
lates the cross network effect from changes in effort, if δp > 0. For example, an increase in own-
attitudes improves effort. The improvement in effort spills-over to those linked in the network
10. They also show that unique equilibria can hold with large network effects even with convex interaction functions
if they are not too convex. See Calvo–Armengol and Jackson (2009) for a study that does not require a bounded action
space and relates NE in peer effects to Bonacich-Katz centrality.
11. A typical requirement for convergence has been δpλmax(W ) < 1, where λmax(W ) is the largest eigenvalue of
W (Ballester, Calvó–Armengol, and Zenou 2006; Ballester and Calvó–Armengol 2010). However, Belhaj, Bramoullé,
and Deroïan (2014) show that with restricted action spaces convergence is achieved for all social interaction parameters.
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through the simultaneity in the best response function, creating social multipliers captured by the
inverse term in 2.1.12
Increases in family ideals improve attitudes. Improvements in attitudes for the adolescent
implies an increase in the average peer attitudes for those linked to the adolescent. Thus, spill-
overs in attitudes from changes in family ideals are present. While I have not assumed a functional
form for the production of attitudes, in the empirics I will consider own-attitudes to be produced
with a similar network effect. This leads to an implicit assumption that own-attitudes are produced
by a = (I − θpW)−1(b+αf ), where θp is the network effect from average peer attitudes. In this
framework, spill-overs in attitudes across the school network from changes in family ideals (αif )
will occur if θp > 0.
The network effects spread influence from changes in family ideals or own-attitudes out
through the network. Spill-overs from attitudes across a school lead to positive impacts on effort
in school, if γ is not equal to zero. Families work through two channels, the conforming effect
and their influence on shaping own-attitudes. Shifts in attitudes among adolescents in school and
among families can work together to create large effects across a school if the social interaction
parameters are greater than zero. I now introduce the data and an empirical model with spatial
econometrics to tie into the theoretical framework.
3.4 Theory Application Examples
The theory laid out in this chapter relates to the identity economics literature and links to
network theory and skill development. The results here fit nicely with the oppositional identity lit-
erature of Battu, Mwale, and Zenou (2007), Bisin et al. (2011b), and Hanming and Loury (2005)
because by allowing the group to be a general notion of who the individual has links with allows
those groups to have formed the oppositional identities or not found in these papers. In the case,
of a group which has developed such oppositional identities among its members, then this theory
12. If bridging agents who have reached their upper (lower) bound exist between sets of adolescents, then positive
(negative) shocks would be blocked from passing between the sets by these agents (Belhaj, Bramoullé, and Deroïan
2014). Also, see Bramoullé and Kranton (2016) for more details regarding games of complements played on networks.
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relates to how strongly that oppositional identity will be for the individual with respect to how
close they are to the group.
Immigrants and the children of immigrants form an interesting application. A great deal
of work in the social sciences has concerned itself with how they assimilate and whether to whom
they assimilate matters for their long run outcomes. Portes and Zhou (1993) proposed today’s im-
migrant communities assimilate in a segmented matter, implying the path of assimilation is not
always upwards towards the middle class but for some may be downwards. They suggest the com-
munities and conditions surrounding immigrants greatly impact their opportunities for assimi-
lation and often their outcomes. So, the immigrant family arriving with little money and forced
into inner city areas underserved by public goods and prone to greater levels of violent crime may
find their children assimilating to underclass groups. These groups, through discrimination and
lack of opportunity, may not believe education is for them and may incentivize their members to-
wards poor educational outcomes and other negative results. Rumbaut (1994) and Zhou (1997)
review the experiences of the children of immigrants and provide more evidence and insights on
how varying types of assimilation paths can yield poor results for these new Americans.
Segmented assimilation theory found in the sociological literature fits the economic the-
ory developed here. Although, this theory does not attempt to explain group formation it does
show the strength of the group one comes to belong to can have effects on the individual’s decision
making. When the only viable groups the children of immigrants find to assimilate to are those
experiencing very negative education and health behavior outcomes themselves, then the ability to
obtain social consumption may outweigh these costs and move these children towards outcomes
their migrating parents had hoped to avoid. In this case, the family group and the peer group may
impose competing ideals for behavior.
Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco (2001) in a substantive review of social science re-
search pertaining to the children of immigrants find that parents immigrate with goals of achiev-
ing positive outcomes for their children. Indeed immigrant parents often work multiple, low pay-
ing jobs in hopes of achieving better results for their children. However, they also find parents
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unable to guide their children away from negative assimilation paths can find their children strug-
gling. Immigrant parents often lack a firm grasp of the surrounding culture and their reference
points for socially guiding their children are gone. Additionally, extensive work time increases the
difficulty in observing who their children’s peer groups have become.
As immigrant parents time available to their children falls, the identity costs of moving
closer to a group with a very different set of prescribe actions from the parents is falling. Com-
bining the implications from the base model and the two group model suggests that as the costs
of deviating from the family group ideals is falling then the peer group can dominate. When one
group dominates, they essentially become the primary source of social incentives. This result shifts
the children’s optimal closeness to their peer group towards the upper bound in the base model.
Also, the parents are now less able to place barriers on the social consumption goods their children
are consuming. The parents may directly effect the level of gi their children are allowed setting up
barriers that prevent them from coming too close to a group incentivizing poor outcomes, thus
they may be able to effect ḡ. Inability to set such barriers in the new context of a new culture and
difficult surroundings may allow the children to move to the fringes of their parental home group
and be pulled towards the prescribed actions of their peers.
Density of the ethnic home group (possibly larger family group) is another parameter
that may enter the model here and one that can help the parents shift their children away from
negative assimilation outcomes. Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller (2005) find empirical and
ethnographic support for the theory of segmented assimilation, and also find that children of im-
migrants with strong family and community ties are more likely to follow less negative assimilation
paths and achieve better long run outcomes. This may imply the ethnic community can help the
parents in moving the parameters of the model in directions preventing the children from drawing
too close to a group with poor education and risky behaviors. The authors note that community
social capital depends more on the density of communal ties than on economic outcomes. The
density of the child’s home, ethnic group then enters as a parameter of my base model that when
increasing may help prevent negative peer group outcomes.
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The theory in this paper illustrates one potential path that the density of a child’s ethnic,
home group may have in a positive way. However, it is not the only path it may work through.
Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (2008) find ethnic segregation, which would go hand in hand with in-
creasing ethnic density, may have short run positive benefits but can yield lower economic assimila-
tion through lower social network connections with the broader society, leading to less opportuni-
ties outside the ethnic network. So, the density of the child’s ethnic group could have contrasting
results that are not entirely clear or reconciled from the current literature.
The news for immigrants in the US is not all bad news. In general, low skill immigrants to
the US, even recent immigrants, have closed economic gaps, making up ground where other low
skills groups have not. The economics literature offers some evidence that the second generation
closes education gaps even when they are from low skill immigrant sub-sets (Card 2005; Chiswick
and DebBurman 2004). Further, Smith (2015) indicates that Latinos in the US have achieved
greater advances in education across generations than accomplished by European or Asian mi-
grants. The mechanism driving upward progress for the children of immigrants is not well ex-
plained. Given the finding in the sociological literature that immigrant parents exhibit strong up-
ward mobility expectations, a transmission of high educational ideals from immmigrant families
to their children may have a role. In my model, immigrant families would transmit high ideals for
education that press effort in school higher and build positive attitudes about school.
Finally, take the story told by Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco (2001) of a Gahnaian
taxi driver in New York City with sons at Brown and Duke and with a third son he hoped would
go to Harvard. Though his story is anecdotal, it is extraordinary. One of the primary factors he
spoke of in guiding his children was a decision to carefully guard who they were friends with and
to not allow them to work so he knew what influences were around them. In the model here and
assuming the children initially desire to follow the families prescriptions, the father’s actions would
enter as a parameter of the model that decreases the social consumption benefit from moving
closer to a group incentivizing risky behaviors and educational outcomes. Additionally, it may also
direct the children towards a set of social groups yielding better outcomes. In this case, his actions
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would increase the identity benefit from drawing closer with a group prescribing high educational
attainment.
3.5 Summary and Theory Conclusion
The economic theory in this chapter endeavors to unveil the degree of struggle that can
arise between one’s identity and their social groups and the role of multiple group identities for
adolescent effort in school. In my model, the individual can do this through giving up the social
benefit and moving away from their group. However, this may be difficult as illustrated. This chap-
ter also extends to consider the potential for two competing group identities in the specific context
of an adolescent choosing effort in school. Those groups are the family and peers.
This model incorporates both elements of peer effects and games of substitutes. As other
agents decrease their set of actions that are opposing to the individual’s personal ideals, then the
individual may have an incentive to move closer to their group. This point, to my knowledge, has
not been discussed in the literature.
The strength of peer effects may also be determined by the degree of identification with
the group (Gioia 2017). In my model, this is captured agreeing with the group ideals and moving
closer to the group. Thus, the peer group to test in an identity model is the group an individual
identfies with. However, my model also predicts that a group whom an individual does not iden-
tify with may still have effects if those groups provide a sufficient amount of social benefits.
An alternative to groups representing an identity, is that individuals attempt to select from
a menu of identities and match those with their group, as far as they can choose their group. In
this case, their may be exogneously determined groups, such as family groups, and endogenously
selected groups. Families still exert influence through incentives to conform. For friend groups
peer influence heightens pursuit of the ideals in the identity by providing a collection of observable
behaviors as a reminder of the ideals needed to exemplify the desired identity. In a sense, one at-
tempts to select from a menu of identities and the presence of peers enhances the desire to display
conformity with the chosen identity so that one will be seen as exemplifying the ideals and held in
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high esteem by those who share the identity. Thus, the peer effect will still be rooted in an iden-
tity process. Of course, an adolescents may select friends based on other shared interests, while
each adolescent is still in the process of selecting from a menu of identities. Once the adolescent
makes friends the collective selection of identity in the group provides an incentive to match up to
the ideals displayed in the group. Thus, again the presence of peer effects would be rooted in an
identity mechanism that remains even after accounting for peer selection.
Families and peers in light of an identity mechanism create conforming incentives and
produce attitudes about school that affect effort in school. The remainder of this dissertation em-





This chapter introduces the data for the dissertation study and the spatial econometric
method used to examine research questions around family and peer influence on schooling atti-
tudes and performance. Additionally, I discuss identification of key parameters.
4.1 Data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) was se-
lected for this study because of its in-depth data on adolescents, friend groups, and social context
and life information. The data collection design selected a nationally representative sample of high
schools, with over 90,000 students initially interviewed. The in-school survey allowed respondents
to nominate their 10 closest friends. Respondents can be linked to the nominator, providing de-
tailed information on the respondents’ peer group. A subset of this sample consisting of just over
20,000 respondents was chosen for a more detailed survey to be conducted in the home. The in-
home survey contains greater detail on the respondents’ home and neighborhood. For the in-home
survey, however, not all of the respondents’ friendship nominations are included in the survey.
Thus, one cannot construct the entire school peer network and include variables from the in-home
survey.
Add Health provides a saturated sample of sixteen schools, where all students in the school
were selected for the in-home interview. Of these schools, two were large schools with one mostly
white and in a mid-sized town, and the other ethnically diverse and in a major metropolitan area.
The remaining schools were scattered between rural and urban areas, some public and some pri-
vate. The saturated sample provides friendship nominations for the 1994-95 school year from the
in-school survey. A number of the respondents cannot be correctly linked between the in-school
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and in-home survey because of missing data in the peer nominations. Add Health re-collected
the school friendship nominations for the saturated schools in May of 1995, which re-gains many
of the lost observations and places these friendship nominations closer to the actual dates of the
in-home survey (occurred from May 1995–December 1995).1 I select this sample, with the May
friendship nominations, to explore the impacts of both families and peers on schooling attitudes
and performance through the channels of social identity.
The survey design follows the in-home group through 4 waves of data collection, placing
them close to 30 years old at the time of wave 4. Waves 1 and 2 are considered the adolescent pe-
riod with wave 3 beginning the respondents’ adult period. Those only in the in-school data are not
followed through subsequent waves. Wave 1 is currently the only wave in use because of the need
to include peer group information. However, I am using these later waves in post-dissertation
projects. Add Health also provides contextual data for the in-home sample created from the 1990
census and other sources. This contextual data covers neighborhood and community information
at the tract, block, and county level.
I focus on combined family and peer group influence on schooling attitudes and perfor-
mance and draw on multiple measures, described below, to proxy these variables. To empircally
test this combined influence, I use spatial econometrics. After discussion of variable selection and
creation, I turn to presenting the method and discussion of identification challenges.
4.1.1 Variable Selection and Creation
Drawing from Add Health’s in-home wave 1 survey, self-reported GPA is used as a proxy
for academic performance. Each respondent is asked to list their grade on Mathematics, Science,
English/Language Arts, and History/Social Studies over A,B,C, and D or lower. Reported let-
ter grades are assigned values of 4 to A, 3 to B, 2 to C, and 1 to D and take an average that is the
average of the non-missing responses to each course grade question.
1. All questions in the home survey related to schooling or other activities refer the respondent to answer for the
1994-1995 school year explicitly.
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Own-attitudes about school is constructed as an index normalized to mean zero and a
standard deviation of one using factor analysis. A set of scale-type questions related to how much
a respondent reports a desire to go to college, how likely they think it is they will go to college,
whether they feel apart of their current school, are happy at their current school, feel that their
teachers are fair, and feel close to people at their school forms the index. Tables 1 and 2 contain
summary statistics and information on the factor analysis. The factor analysis is conducted on the
full sample post-listwise deletion of missing observations in the variables included for the factor
analysis (N = 3596). Table 1 shows that all of the variables range from one to five. The scales are
coded such that ones relate to the lowest report for a variable and fives the highest. Table 2 shows
that all variables load strongly onto a single factor and only one factor in the analysis has an eigen-
value greater than one—the common cut-off rule for considering a factor as potentially relevant.
Additionally, table 2 reports the factor scores used to generate an index out of these variables. For
this disseration, I focus only on the composite variable generated from the factor analysis on these
measures.2
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Factor Analysis
Mean SD Min Max N
How Likely Variables
Desire for College 4.30 1.12 1 5 3596
How Likely College 4.01 1.22 1 5 3596
Agree/Disagree
Feel Part of School 3.81 1.04 1 5 3596
Happy to be at School 3.71 1.09 1 5 3596
Feel Teachers are Fair 3.52 1.05 1 5 3596
Feel Close to People at School 3.73 1.00 1 5 3596
2. Separating the measures into different components could be interesting but it is not clear why to do so and the
factor analysis only generates a single factor with an eigenvalue above one.
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Table 2. Factor Analysis: Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues
Factor Loadings Uniqueness
How Likely Variables
Desire for College 0.532 0.717
How Likely College 0.537 0.712
Agree/Disagree
Feel Part of School 0.681 0.537
Happy to be at School 0.616 0.621
Feel Teachers are Fair 0.356 0.873
Feel Close to People at School 0.579 0.665
Factor Eigenvalue 1.88
The family ideal on education—αif in chapter 3.3—is operationalized from respondents’
perceptions of expected parental disappointment if failing to graduate college. A key assumption
behind selecting perception of college disappointment is that these perceptions relate to the trans-
mission of an ideal on academics from the parents to the respondent. Two college disappointment
questions were asked, one for the mother and one for the father. These are Likert scale variables
where 1 is low and 5 is high disappointment. I seperate the mother and father college disappoint-
ment variables into three variables apiece. Answers of 3 form a middle category representing a
reference group to low and high responses. Answers of 1 and 2 are collapsed into a binary variable
representing a low disappointment category and answers of 4 and 5 into a high category. I form
a series of indicators combining the mother and father college disappointment reports. These are
as follows: an indicator if two parents are in the low category (0 if a single parent home), an indi-
cator if only one parent is in the low category (includes single parent homes), a reference category
indicator if both parents are in the middle category (or if a single parent home is in the middle cat-
egory), an indicator if only one parent is in the high category (including single parent homes), and
an indicator if both parents are in the high category (0 if a single parent home).
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The remainder of the variables cover controls for characteristics and environments that
may influence the outcomes. Controlling for characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, parental
education (which may proxy socio-economic status or simply the information available to the ado-
lescent on the returns to education), language, and grade level in school (which may also capture
maturity effects) are included in the list of covariates to control for homophily in peer group selec-
tion (M. O. Jackson 2011). Parental education, in this study, refers to the highest level of parental
education in the household. Test scores from the Add Health Peabody Picture Vocabulary test,
normalized to mean zero and a standard deviation of one, are included as a proxy for ability, be-
cause ability may lead to selection of peers with similar abilities. The adolescent’s perception of
other students’ prejudice is used to proxy for possible discrimination that may raise a barrier and
create negative schooling attitudes. The number of siblings in the home is included to capture
more information about the family background that may be unrelated to identity, along with an in-
dicator for single parent homes. Finally, indicators for language spoken in the home are included
to control for peer group selection—if adolescents select peers based on language—and to capture
potential language barrier effects that may influence outcomes.3
The Add Health data offers a variety of alternative variables that I do not utilize in this
study. Before moving on, I will briefly describe one component of the data that may help dig into
the black box of school fixed effects: the school administrative survey. Akerlof and Kranton (2002)
theoretically describe how school policy can sort students into groups with differing ideals for ef-
fort. Their primary prediction is that a singluar school identity creates stronger incentives for ef-
fort in the group adopting the school identity compared to a school that supports a multiplicity of
group identities; however, the singluar school identity sorts a higher share of students into groups
that do not adopt the school identity and incentivizes low effort compared to the multiplicity ap-
proach. The attitude variables discussed above which specifically relate to how an adolescent feel’s
about their school can form measures of identification with one’s school. Based on the theory I
3. Language spoken in the home is the best proxy I have found in the Add Health data for the ability to speak a
language other than English.
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expect some school policies may increase the attitudes of adolescent’s in one group and decrease
them in another. It also may influence the share of students in these different groups. The chal-
lenges to any analysis investigating this will be to identify pertient school policies, identify salient
groups, and to identify the effect of school policies interacted with group membership sorting out
bias from selection and other omitted variables. Therefore, I do not pursue this analysis here.
The school administrator questionnaire for the first wave of the data was conducted by
phone with school administrators. It contains basic descriptions of the school type, demographics
in the school (students and teachers), specializations, school performance, school programs related
to sexual health, violence, drugs, alcohol, and smoking, policies for suspension based on misbe-
havior, and policies on hall pass requirements, dress codes, and student parking. The advantage of
Add Health is that it provides this data for a nationally representative sample of adolescents along
with a plethora of measures.
An example of one path forward would be to use the presence of a dress code or not and
examine how this influences the attitudes of adolescents along racial and ethnic lines. In the pres-
ence of oppositional identities for any one group, a dress code may generate worse ties for the op-
positional group, while it may generate stronger ties for groups whose norms match the code. Al-
ternatively, a dress code in the school could foster a school identity that moderates ethnic divisions
by providing students with something in common—if only something to complain about together.
I leave further consideration to future work, but this discussion accomplishes two things: one, it
suggests there may be heterogeneity in group effects on attitudes in school. The average spillover
effects from peers that I will explore in this study do not allow for heterogeneous effects. In this
dissertation, I seek to first establish whether these spillovers exist in networks. Two, it lays the
groudwork for extensions to my dissertation that build on the identity model and attitudes about
school. For this study, I will wash out specific influences from differing school policies through the
inclusion of school fixed effects.
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4.1.2 Mapping School Networks from Friendship Nominations
Add Health asked respondents for up to ten friendship nominations from which the school
peer networks can be constructed as a spatial weights adjacency matrix (W). I use friendship nom-
inations to define the links in the matrix. The spatial weights matrix is defined as a block-diagonal
row-normalized directed graph. I call this W but note that it is a block-diagonal version of the
network in the theory (chapter 3.3), which was developed for a single school. Each school network
enters on the diagonal with zeros elsewhere. Some respondents have all friendship nomination
slots missing. I drop these observations to avoid row entries that contain all zeros in the spatial
weights matrix. In the directed graph, some respondents named only these dropped adolescents as
peers and are subsequently lost. In the final sample construction, each individual has sent at least
one link and receives at least one, and the sample size is 2,174 observations.4
Later, as a sensitivity test I consider an assumption of friendship reciprocity in the defi-
nition of the weights matrix to regain some of the lost observations. This leads to the undirected
graph and means that the weight matrix maps social links such that anyone who was named by a
schoolmate receives a link to that person regardless of whether they nominated them or not. In
this case, the sample size rises to 2, 725. The caveat is that the reciprocity assumption may induce
links where they do not exist.5
Figure 4 maps the nodes and edges for one of the Add Health Schools in the saturated
sample. It illustrates that after removal of adolescents with all missing nomination slots, all mem-
bers have at least one link. Also, the graph is directed denoted by the arrow, which signals that a
node has nominated the other as a friend.
Figure 4 visually shows that each adolescent has direct and indirect links. Combined all of
the nodes and edges form a graph and a network structure based on the nominations data for each
4. When deleting observations with missing friendship nominations, one school is lost leaving 15 schools total.
5. Lin (2010) and Lin (2015) have tested many iterations and different specifications of the weights matrix. Re-
assessing all of these iterations is not the focus of this paper.
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adolescent. The matrix Ws maps each of these links for each node into a square matrix where each
school enters on the diagonal with zeros elsewhere.
Figure 4. Graph of Directed Network Links for a Small Add Health School: An Example of Network
Topology
4.1.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the variables with the initial sample, after dele-
tion of missing data, and the analysis sample after construction of the directed graph spatial weights
matrix. For the majority of variables, the summary statistics remain consistent across the samples.
However, average GPA rises from about 2.70 points to 2.75 points and the normalized factor anal-
ysis index, attitudes, climbs from approximately mean zero in the initial sample to a mean of 0.084
after deletion of islands for the directed graph. Additionally, the average score for the normalized
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vocabulary test rises to 0.136. This appears to indicate that the islands deleted from the sample
with the directed graph construction have lower attitudes and lower verbal reasoning skills. Demo-
graphically, the only compositional change by race/ethnicity is for blacks, with their share of the
sample falling from about 15 percent to about 12 percent.
This study is focused on families plus network effects from in-school chosen peers. In that
regard, we can consider the results conditional on being linked within the larger school network.
As a very basic check, I explored a regression for the GPA model with own-attitudes, the fam-
ily ideal indicators, and the controls as regressors—but no peer variables—with the sample post-
listwise deletion of missing observations and the sample post-construction of the directed graph.
Comparing the coefficient estimate for own-attitudes between the two samples yields a very simi-
lar result. Finally, as a sensitivity test I study the spatial models with the undirected graph, which
imposes the friendship reciprocity assumption and returns many of the lost observations. Even in
this sample, however, the attitudes index and vocabulary test scores in the the sample have means
that are closer to the original sample but are still higher. Thus, the focus of this study is on those
linked within the larger school network.
Again, the family ideal indicators are the indicators of adolescent perception for parental
disappointment if they do not attend college. Two parents in the high disappointment category
contains the largest share of the sample followed by the one parent high category. Combined, ap-
proximately 71 percent of all sample respondents report a minimum of 1 parent in the high cate-
gory. The middle category will be the reference category and accounts for about 13 percent of the
sample.
The controls section in 3 covers variables to control for background characteristics and
peer group selection. The adolescent’s perception of other students’ prejudice is reported on a one
to five scale with higher values indicating higher perceived prejudiced from other students. The
mean is stable across the different samples. The highest education level of the parents remains sta-
ble over the samples at around 13.6 years of education. Single parent home account for about a
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quarter of the sample and the number of siblings in the home averages about 1.5 across the sub-
sets of the data.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Pre-Deletion Post-Deletion Sample with Sample with
of Missing of Missing Directed W Undirected W
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Self-Reported GPA 2.699 0.788 2.713 0.790 2.749 0.785 2.736 0.786
Attitudes 0.000 0.875 0.016 0.861 0.084 0.833 0.060 0.841
Parental Attitudes about College
Two Parents in Low Category 0.082 0.274 0.079 0.269 0.074 0.262 0.075 0.264
One Parent in Low Category 0.112 0.316 0.111 0.314 0.102 0.303 0.104 0.305
Both Parents, or 1 Par H.H., in Middle C.D. 0.129 0.335 0.130 0.336 0.126 0.331 0.125 0.331
One Parent in High Category 0.290 0.454 0.285 0.452 0.282 0.450 0.279 0.449
Two Parents in High Category 0.416 0.493 0.423 0.494 0.444 0.497 0.442 0.497
Controls
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores -0.000 1.000 0.037 0.969 0.136 0.939 0.082 0.940
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced 3.148 1.231 3.168 1.237 3.217 1.227 3.188 1.226
Highest Parental Education 13.530 2.756 13.562 2.736 13.666 2.724 13.601 2.738
Single Parent Household 0.275 0.447 0.274 0.446 0.259 0.438 0.264 0.441
Number of Siblings 1.479 1.227 1.494 1.205 1.515 1.187 1.491 1.187
Female 0.489 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.492 0.500 0.501 0.500
Hispanic 0.204 0.403 0.196 0.397 0.183 0.387 0.194 0.395
Asian 0.147 0.354 0.140 0.347 0.155 0.362 0.145 0.352
Black 0.151 0.358 0.151 0.358 0.117 0.322 0.138 0.345
White 0.485 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.532 0.499 0.512 0.500
English Spoken in Home 0.848 0.359 0.855 0.352 0.853 0.354 0.852 0.355
Spanish Spoken in Home 0.102 0.303 0.098 0.298 0.097 0.296 0.102 0.302
Other Language Spoken in Home 0.051 0.219 0.047 0.211 0.050 0.218 0.046 0.210
School Grade 10.182 1.497 10.158 1.486 10.176 1.436 10.173 1.471
Observations 3702 3179 2174 2725
Half of the sample is female and this does not change from the initial sample. Ethnic-
ity/race indicators for Hispanic, Asian, black, and white are included with white used as the refer-
ence group in the analysis. Close to half the sample is white, with Hispanics composing an approx-
imately 18 percent share, Asians close to a 15 percent share, and blacks around 12 percent. These
values also stay consistent over the samples, excepts for blacks as noted previously. All indicators
for language spoken in the home stay consistent over the samples and the same is true for the aver-
age school grade level.
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4.2 Method: Spatial Econometrics
Empirically, I test both a model with own-attitudes as the dependent variable with peer
attitudes, expected family disappointment if failing to graduate college, and controls, and a model
with GPA—as a proxy for effort—as the dependent variable with peer GPA, own-attitudes, family
disappointment, and controls as covariates. Interpretation of parameter estimates, especially for
spill-over effects, does not rely solely on the coefficient estimates. These estimates do not take into
account the endogenous effect—the simultaneously determined interaction effect from the peer av-
erage of the dependent variable—and therefore do not fully capture effects from a change in a vari-
able. Investigating the implications from the theory, requires exploring both the endogenous effect
estimates and then the partial effects that give estimates of direct, indirect (spatial spill-overs) and
total effects from changes in an independent variable.
4.2.1 Empirical Model
For either own-attitudes or GPA as the dependent variable, the model can be expressed in
a general spatial econometric form. Borrowing some notation from Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) the
generalized nesting spatial (GNS) model is given by
Y = lκs + λWY +Xβ +WXϕ+ u, (4.1)
where spatial autocorrelation in the error is captured by us = ρ0Wsus + ϵs and has s = 1, ..., ŝ
denotes the schools, with ŝ the total number of schools, ns the number of observations in a school,
and N =
∑ŝ
s=1 ns the total sample size. ϵs is an i.i.d error component with zero mean and vari-
ance σ20 . l is a vector of ones and κs the school intercept. Y is the N × 1 vector of outcomes and
X is the N × k matrix of variables that include family ideals, the controls, and, in the case of the
GPA model, own-attitudes about a school. λ is the endogenous social interaction effect—network
effect—corresponding in the theory section to δp or θp. Again, W is row-normalized, thus WY
returns the weighted average of the peer dependent variable. β is the k × 1 vector of coefficients.
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The weighted average peer variables corresponding to those in X are introduced as the lag of X by
WX with ϕ the vector of corresponding coefficients.
Weighted average peer variables enter the model because the literature distinguishes be-
tween social interaction effects through λ and contextual peer effects. Ignoring the GNS with
fixed effects risks bias to estimates of the included parameters, because of potential endogenous,
contextual, and correlated effects, unless an excluded component can be justified with a zero effect.
In the absence of social interaction effects global spill-overs through the network do not exist, but
local spill-overs from contextual effects may.6
A variety of other spatial models can be obtained from the GNS model by restricting pa-
rameters to zero. Elhorst (2014) provides a full accounting for the taxonomy of spatial models.
I explored and compared these spatial models and conclude on presenting the Spatial Durbin
Model (SDM)—which sets ρ = 0—and the GNS model. Both of these models importantly in-
clude endogenous and contextual effects.
Average peer attitudes are omitted from the GPA model. Average effort in the peer group
is expected to track with the average attitudes, because both form measures that in the theory
match an ideal in the peer group expressed as a prototypical choice (effort) or trait (attitudes).
Thus, average performance in school by the peer group will track with the average peer group at-
titudes. In the empirics, this means average peer attitudes and average peer performance may be
collinear. I choose the average peer performance in the performance model and average peer at-
titudes in the attitudes model for the empirics to match the theory and to capture the simultane-
ity that arises from these actions occurring on a network that can lead to global spill-overs in the
network. Own-attitudes enters as a key explanatory variable to a school performance model as
motivated in the theory, and excluding peer average attitudes from the performance model, is the-
oretically motivated.
6. See Elhorst (2014), Epple and Romano (2011) and Manski (1993) for further detail.
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Estimation is by quasi maximum likelihood (QML). To illustrate the method for quasi-
maximum likelihood estimation, I present the estimator, with group fixed effects included only at
the school level.
The reduced form of equation 4.1 (dropping the s subscript for simplicity) is Y = S−1(Zδ0+
R−1ϵ), where S = (I − λW), Z = (l,X,WX), δ0 = (κ, β′, ϕ′), and R = (I − ρW). It is con-





j = I+ λW + λ2W2 + ...,
and given a row normalized weights matrix this implies the restriction that λ ∈ (−1, 1) else iden-
tification fails (Lesage and Pace 2009). A Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation frees the distur-
bance term from the spatial correlation component allowing the model to be expressed as
RSY = RZδ0 + ϵ. (4.2)
Now let the full parameter vector be θ = (δ′0, λ, ρ)′ and ϵ = R(SY − Zδ0). Assuming














Estimation of the spatial parameters λ and ρ is simplified by first concentrating 4.3 through maxi-
mizing with respect to δ0 and σ2 and using the closed form solutions to δ̂0 and σ̂2 to reduce 4.3 to
















Solving we can find that δ̂0 = (Z′R′RZ)−1ZR′RSY and using δ̂0 to solve for σ̂2 we can find
that σ̂2 = 1nY′S′R′PRSY, where P = I − RZ(Z′R′RZ)−1Z′R′. Lesage and Pace (2009)
makes an instructive point for the model that omits ρ, which can be extended here. Supposing
we knew the parameter values of λ and ρ we can estimate the remaining parameters with simple
OLS as evidenced by δ̂0. Therefore, concentrating out δ0 and ρ and obtaining the concentrated
likelihood function in terms of γ = (λ, ρ)′ allows first estimating γ and then using those estimates
to estimate δ̂0 with a basic regression. To obtain the concentrated likelihood function, input the














(SY − Zδ̂0)′R′R(SY − Zδ̂0).
This expression reduces to a function of γ and a constant term k that does not depend on γ. The
concentrated log-likelihood is a partial likelihood and given by
LL(γ) = k − n
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The quasi-maximum likelihood estimates for γ from 2.3 can now be obtained and in turn used to
obtain estimates for δ0.7
7. See Lesage and Pace (2009), Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010), and Burridge, Elhorst, and Zigova (2014) for more on the
concentrated likelihood function in its different forms for different spatial models. Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) provide
formal proofs of identification and asymptotic results for the GNS social interaction model, with a row-normalized
spatial weight matrix, and homoskedastic errors. Methods other than ML exist to include generalized spatial two-stage
least squares (GS2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM), and Bayesian techniques. See Kelejian and Prucha
(1998), Lee (2003), Lee (2007b), Liu, Lee, and Bollinger (2010), and Lesage and Pace (2009) for more details on
alternative estimation methods.
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A primary difficulty is the calculation of the derivatives for the logged determinant terms
and the assumption of constant variance across spatial units. Lesage and Pace (2009) provide an
overview of methods for these calculations and multiple software packages now contain routines
to estimate the QML model with homoskedastic errors. In the case of heteroskedastic errors,
Burridge, Elhorst, and Zigova (2014) note that closed form solutions from the unconcentrated
log-likelihood function in 4.3 are no longer available. Kelejian and Prucha (2010) develop the gen-
eralized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) approach, along with a generalized method of
moments routine for the calculation of ρ, in the presence of heteroskedastic errors. The tradeoff,
noted in footnote 15 of Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010), is that relying on the lagged X variables for in-
struments may result in weak identification with weak WX instruments and the results can be
sensitive to interaction between the instruments and model specification. Burridge, Elhorst, and
Zigova (2014) discuss an ML extension for heteroskedasticity in the GNS model but do not ex-
tend it to the case of group fixed effects. Lesage and Pace (2009) put heavy emphasis on Bayesian
approaches for spatial models with heteroskedasticity but do not consider those in the case of the
GNS model. Neither Lin (2010) nor Lin (2015) in peer effects application papers using the GNS
model mention heteroskedasticity. Thus, the econometric state of accounting for heteroskedastic-
ity in a peer effects model is still young and worth considering further in the future.
4.2.2 Interpretation
Parameter interpretation in spatial models is more complicated than with a typical regres-
sion model. Write the reduced form of the GNS model in 4.1 as
Y = (I− λW)−1(Xβ +WXϕ) +V, (4.5)
where V contains the school intercepts and error terms. The identity matrix, I, is N ×N .8
8. I drop the s subscript for simplicity.
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= (I− λW)−1(Iβk +Wϕk). (4.6)
The expression in 4.6 is the empirical counterpart to the theoretical network profile of NE in 3.4.
Taking the derivative of 4.5 for the kth variable and all adolescents in the sample returns the ma-
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. (4.7)
The expression in 4.7 is a matrix of partial effects for the kth variable that gives the direct effects
on the diagonal, indirect effects off the diagonal, and total effects as either the row or column sum
multiplied by (I− λW)−1, which is sometimes referred to as the spatial or, in this case, social mul-
tiplier. These are taken for each individual spatial unit, adolescent in my data, thus the marginal
effects can differ across people. Lesage and Pace (2009) recommend reporting the average of the
direct effects on the diagonal and the average of the row or column sums for the average total ef-
fects that includes both the direct and indirect effects.9 The row sum in 4.7 gives the total impact
on i’s outcome that occurs from changing an independent variable by the same amount across all
observations in a network. A column sum gives the total impact on the outcomes of all individuals
in the network that occur from a change in an independent variable for a single, jth observation.
It turns out that the row and column sums are equal and only the chosen interpretation that dif-
fers.10
9. In the case of own-attitudes in the GPA model, average peer attitudes is omitted therefore the off-diagonals of 4.7
are all zero and spill-over effects only run through the social multiplier matrix for a change in own-attitudes.
10. See Lesage and Pace (2009) for a detailed accounting of this fact.
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The average direct effect provides the estimated average impact on an individual’s depen-
dent variable for a change in an independent variable. For example, the average direct effect for
own-attitudes in the GPA model will provide the estimated average impact on an adolescent’s
GPA for a one unit change in attitudes. The average direct effect includes the feedback effects
that return to the adolescent through the simultaneity and through the spatial lag in the explana-
tory variable. Finally, taking the difference between the average total effect and the average direct
effect gives the average indirect effect.
Indirect effects are the social spill-overs. Social spill-overs are impacts on the outcomes
of those linked to an adolescent i, running from a change in a variable for i to those linked in the
network. For instance, the indirect effect of a change in the attitudes of adolescent i is the spill-
over effect to those directly linked to i and then on to those linked with i’s peers and so forth. This
can be summed up as the impacts xik → yj . The average indirect effects represent cumulative
average impacts over the network (not including i) from a change in xik. Therefore, estimates of
indirect effects can be larger than direct effects, but keep in mind that it is an estimate of the aver-
age cumulative spill-over in the network from a change in xik.11 In an attitudes model, the effect
of peer attitudes (λ) will test for the network effects in attitudes that create spill-over effects sug-
gested in the theory. Average direct effects allow testing for the influence of transmitted family
ideals—as proxied by parental college disappointment—in shaping an adolescent’s attitudes about
school. The indirect effect estimates for family ideals then test for the presence of spill-overs in at-
titudes from changes in family ideals. Because I use indicators of parental college disappointment
to proxy the family ideals, the low indicators are expected to have negative average direct and indi-
rect effects and the high indicators positive average direct and indirect effects. Combined this links
the spatial econometric empirical model to the theoretical model for production of own-attitudes.
Moreover, testing for direct and indirect effects from changes in family expectations tests whether
the family influence creates spill-overs by working through the presence of peer effects. It does
11. For a more detailed explanation of the indirect effect estimates as average cumulative effect estimates over the
network see LeSage and Dominguez (2012) and Lesage and Pace (2009).
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so by exploring whether changes in family expectations have influence to other adolescents in
a school through the presence of endogenous peer effects. This not a test of moderating effects.
Rather, it is a test of spill-overs in the presence of peer effects when the change in the independent
variable is strong enough.
In a GPA model, the effect of peer GPA (λ) will test for the network effects in GPA con-
sistent with a conforming effect suggested in the theory. Average direct effects allow testing for
the influence of own-attitudes on performance. A positive estimate will be consistent with the
theory and suggest family and peer influence on own-attitudes will affect performance in school.
Also, average direct effects can examine the influence of family college disappointment as a con-
forming effect. Average indirect effects will test for spill-overs in performance across a school-
network for changes in own-attitudes and changes in family college disappointment. Combined
this links the spatial econometric empirical model to the theoretical model for choice of effort.
In chapter 2 and 3 I discuss how family and peer group ideals may combine or compete.
The above discussion on spatial partial effects, especially indirect effects, setups up how I can ex-
plore the consequences of a change in parental expectations, my proxy for family ideals, that be-
cause of the addition of peer networks in a school may generate spillovers in the network. This
holds constant any other change in the peer group that will also create influence through peer ef-
fects. In that sense it tests whether family influence has multiplier effects because of peers. How-
ever, in the case that peer effects are present, it also informs us that any other change working
through the peer group can compete with the family effect on adolescent.
For example, consider an adolescent named John whose parents attend a workshop on fi-
nancial aid and then raise their collegiate expectations. If that has a positive influence on John’s
attitudes, then John positively influences his peers’ attitudes in the presence of social interaction
effects, holding all else constant. However, because of these social interaction effects if something
else also changes among the peers then John will recieve spillovers in reverse. For example, sup-
pose Sally and Tim are John’s friends and they hang out in a group. They begin to feel rejected at
their school and are convinced that the teachers are out to get them. This lowers their attitudes
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about school and they see themselves in opposition to academics. Because, of social interaction
effects when John deviates by raising his attitudes in response to his parent’s expectations he is
pulled in two different directions. Thus, in this case the two groups compete in terms of their con-
forming influences. John’s spillover to Sally and Tim may not be large enough to overcome their
feeling of being outcasts at the school. Exploring for evidence of social interaction effects, direct
effects from parental educational expectations, and indirect effects from parental educational ex-
pectations allows me to more generally explore this story. If all three are present, then it is indeed
possible for their to be combined and/or competing effects from family and peer groups.
4.3 Identification
4.3.1 Peer Effects
Identification of peer effects faces a number of concerns. Simultaneity from including the
weighted average of peer outcomes introduces linear dependence between peer outcomes and peer
characteristics. Manski (1993) dubs this the “reflection problem”. Lack of identification results
from large group means defining the peer average outcome. As a result, there is little, or no, varia-
tion in peer group means over the sample. The effect of peer average outcomes (the endogenous ef-
fect) and peer contextual effects cannot be separately identified. Network data, however, can break
the linear dependence between peer outcomes and peer characteristics. Variation in the interac-
tion groups is critical. Lee (2007a) studying the use of spatial econometric models for peer effects
shows that with more variation identification is stronger. With network data defining the individ-
ual’s reference group, average peer outcomes and characteristics are now specific to the individual.
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) formally show that the “reflection problem” is solved in
the presence of second order peers linked to first order peers but not to the individual.12 Extend-
12. This implies intransitive triads such that for the set of i,j,k people where {i, j} and {j, k} are linked persons i
and k are not linked. Without unobserved heterogeneity, this means that if I, W, and W2 are linearly independent
social effects are identified. Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) also show that I, W, W2, and W3 must be linearly
independent when controlling for correlated effects for identification to hold.
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ing to control for correlated effects requires the existence of third order peers for identification to
hold. I have checked my data by school-network and these conditions hold.
Correlated effects from shared environments and peer group selection are additional threats
to the identification of peer effects (Epple and Romano 2011). Leaving correlated effects unac-
counted for may lead the researcher to believe they have estimated peer effects, when in reality the
outcomes of individuals and peers are similar because of unobserved, shared environments that af-
fect the dependent variable. I include school fixed effects to control for shared environments and
estimate the spatial correlation component to potentially control for unobserved heterogeneity in
peer selection.
It is possible a school may consist of multiple macro-group structures such that all mem-
bers of the macro-group can be connected by a path of some length. Fixed effects at the macro-
group level suffer from the incidental parameters problems. This occurs because the number of
macro-group fixed effects will grow at the same rate as the sample size. Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010)
introduce a panel like within transformation to avoid this problem. However, Burridge, Elhorst,
and Zigova (2014) find that this can introduce multi-collinearity and reject the GNS model with
macro-group fixed effects in comparison to other spatial models with their data. Therefore, I in-
clude the school fixed effect to capture correlated environmental effects at the school level but this
may leave some macro-group heterogeneity unaccounted for.13
Moffit (2001) points out that correlated effects can also arise from omitted variables that
represent the friendship selection process. Spatial econometrics makes it possible to estimate cor-
relation in the error terms between spatial units—adolescents in this case—that varies at the group
level. Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) suggest that controlling for this correlation component (ρ) can re-
duce some of the bias from a misspecified model, as far as there are omitted variables related to
13. As will be seen in the results, estimation of the endogenous effect, λ, in the GPA model turns out to be strikingly
similar to its estimation in Lin (2010) who uses the panel like within transformation proposed by Lee, Liu, and Lin
(2010) at the school-grade level and the full Add Health sample, thus unobserved correlated effects at a lower level than
the school fixed effect appears to not be an issue.
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self-selection into peer groups. Games of complements played on networks suggest environments
where peer effects exist naturally imply spatial dependence.
The spatial dependence is tied through the endogenous effect of peer behavior, contextual
effects, and the potential correlated effects in the error term. Each individual is impacted by their
reference group. With schooling and friendship, the reference group sensibly results from a pro-
cess of self-selection into a friend group. The correlated spatial dependence now represents both
impacts from common shocks and selection effects based on shared tastes and preferences (though
it may not capture all of the effects from self-selection; see Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) for more de-
tail). If there exists friend group selection around shared preferences for the dependent variable
in question, then failing to control for this spatial correlation will result in upward bias of the en-
dogenous effect parameter. For example, in this case, positive correlation in grades resulting from
similar preferences for school performance will be missatributed to the performance of peers which
increases the estimated peer effect. Whereas, if there exists group selection around other behaviors,
instead of the one under study, then failing to control for spatial correlation can still result in a bias
to the peer effect and may even result in a downward bias.
For example, suppose unobservable preferences that determine peer group selection bring
peers together who have dissimilar unobservables in school performance conditional on peer per-
formance. Now, the residuals between peers will be negatively correlated in a performance model
and decrease the estimated effect of peer performance on own-performance. In essence, this would
be a case of distance between peers in terms of grades because of unobservables that once con-
trolled for indicate the influence of peer grades is actually stronger.
Where network theory literature informs interpretation of estimated effects, the spatial
econometrics literature has made advances regarding how those estimates can be obtained in face
of the “reflection problem” and unobserved correlated effects. Additionally, Add Health provides a
rich set of characteristics that may relate to peer group selection and which I include in the control
variables.
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Later, I consider an alternative method for estimating the endogenous peer effect. The
results of Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) imply that indirect links (peers of peers) form
natural exclusion restrictions. Thus, I use the characteristics of peers of peers as instruments for the
endogenous peer effect, to compare against those of the spatial models with the spatial correlation
term.
4.3.2 Attitudes and Family Ideals
The theoretical framework from chapter 3 and the empirical framework of this chapter
for the attitudes model assumes that current period GPA does not determine the individual’s cur-
rent period attitudes about school. Grades from previous periods may reasonably play a role in
building attitudes about academics through motivation or confidence. The influence of past period
GPA could be captured by a confidence variable. If none exists and past period GPA is not avail-
able, then there is an omitted variables problem. Ability, however, may hurt confidence through
preventing a person from doing well or help confidence in the opposite case. We know that IQ is
rank stable after the age of 10 (Heckman and Mosso 2014), so variation in current period attitudes
from confidence in one’s ability may be captured in an ability proxy for adolescents. I include the
Add Health Peabody Picture Vocabulary test scores as an ability proxy.
Parental educational expectations may still be simultaneously determined with an adoles-
cents own-attitudes and performance. I recognize this point. In this study, I descriptively explore
the role of these educational expectations and focus identification on the peer effects and on the
effect of attitudes on school performance. Disentangling the relationship between parental expec-
tations and adolescent attitudes, or other outcomes, is for future work.
As a possible test for the impact of attitudes on performance free of simultaneity, I use
data from wave II in robustness checks and explore the impact of the previous period attitudes on
wave II GPA.14 Furthermore, I consider past period attitudes as instruments for the effect of cur-
rent period attitudes. These checks are presented with caution, because bias from serial correlation
14. The last wave for the high school period of Add Health respondents.
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between periods cannot be ruled out and a third wave of high school data does not exist to appro-
priately instrument for the time lagged effects15 Finally, I check the effect of attitudes on years of
educational attainment drawn from wave four of the data, the last available wave. This last check
removes simultaneity and aims to offer an alternative measure of effort.
Estimated effects for family ideal indicators could suffer from unobserved adolescent abil-
ity, unobserved heterogeneity in the family background, and potential simultaneity with the ado-
lescent’s attitudes or performance. An ability proxy is included for the first issue and several mea-
sures for family background effects are included to control for the second issue. For the case of
simultaneity, I argue that the adolescent’s attitudes are unlikely to predict the families academic
ideals unless parents are adjusting their ideals to their children’s behavior. More likely parent’s ad-
just their enforcement of ideals to the behavior, when holding constant ability.
4.4 Data and Methods Summary
In this chapter, details on the data, variable creation, spatial econometric methods, and
identification have been discussed in the context of studying family and peer influences on schoo-
ing attitudes and performance. Data from Add Health provides the ability to proxy family ideals
as educational expectations and to observe the peers an adolescent identifies with. Furthermore, a
range of questions feasibly allows proxying an adolescent’s attitudes about school.
I use spatial econometrics to test both direct and spill-over effects suggested by the theory.
Spatial model partial effects closely match the profiles of Nash Equilibria derived in the theory
of two groups in the previous chapter. Thus, the Add Health Data operationalizes the key theory
variables and spatial econometrics facilitates testing it.




This chapter explores descriptive relationships between the key variables of interest. These
were motivated in the theory chapter and discussed operationally in the data and methods chap-
ter. The factor score variable I relate to attitudes about school was constructed mean zero with
a standard deviation of one from reports of desire for college, how likely the respondent thinks
they will go to college, feeling apart of the school, happy at school, feeling teachers are fair, and
feeling close to people at school for own-attitudes, as discussed in the data and methods chapter.
Hereafter, I simply refer to it as attitudes or own-attitudes. Family ideals are proxied by the in-
dicators constructed from parental college disappointment and self-reported grade point average
(GPA) proxies effort in school. Where useful, I provide descriptive relationships from both the
full sample of the saturated schools post-listwise deletion of missing data and the sample post-
construction of the directed graph spatial weights matrix. In all cases, the descriptive patterns of
interest do not change with the loss of data. For conciseness and ease of comparison, I present
these side by side but the focus is on exploring the descriptive associations.
In general, the descriptive analyses show that the variables and data selected have varia-
tion consistent with my expectations from the theory. We do not directly observe family or peer
ideals. To proxy these concepts can be admittedly difficult. I bring expectations to the data from
the theoretical component of this dissertation. The data and variables from Add Health appear to
descriptively match some of those expectations, motivating the study of the spatial econometric
results in the next chapter.
The four key components are parental collegiate expectations, attitudes about school, per-
formance in school, and peer effects. Five points are drawn from the descriptive analysis to ex-
plore these key components. I first present evidence consistent with theoretical expectations on
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the associations between parental expectations and attitudes about school and performance in
school. Second, there is a positive correlation between own-attitudes about school and perfor-
mance. Third, attitudes are positively related to peer attitudes and GPA to peer GPA. Also, when
split over parental expectations it appears that as parental expectations move from low to high ado-
lescents have better attitudes for a given average of peer attitudes. Thus, those with low parental
expectations and low peer attitudes have much lower attitudes about school than any other group.
This pattern is repeated, though less drastically, for GPA. Fifth, the association between GPA and
peer GPA shifts down for those with below average attitudes about school, which indicates that
own-attitudes is still correlated with performance when conditioning on peer performance as ex-
pected.
5.1 Empirical Distributions of Attitudes and GPA by Parental Collegiate Expectations
Figures 5 and 6 explore the empirical densities of own-attitudes about school and GPA by
indicators for parental college disappointment. Both present the same graphic from the full sample
(left panel) and the sample post-construction of the directed graph spatial weights matrix (right
panel), as a quick check against the loss of observations in the sample with the directed graph. The
primary point here is that parental expectations are related to attitudes in a manner consistent with
the theory.
In figure 5, the patterns between both panels are the same. Differences in the distribution
of attitudes by parental college disappointment do not appear to be affected by the loss of observa-
tions after construction of the spatial weights matrix.
Parental college disappointment is the selected proxy for ideals on education transmitted
by the family to the respondent. In the theoretical model, lower family ideals lower an adolescent’s
malleable attitudes about school. Figure 5 shows a descriptive story consistent with this expecta-
tion. The empirical density of attitudes shifts to the right—towards better attitudes—as parental
expectation for college rise. Having either one or two parents with low expectations corresponds
with a much higher density over poor attitudes, than either one or two parents in the high cate-
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gories. Having parents in the middle, say neutral expectations, splits the difference between the
low and high categories. Descriptively, adolescents with parents who indicate higher expectations










−4 −2 0 2
Attitudes
Two Par. Low One Par. Low
Par. Middle One Par. High
Two Par High










−4 −2 0 2
Attitudes
Two Par. Low One Par. Low
Par. Middle One Par. High
Two Par High
Sample with Directed W
Figure 5. Density of Attitudes Index by Parental College Disappointment Categories
Figure 6 shows the empirical density for adolescent GPA by parental college disappoint-
ment indicators. It too indicates that the differences between level of parental expectations do not
change much from the loss of observations in the sample post-construction of the spatial weights
matrix. The differences by parental expectations are again as expected with the empirical density
of GPA improving as parental expectations increase. While not as pronounced as in figure 5, these
differences show there is variation in performance by level of parental collegiate expectations.
In figure 6, adolescent’s with two parent’s in the high expectations category have markedly
stronger performance. This, of course, could result from a variety of other factors, but it does ap-
pear to suggest that it is important to break down parental college disappointment into indicators
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that account for whether collegiate expectations are the same or different in a family. Also, on
the low expectations side having one parent in the low category returns an empirical distribution
shifted to the left of two parents in the low category. On the whole, GPA densities for the one
parent low and two parent low categories are worse than other categories as expected. Why the
one parent low category is further left than the two is not entirely clear, but it may simply result
from additional factors in single parent homes who all enter on the one parent low, one parent
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Figure 6. Density of GPA by Parental College Disappointment Categories
5.2 Associations Between GPA, Attitudes, and Peer Outcomes
Figure 7 shows the simple association between GPA and own-attitudes. Stata’s binscatter
command was used to construct the graphs. Each dot represents the mean of equal sized bins of
observations. The left panel is from the full sample and the right panel the sample with the spatial
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weights matrix. The results are qualitatively unchanged. Both panels show a clear linear associa-
tion between GPA and own-attitudes. This is consistent with my expectations from the theory.
Recall that in the theory model own-attitudes positively impacts effort by lowering the cost of ef-
fort. Adolescents on the lower end of the attitudes distribution are associated with much worse
school performance than those on the higher. Furthermore, having very high attitudes is associ-










−2 −1 0 1 2
Own Attitudes about School










−2 −1 0 1 2
Own Attitudes about School
Sample with Directed W
Figure 7. Descriptive Association Between GPA and Own-Attitudes
Figure 8 explores the descriptive relationships between attitudes and peer average attitudes
in the left panel and GPA and peer average GPA in the right panel. In each case, the relationships
are delineated by parental collegiate expectations and estimated with the Lowess smoothing esti-
mator. Attitudes are positively associated with peer attitudes and GPA with peer GPA for every
level of parental expectations. In the left panel of figure 8, parental collegiate expectations shifts
the trend line between attitudes and peer attitudes up as the expectations increase. It appears that
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parental expectations may combine with or compete against peer attitudes. Adolescents with fami-
lies in the high college disappointment categories but with peers who have poor attitudes are asso-
ciated with considerably worse attitudes. Their attitudes are much better than adolescents with low
parental expectations and low average peer attitudes. But, their attitudes are much worse than ado-
lescents with high parental expectations and high average peer attitudes. Adolescents for whom
families have low expectations and average peer attitudes are low are associated with markedly
worse attitudes than any other group. There does appear to be some convergence towards the ex-
treme end of average peer attitudes. However, because of a small numbers of observations at the
extreme ends of the attitudes distribution not much can be assessed. At all levels of peer attitudes
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Figure 8. Descriptive Association Between Attitudes and Peer Attitudes and GPA and Peer GPA by
Parental College Disappointment Indicators
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In the right panel of figure 8, the pattern between parental collegiate expectations and
the trend between GPA and average peer GPA is similar to that of attitudes, though not quite as
pronounced—unless comparing the one parent low category with the two parent high category.
Again, adolescents for whom families have stronger expectations and average peer performance is
high are associated with the best performance. And, adolescents for whom families have the low-
est expectations and average peer performance is low are associated with the worst performance.
Overall, this is consistent with the theoretical implication that family ideals and peer group ide-
als may combine or compete. When both groups have high ideals, strong incentives are exerted
for high effort, and when both groups have low ideals, strong incentives are exerted for low effort.
Competing ideals result in incentives that push effort in different directions. The associations re-
ported in figure 8 are consistent with this, but of course, may be the result of a variety of other
factors.
Figure 9 plots GPA against average peer GPA by own-attitudes less than zero (the mean
of the attitudes index) and own-attitudes greater than zero. With very poor peer performance,
GPA is quite low, but it is substantially worse when own-attitudes are negative. At some points on
the curve, the difference is as great as 0.5 GPA points. At very high levels of peer performance the
difference does not appear to be so drastic, yet those with negative attitudes trail below those with
positive attitudes.
The plotted associations in figure 9 are consistent with the hypothesis that own-attitudes—
though possibly impacted by peer attitudes—can have independent effects from the peer group.
Even very high peer performance does not remove the difference between negative and positive
own-attitudes. Clearly, this is only descriptive but it is suggestive that peers and own-attitudes
may have effects on performance in line with the expectations from the theory.
The descriptive analyses for the operationalized key variables matches expectations from
theory. I observe consistent patterns between family college expectations and attitudes and fam-
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ily college expectations and GPA with both the full sample post-listwise deletion of missing data
and the smaller analyses sample post-construction of the directed graph spatial weights matrix.
Associations between family college expectations and attitudes indicate higher expectations are
correlated with better attitudes about school. Similarly, higher family expectations are correlated
with better performance in school. Own-attitudes is strongly correlated with GPA. Peer attitudes
and peer GPA are also strongly associated with own-attitudes and own-GPA. Finally, the nega-
tive correlation between poor attitudes about school and performance remains as peer GPA rises.
This is consistent with own-attitudes being produced by multiple sources, not only the peers, and
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Using Add Health data, this chapter investigates results from the empirical model defined
in chapter four linked to the theory in chapter three. Descriptive analyses in chapter five show that
associations between respondents’ report of expected parental college disappointment if they fail
to graduate college (my proxy for family ideals) and the outcomes—own-attitudes about school
and performance—are consistent with the theory. Chapter five also illustrated that GPA is corre-
lated with own-attitudes and peer average GPA and that own-attitudes are correlated with peer
attitudes. This chapter explores each of these points with the spatial econometric models described
in chapter four. Furthermore, I test for spill-over effects, as discussed in the theory on two group
identity influences (chapter 3), from changes in family college expectations and own-attitudes.
Spill-over effects in spatial models are not simply the coefficient estimates on lagged peer
variables. As discussed and shown in chapter four, the partial effects from spatial models include
social multiplier effects from the endogenous social interaction effect of the average outcome among
the peers multiplied against the individual level and lagged peer covariates (sometimes called con-
textual peer effects). I use the direct, indirect, and total effects suggested by Lesage and Pace (2009)
and defined in chapter four to interpret the main spatial model results. Again, the direct effect
from a change in a variable on the outcome includes both the influence that is solely individual
and the network effect that goes out through the network and returns influence back to the indi-
vidual through simultaneity. The indirect effect is the average influence from a change in a variable
for an individual out across the network. The total effect is the overall average aggregate effect in-
cluding the direct and indirect effects.
I present the general nesting and spatial Durbin models as the main models of interest.
The peer effects literature reviewed in chapter two motivates the inclusion of lagged peer variables
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in both outcomes and other covariates, and the spatial econometric literature applied to peer ef-
fects motivates the estimation of the spatial correlation term in the residuals. By including lagged
peer variables in both the outcome and covariates multiple types of peer effects are allowed. En-
dogenous effects from simultaneity between one’s own outcome and peer outcomes can create
social multiplier effects—meaning that any change in a variable that impacts the dependent vari-
able for some adolescents will create even stronger effects by influencing other adolescents. One
adolescent’s attitude about school improves from a change in the home environment, for example,
then the presence of peer effects in attitudes implies improvement in the attitudes of those con-
nected. Peer effects stemming from a change in one adolescent’s home environment do not imply
social multipler effects. For example, if the improvement in an adolescent’s home environment also
comes with increased school support from the family then other adolescents may be influenced as
well, creating contextual effects.
In chapter four, I defined the general nesting spatial model, which includes all types of
spatial effects. The spatial correlation term (ρ) may capture some unobserved variation from peer
group selection around the dependent variable of interest.1 The spatial Durbin model omits ρ but
still includes endogenous and contextual peer effects. Therefore, I present the general nesting and
spatial Durbin models to explore the impact of peer effects with and without the control for spatial
correlation in the residuals between an adolescent and her peers. Other restrictions of the spatial
models—discussed in chapter four—-were explored but in each case either the general nesting or
spatial Durbin model returned a better fit of the data. Furthermore, the presence of a positive and
significant effect from peer outcomes in both the attitudes and performance models and of some
significant contextual peer variables is consistent with the presence of multiple types of peer ef-
fects as motivated in the larger peer effects literature. Thus, I conclude that the general nesting and
spatial durbin models are the appropriate models to present based on the past literature, potential
endogeniety problems from omitting them, and my results.
1. See Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) and Lin (2015) for more discussion of this point.
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The main findings from this chapter are largely consistent with theoretical predictions
made for adolescent effort in school and the production of own-attitudes. Estimates on peer ef-
fects from GPA and own-attitudes are positive and significant, suggesting social multipliers in
those models. This evidence is also consistent with conforming effects from peer group ideals and
expectations as motivated in the theory. Additionally, family expectations on college are found to
be highly important to the production of own-attitudes but less so in their direct effect on perfor-
mance, suggesting that family ideals may work more to build attitudes and aspirations for educa-
tion than to impart conforming incentives. Finally, the empirical evidence shows spill-over effects
in a school-network from family college expectations exist, especially in the attitudes models, and
the empirical evidence shows evidence for spill-overs from changes in own-attitudes for GPA. The
results suggest that targeting mechanisms related to both family and peer ideals over education
can positively impact an adolescent’s educational attitudes and outcomes, and in turn, send effects
across a school network.
6.1 Spatial Model Results
Table 4 presents the model results for GPA as the dependent variable in the first two
columns and attitudes as the dependent variable in the last two columns. School fixed effects are
included for all models to capture school-level correlated effects. For the primary model results in
table 4, the endogenous effect for GPA and attitudes and the spatial correlation terms are the esti-
mated parameters of interest. I leave consideration of the impact from changes in covariates to the
partial effects.
Endogenous effects, in table 4, for average peer GPA are positive and highly significant.
The endogenous effect in the GNS model is estimated to be 0.440 and the correlation compo-
nent −0.249. This is consistent with previous research. Lin (2010) who estimates a GPA speci-
fication with the GNS model—but with a different specification from mine and using the entire
Add Health sample—finds an endogenous effect of 0.473 with a correlation estimate of −0.237 in
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her table 6. Her estimate for the endogenous effect in the SDM with fixed effects is also relatively
similar to my SDM endogenous effect estimate.
The positive estimates for the endogenous effect implies that social multipliers are present
in the network from changes in GPA. Further, identity theory suggests that the parameter esti-
mate for average peer GPA proxies the incentives to conform to the peer group ideal, leading to
complementary effects in GPA between the individual and the peers. The empirical presence of
this effect provides evidence this occurs and that global spill-overs will occur from changes to vari-
ables that impact performance.
Average peer attitudes are omitted from the GPA model as described in the empirical
model section. Models including it were estimated. Compared to models without average peer
attitudes the estimate for the endogenous effect (peer average GPA) barely changed in either the
SDM or the GNS. However, the parameter estimate on peer average attitudes is close to zero with
a p-value above 0.9 in the SDM but slightly negative with a p-value less than 0.05 in the GNS.
An OLS omitting the average peer GPA and including the average peer attitudes, returns a pos-
itive and highly significant effect for peer attitudes. Thus, when the endogenous effect is omit-
ted the cofficient on peer average attitudes is positive and significant. Including peer GPA in the
SDM, the coefficient on peer average attitudes is near zero and in the GNS, where the effect of
peer average GPA increases in magnitude, the average peer attitude parameter estimate becomes
negative and significant. Parameter estimates for other variables were not affected—to include
own-attitudes. This supports the idea that average peer attitudes proxy the group ideal and the av-
erage peer GPA is an expression of that ideal, meaning they proxy the same thing and should not
both be included.
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Table 4. Spatial Models for GPA and Attitudes (W1)
GPA Attitudes
(SDM) (GNS) (SDM) (GNS)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Endogenous Effect (Peer Avg. of D.V.) 0.237*** 0.440*** 0.193*** 0.316***





Parental Attitudes on College
Two Parents in Low -0.004 -0.007 -0.335*** -0.328***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.076) (0.076)
One Parent in Low -0.090* -0.094* -0.222*** -0.213***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.060) (0.060)
One Parent in High 0.083* 0.086** 0.117** 0.115**
(0.043) (0.042) (0.050) (0.049)
Two Parents in High 0.084* 0.079* 0.249*** 0.248***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.055) (0.055)
Controls
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.010 0.008
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced 0.008 0.008 -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Highest Parental Education 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.018** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Single Parent Household -0.050 -0.051 -0.058 -0.059
(0.041) (0.041) (0.048) (0.047)
Number of Siblings in Home -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Female 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.086** 0.085**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
Hispanic -0.033 -0.055 0.022 0.041
(0.074) (0.075) (0.085) (0.087)
Asian 0.044 0.025 -0.011 -0.005
(0.085) (0.087) (0.099) (0.100)
Black 0.011 0.014 -0.112 -0.102
(0.092) (0.096) (0.106) (0.110)
Spanish Spoken in Home 0.080 0.078 0.032 0.033
(0.069) (0.070) (0.080) (0.081)
Other Language Spoken in Home 0.071 0.053 -0.010 -0.013
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued
GPA Attitudes
(SDM) (GNS) (SDM) (GNS)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
(0.076) (0.077) (0.088) (0.089)
School Grade 0.026 0.036 0.053** 0.057**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
Peer Average of Parental Attitudes
Two Parents in Low -0.227** -0.171* -0.228** -0.179*
(0.091) (0.090) (0.105) (0.108)
One Parent in Low -0.044 -0.001 -0.197** -0.186**
(0.077) (0.075) (0.089) (0.088)
One Parent in High -0.134** -0.127** 0.006 -0.016
(0.062) (0.060) (0.072) (0.072)
Two Parents in High 0.032 0.009 0.024 -0.016
(0.067) (0.065) (0.077) (0.079)
Peer Average of Controls
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.019 -0.015 0.030 0.031
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced -0.019 -0.021 -0.002 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Highest Parental Edu 0.004 -0.003 0.042*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Single Parent Household 0.060 0.052 0.104 0.101
(0.057) (0.056) (0.066) (0.065)
Peer Number of Siblings in Home 0.007 0.002 0.028 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.049 -0.087** -0.013 -0.019
(0.044) (0.042) (0.050) (0.050)
Hispanic 0.036 0.084 -0.033 -0.064
(0.093) (0.093) (0.108) (0.109)
Asian 0.081 0.066 0.026 0.002
(0.099) (0.099) (0.114) (0.115)
Black -0.136 -0.098 0.100 0.085
(0.102) (0.105) (0.119) (0.121)
Spanish Spoken in Home 0.082 0.038 0.242** 0.218**
(0.087) (0.087) (0.101) (0.102)
Other Language Spoken in Home 0.174* 0.132 0.214* 0.193*
(0.095) (0.094) (0.109) (0.109)
School Grade -0.028 -0.042 -0.058* -0.063**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant 1.490*** 1.153*** -0.819*** -0.700***
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued
GPA Attitudes
(SDM) (GNS) (SDM) (GNS)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
(0.249) (0.216) (0.286) (0.267)
School Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2174 2174 2174 2174
Likelihood −2104.282 −2097.989 −2420.532 −2419.479
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. SDM = Spatial Durbin
Model, GNS = General Nesting Model
The endogenous effect in the GNS model for both GPA and attitudes is larger than in
the SDM because of the negative estimates on the spatial correlation component. A negative spa-
tial correlation suggests that omitting it from the model returns an estimate of the endogenous
effect that is biased downward (per Lin (2015)). Lin (2010) finds a negative estimate of the cor-
relation term in a GPA spatial model with the Add Health data. Lin (2015) finds the same result
for spatial models studying peer effects over a variety of behaviors with the Add Health data. She
comments in footnote 22 that such negative correlation implies negative selection on the depen-
dent variable in friendship formation. This, she suggests, implies common tastes on the outcome
of study is not driving friendship formation. Alternatively, as I discuss in chapter 4.3, this could
relate to a case of distance between peers in terms of grades because of unobservables that once
controlled for indicate the influence of peer grades is actually stronger.2 Still, however, I recognize
that peer group selection bias could remain a problem in the endogenous effect estimate, because
I have not modeled the network formation. Estimating ρ provides a step towards reducing bias
from the misspecified model that omits determinants of network formation that also influence the
outcome.
2. I did explore omitting peer grades from the model but including the spatial error correlation. When I did this, I
found a positive and significant value for ρ. This supports the idea that once we control for peer grades the correlation
in the residuals is capturing variation from unobservables that create distance in grades.
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Multiple own and contextual effects from the included covariates are significant. The
presence of some significant contextual effects indicates that models omitting average peer vari-
ables for the covariates will miss these channels of peer effects, which can create spill-overs from
changes in a variable in addition to the presence of the endogenous effect. Direct and indirect ef-
fects are explored in the partial effects.
The attitude models, in columns 3 and 4 of table 4, test the assumptions from the theory
on the role of family and peer effects for the production of own-school attitudes (αi). In both
the SDM and GNS, the endogenous effect—or the impact from the weighted average attitudes
of peers—on own-attitudes is positive and highly significant, indicating a social multiplier effect
for attitudes about school. The magnitude of this effect ranges from 0.193 in the SDM model to
0.316 in the GNS model. Both models show that an adolescent’s peers’ attitudes influence their
own attitudes. This is captured in the theory as an assumption. The evidence here is at least con-
sistent with this assumption. Furthermore, this suggests there will be social effects in attitudes to
the average individual in the school that will result in spill-overs for changes in attitudes across a
school network.
With regards to peer group selection bias, the spatial correlation term is estimated to be
negative, but it is only significant at the 10 percent level. Again, this indicates that after control-
ling for correllation in residuals between peers the effect from peer attitudes is stronger. When ρ
is omitted the endogenous effect is biased downwards. If ρ fails to capture peer group selection
effects, then the SDM estimate is at least free of the “reflection problem”.
Own and contextual effects are present for multiple variable in the attitudes model. Among
the own controls and peer average controls several are significant.3 Again, direct and indirect ef-
fects for changes in explanatory variables are explored below.
3. The average of peer parental attitudes are the fraction of peers parents in each category of educational expecations.
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6.1.1 Partial Effects of Schooling Attitudes Model
Table 5 reports the average impacts on school attitudes to the individual and across the
network for changes in the independent variables using the results of the models reported in ta-
ble 4. The direct, indirect, and total effects are average effects from a change in a variable. The
indirect effects allow testing for the presence and strength of spatial spill-overs in each variable. El-
horst (2014) explains that in an OLS model the coefficients are the direct effects, or the effect of
a change in x on the attitudes, but they do not include the feedback effects from the endogenous
peer effect, while the spatial models do.4
The direct effects of parental college disappointment are as expected and highly significant.
In the SDM, the estimated direct effects for these variables are −0.338 for two parents in the low
and −0.223 for one parent in the low category both significant at the one percent level. Interpret-
ing the SDM estimate, an average adolescent in the school network who experiences a change to
the state of having two parents in the low college category is estimated to decrease schooling atti-
tudes by 0.338 standard deviations.5 This result combines the immediate impact on attitudes for
the adolescent of the parental change and the return effects of changing peer attitudes in response
to the individual’s change in attitudes. For a change from the neutral category to the state of hav-
ing two parents in the high college disappointment category (two parents in the high ideal indica-
tor), interpreting the SDM estimate suggests a 0.251 standard deviation increase in own schooling
attitudes at the one percent significance level. A similar interpretation can be made from the GNS
model. These strong effects are consistent with expectations from the theory that family ideals in-
fluence attitudes about schooling.
The indirect effects estimate the average change over other network members’ attitudes
from a change in a variable for person i. In the GNS model, indirect effects are somewhat stronger,
4. Direct effect estimates are often very similar to the OLS coefficient estimates. It is the estimates for indirect ef-
fects that are especially important and use of coefficient estimates for spill-over interpretations risks erroneous inference.
5. Attitudes is standardized mean zero standard deviation of one but because of lost observations the standard devia-
tion of attitudes for the sample is 0.833. I use the one standard deviation increase for interpretation as an approximate.
More percisely the predicted change is 0.282 standard deviations.
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but both models yield the same interpretations. The average effects are negative for parents in the
low college disappointment categories and highly significant. This is consistent with the theoreti-
cal point that social spill-overs exist in family ideals. If families fall towards lower ideals their chil-
dren’s attitudes about school are impacted and this has a ripple effect in the network diminishing
other adolescents’ attitudes. A shift from the reference, or neutral category, to two parents in the
low category has an estimated indirect effect of −0.360 in the SDM model and a change to the
one parent low category has an estimated indirect effect of −0.295 standard deviations of school-
ing attitudes. Therefore, in a change for an average adolescent from the neutral category to either
of these, the average cumulative effect to other adolescent’s in the network is a strongly negative
decrease in schooling attitudes. The high categories do not return significant estimates, indicating
the spill-over effects work through changes to lower ideals. The results for the low categories are
consistent with the theory around how peers and families influence own-attitudes such that spill-
over effects can occur when families change their ideals.
Among the characteristic variables, the Add Health Picture Vocabulary Test, my ability
proxy, is not estimated to have significant direct or indirect effects. Feeling that other students are
prejudiced does have a significant direct effect estimate that is similar between the SDM and GNS.
It implies that for the average adolescent in the school network greater levels of discrimination
lowers schooling attitudes. The magnitude is not necessarily large, a standard deviation shift in
feeling others are prejudiced is predicted to lower the average adolescent’s schooling attitudes by
0.061 standard deviations.
Direct and indirect estimates for the highest number of years of parental education are
positive and significant in both models. The direct effect estimate in the SDM predicts that adding
one year of education increases attitudes by 0.018 standard deviations. The indirect effects are
larger. These imply that increasing the highest parental education in the home for an average ado-
lescent positively influences other members of the network. In the SDM, indirect effects predict
that for every year of added education for an average adolescent, the cumulative change in school-
ing attitudes over the network is a 0.056 standard deviation increase. Thus, for example a shift of
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four years, say from high school graduate to college graduate, predicts an average direct effect to an
adolescent of 0.072 standard deviations and a spill-over effect of 0.224 standard deviations. Com-
paratively, these predictions are weaker than those found from the parental college disappointment
indicators. Whether or not shifting family ideals on education is easier than shifting parental ed-
ucation, is for another study, but this does imply that the ideals a family transmits can impact an
adolescents malleable attitudes about school and then spill-over from the adolescent through the
school.
Of the remaining variables, estimates of the coefficients for the average direct effects on
the female indicator and the school grade return significant results. Ethnicity and language spoken
at home do not appear to have direct influences on schooling attitudes, although it could be there
is simply not enough observations in each ethnicity to sufficiently capture the result. Females are
estimated to have better attitudes about school than males and too those in higher grades. This
school-grade effect is consistent with a maturation process or with those with worse attitudes drop-
ping out of high school. School grade also is estimated to have a negative indirect effect. While
I cannot conclude why this is the case, it is consistent with experiencing negative effects from
friends in higher grades if older adolescent friends serve to provide access to negative behaviors
such as drinking or smoking.
Speaking Spanish or any other language different from English in the home is not esti-
mated to have direct effects, but both variables are estimated to have very strong spill-over effects
in the school network. In both the SDM and GNS, these effects are around 0.30 standard devia-
tions of schooling attitudes. It is not clear in the current framework what is driving these results.
It may be that after controlling for ethnicity and discrimination the presence of those speaking
different languages in the home builds a positive environment that motivates positive schooling
attitudes in the network. No conclusion can be made here, but it especially suggests examining
immigrants as a sub-group through the lens of identity may be worthwhile.
The total effects, in the third and sixth columns of table 5, show the combined direct and
indirect effects. They capture both the influence to the average adolescent and the spill-overs cre-
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ated in the network. One interpretation is that they represent the impact from changing a variable
by the same amount across all other observations in the network on the outcome of one adolescent
in the network (Lesage and Pace (2009)). Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the impact over
all outcomes in the network, including the individual’s, from changing a variable for just one indi-
vidual. For example, the total effects from a shift to two parents in the low, or to just one parent,
are quite large in both the SDM and GNS. These imply that changes to family ideals for a large
enough portion of the network’s families will have overall strong effects in the network for improv-
ing schooling attitudes, especially if a number of those were in the low category. In the SDM, a
shift from two parents in the low to two parents in the high is predicted to result in an average to-
tal increase of 1.037 standard deviations in attitudes over the network, which is mirrored in the
GNS model. Thus, changes in network members’ family ideals can have large combined effects
between the individual and the spill-over effects occurring through the school social space.
6.1.2 Spatial Partial Effects for GPA Model
Table 6 gives the results of the partial effects with GPA as the dependent variable for the
preferred model, the GNS, and the SDM model for comparison.
In the GNS model, the average direct effect of increasing attitudes for the average net-
work member is positive and significant, with a similar result in the SDM. For the average adoles-
cent in a school, a standard deviation increase in schooling attitudes approximately increases GPA
by 0.195 points, similar, and larger, to a standard deviation increase for the ability proxy.6 Among
the parental college disappoint variables only the one parent high category is significant at the five
percent level. A change from the middle, reference, category to the one parent high is estimated to
increase GPA by 0.09 points. Two parents in the high college disappointment category is positive
as expected but only significant at the ten percent level. The one parent low category is significant
at the ten percent level and estimated to reduce GPA by 0.099 points. These estimates are consis-
6. More precisely the direct effect in standard deviation terms is 0.195 ∗ 0.833 = 0.162.
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tent with the transmission of family ideals playing a larger role through impact on the production
of attitudes than through a conforming incentive.
Table 5. Partial Effects: Average Impact on School Attitudes to the Individual and Through the Network
SDM GNS
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Two Parents in Low Category -0.338*** -0.360*** -0.698*** -0.336*** -0.407** -0.742***
(0.077) (0.133) (0.162) (0.079) (0.161) (0.186)
One Parent in Low Category -0.223*** -0.295*** -0.519*** -0.218*** -0.365*** -0.584***
(0.062) (0.112) (0.134) (0.060) (0.127) (0.146)
One Parent in High Category 0.118** 0.034 0.151 0.117** 0.027 0.144
(0.051) (0.089) (0.106) (0.050) (0.103) (0.117)
Two Parents in High Category 0.251*** 0.088 0.339*** 0.253*** 0.086 0.340**
(0.054) (0.096) (0.116) (0.056) (0.118) (0.134)
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.010 0.040 0.049 0.008 0.049 0.056
(0.020) (0.032) (0.037) (0.020) (0.035) (0.040)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced -0.055*** -0.015 -0.070** -0.056*** -0.014 -0.070**
(0.015) (0.025) (0.030) (0.015) (0.031) (0.034)
Highest Parental Education 0.018** 0.056*** 0.074*** 0.016** 0.061*** 0.078***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.017)
Single Parent Household -0.058 0.116 0.058 -0.060 0.122 0.062
(0.048) (0.084) (0.102) (0.046) (0.100) (0.115)
Number of Siblings in the House 0.005 0.036 0.041 0.004 0.040 0.044
(0.014) (0.025) (0.029) (0.014) (0.027) (0.031)
Female 0.087** 0.004 0.091 0.087** 0.009 0.096
(0.037) (0.059) (0.058) (0.037) (0.064) (0.061)
Hispanic 0.022 -0.036 -0.013 0.042 -0.075 -0.033
(0.086) (0.129) (0.147) (0.089) (0.140) (0.149)
Asian -0.011 0.030 0.018 -0.006 0.001 -0.005
(0.100) (0.128) (0.136) (0.102) (0.143) (0.147)
Black -0.113 0.098 -0.015 -0.105 0.080 -0.025
(0.104) (0.132) (0.123) (0.108) (0.147) (0.131)
Spanish Spoken in the Home 0.032 0.307** 0.340** 0.033 0.333** 0.366**
(0.080) (0.120) (0.135) (0.083) (0.137) (0.147)
Other Language Spoken in the Home -0.010 0.263** 0.252* -0.013 0.277* 0.264*
(0.085) (0.134) (0.148) (0.089) (0.150) (0.157)
School Grade 0.054* -0.060* -0.006 0.058** -0.067** -0.009
(0.027) (0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023)
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are drawn from a sim-
ulation based on Pv + [θ̂′] where P is the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition of the estimated variance-
covariance (VCV) matrix and and θ̂ is the estimated parameters. The simulation takes 1,000 draws of v a vector
with length equal to the number of parameters drawn normal mean zero and standard deviation of one (see Elhorst
(2014) chapter 2 for more details).
107
Table 6. Partial Effects: Average Impact on GPA to the Individual and Through the Network
SDM GNS
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Attitudes 0.208*** 0.061*** 0.270*** 0.195*** 0.137*** 0.333***
(0.018) (0.005) (0.023) (0.020) (0.014) (0.033)
Two Parents in Low Category -0.004 -0.298** -0.303** -0.007 -0.311** -0.318*
(0.070) (0.120) (0.148) (0.070) (0.154) (0.172)
One Parent in Low Category -0.091* -0.085 -0.175 -0.099* -0.071 -0.170
(0.053) (0.099) (0.117) (0.051) (0.129) (0.141)
One Parent in High Category 0.084* -0.151* -0.067 0.090** -0.164 -0.073
(0.045) (0.081) (0.097) (0.043) (0.103) (0.112)
Two Parents in High Category 0.085* 0.067 0.153 0.083* 0.075 0.158
(0.049) (0.088) (0.107) (0.048) (0.111) (0.124)
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.142*** 0.067** 0.209*** 0.144*** 0.075** 0.219***
(0.018) (0.029) (0.034) (0.018) (0.037) (0.041)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced 0.008 -0.023 -0.015 0.008 -0.031 -0.023
(0.013) (0.025) (0.029) (0.013) (0.030) (0.033)
Highest Parental Education 0.026*** 0.012 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.013 0.039**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016)
Single Parent Household -0.051 0.064 0.013 -0.053 0.055 0.002
(0.042) (0.075) (0.093) (0.041) (0.096) (0.107)
Number of Siblings in the Home -0.001 0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.012) (0.022) (0.026) (0.013) (0.028) (0.031)
Female 0.189*** -0.008 0.180*** 0.194*** -0.019 0.175***
(0.032) (0.053) (0.053) (0.033) (0.064) (0.061)
Hispanic -0.033 0.038 0.004 -0.058 0.109 0.052
(0.074) (0.114) (0.130) (0.078) (0.140) (0.144)
Asian 0.044 0.120 0.164 0.026 0.136 0.162
(0.087) (0.116) (0.123) (0.093) (0.144) (0.142)
Black 0.012 -0.174 -0.163 0.015 -0.165 -0.150
(0.091) (0.115) (0.114) (0.100) (0.142) (0.127)
Spanish Spoken in the Home 0.081 0.131 0.212* 0.082 0.125 0.206
(0.072) (0.115) (0.127) (0.071) (0.134) (0.141)
Other Language Spoken in the Home 0.072 0.250** 0.322** 0.056 0.276* 0.332**
(0.078) (0.120) (0.138) (0.077) (0.147) (0.154)
School Grade 0.026 -0.028 -0.002 0.037 -0.048 -0.011
(0.024) (0.029) (0.019) (0.025) (0.032) (0.022)
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are drawn from a simula-
tion as noted in the previous table.
The ability proxy, parental education, and being female have significant direct effects on
GPA. The Add Health Picture Vocabulary test scores are positive and significant, as one may ex-
pect of an ability proxy with relation to GPA. In the GNS, the average direct effect for the abil-
ity proxy is 0.15. Comparing this to the average direct effect on the attitudes index implies that a
standard deviation change in attitudes leads to a slightly larger impact on GPA, as a standard de-
viation increase in the Add Health Picture Vocabulary test scores. The highest parental education
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level positively effects GPA, which may result from an improved ability to support the children’s
educational needs or simply through access to more resources if education returns greater wages. A
standard deviation shift in the highest parental education in the home predicts a small 0.07 GPA
point increase. Thus, an implication combined with the results for the average direct effects of the
parental ideal proxies is that families affect performance more through their influence on adoles-
cent attitudes than directly onto performance. Finally, the direct effect estimate for females in-
dicates that the average adolescent female in a school scores 0.194 GPA points higher than the
average male.
Evidence for indirect effects from changes in schooling attitudes is strong. It is positive
and significant at the one percent level in both the SDM and the GNS, though stronger in mag-
nitude in the GNS. For the GNS, a one standard deviation increase in schooling attitudes is es-
timated to return an average cumulative increase for other adolescent’s in the network of 0.137
GPA points. In the attitudes model, the evidence supported endogenous peer effects in school-
ing attitudes that cause changes in attitudes to impact adolescent attitudes over the network. Here
we see own-attitudes impact GPA and that changes in own-attitudes spill-over to create positive
changes in GPA over the network. Therefore, schooling attitudes spread over the network and im-
pact GPA, and changes in attitudes create further improvements in performance for the adolescent
and others in the network.
Indirect effects among the family ideal variables are only found to be strong for the two
parents in the low college disappointment category. The estimate is significant at the five percent
level in both the SDM and the GNS. Interpreting the GNS estimate, a discrete change for the
average adolescent from having parents in the neutral category to two parents in the low category
results in an average cumulative reduction of GPA to other adolescent’s in the network of 0.311
points. The one parent in the high ideal category has a non-intuitive, negative indirect effect es-
timate that is significant in the SDM at the 10 percent level and not significant in the GNS. The
two parent high category is not significant, though the point estimate for the indirect effect is pos-
itive, as expected. Why the one parent with a high ideal category results in a negative indirect ef-
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fect is not entirely clear. It may be that the result is simply a bad draw. Alternatively, if we take it
as negative, then it implies that a change from the neutral category to the one parent in the high
category has a negative impact on the adolescent’s friends GPA. Overall, and sticking with the
GNS model, the parental ideal variables indicate spill-overs occur if two parents have low educa-
tional ideals. Also, recall that the indirect effect is an average of the cumulative spill-overs across
the school. It can be bigger than the direct effect. This implies that there is a direct effect, though
small, that results in spill-overs showing up when we aggregate all the spillovers in the network
into an average effect.
The indirect effect estimates for the ability proxy is significant but not so for the highest
parental education in the home. Comparing these results to the attitudes model points to family
inputs largely working through their influence on own-attitudes. The picture vocabulary test score
has an indirect effect in the GNS model of 0.082 GPA points for a standard deviation increase
in the test score significant at the five percent level. Comparing the indirect effects of the ability
proxy and attitudes indicates that a standard deviation change in either results in relatively similar
impacts on GPA. Of the other variables, only the Spanish spoken in the home indicator returns
estimates of significant indirect effects on GPA. The estimated effect is positive but marginally sig-
nificant. Nevertheless it furthers the finding of positive indirect effects on attitudes from Spanish
spoken in the home and suggests exploring peer effects in relationship to immigrants is an interest-
ing extension.
The total effect from a change in attitudes is highly significant. It shows that the com-
bined overall average increase in GPA for a standard deviation increase in the attitudes of an aver-
age adolescent in the school and others around her is 0.333 GPA points (using the GNS model).
This is slightly larger than the total effect for a standard deviation increase in vocabulary test scores,
implying that positively shifting ideals around schooling results in similar overall improvements in
performance as does positively shifting ability.
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6.2 Robustness and Extended Analyses
To parse out the models further, I explore robustness checks and extensions. First, I use
the peers of peers characteristics as instruments for the endogenous peer effect in case control-
ling for the spatial correlation term (ρ) failed to capture variation from omitted variables due to
the peer group selection process, leaving selection effects to persist. Second, I explore the effect
of attitudes on performance in a later period. Third, I use an alternative dependent variable, final
educational attainment, a long-term measure of effort. Finally, I explore some additional sensitiv-
ity checks for the model results. One, briefly considers an alternative to the parental college dis-
appointment for the parental effect on attitudes and performance, and the second makes use of a
friendship reciprocity assumption to gain back observations lost when using the directed graph.
6.2.1 Peers of Peers as Instruments
With network data, peers of peers are two links away and theoretically only influence the
individual through their influence on the individual’s one link away peers. Bramoullé, Djebbari,
and Fortin (2009) lay the theoretical groundwork for using these as instruments for the endoge-
nous effect. Econometrically the implementation of peers of peers as instruments has a corol-
lary in the spatial econometrics literature, where regions that are indirectly linked have been sug-
gested as instruments for the endogenous effect (Kelejian and Prucha 1998; Lee 2003; Kelejian
and Prucha 2010).7
Table 7 reports the instrumental variable (IV) model results from using peers of peers as
instruments for the endogenous peer effect. The IVs from peers of peers do not include the out-
come, rather the background characteristics. The outcome cannot be used because it is a part of
7. Lee (2003) establishes, under certain regularity conditions, the best generalized spatial two stage least squares es-
timator that is asymptotically efficient compared to other estimators in the class. His approach involves first estimating
the instrumental variables (IV) model with the neighbor of neighbor characteristics and then using the reduced form
prediction from that estimation to create an average of the predicted neighbor lags in the dependent variable (Wŷ). In
the second step, Wŷ is used as an instrument for the endogenous variable Wy. I do not present this extra step, because,
while I want to compare the point estimates from using the peers of peers as instruments to my previous results, I also
want to focus on the relevance of peers of peers as instruments. This second goal concentrates the attention to the peers
of peers IV step, rather than the asymptotically efficient extension with Lee’s method. Thus, for conciseness I keep the
results in table 5 to those of interest.
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the global chain of actions and reactions and is endogneous to the average of peer outcomes (the
first stage).
For the attitudes model in column 1, the estimated endogenous effect is about 0.277 points
larger than its estimate for the SDM results reported in table 2 and 0.15 points larger than its es-
timate for the GNS model. It remains highly significant and continues to indicate that spill-overs
in attitudes occur over a school social space. For the GPA model in table 7, the estimated endoge-
nous effect is about 0.11 points larger than its estimate in the SDM results reported in table 4,
while it is about 0.10 points smaller than its estimate in the GNS model. It too remains highly
significant and continues to indicate that spill-overs in GPA occur over a school social space. The
overall results remain consistent.
Table 7. Peers of Peers as IVs for the Endogenous Effect
Attitudes GPA
β / SE β / SE
Endogenous Effect 0.470*** 0.343***
(0.169) (0.108)
N 2174 2174
Hansen J (p-value) 0.082 0.410
Montiel-Pflueger “Effective” F 3.019 6.108
Montiel-Pflueger Critical (tau=5%) 24.038 24.108
Montiel-Pflueger Critical (tau=30%) 6.090 6.116
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Models are estimated with the same set of variables as in table 2—to
include school fixed effects—but with peers of peers characteristics as instruments rather than estimating the spatial
correlation term.
A concern, however, with using peers of peers as instruments is that these second order
neighbors may yield weak instruments and be sensitive to model specification (Lee, Liu, and Lin
2010; Lesage and Pace 2009). The p-value from the Hansen J statistic fails to reject the null at the
five percent level (though not the ten percent) in the attitudes model, and in the GPA model it
is far from rejecting the null, returning a p-value of 0.410. These provide some evidence that the
overidentification restrictions are met. The instruments may still be weak. Montiel and Pflueger
(2013) provide a weak instrument test that extends the Stock-Yogo test from Stock and Yogo
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(2005) and is robust to heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and clustering.8 Their “effective” F
statistic is reported in table 7, with comparable critical values based on levels of acceptable bias
(τ ). Notably, in both models the test statistic falls well below the critical values for the five per-
cent worst case acceptable bias, implying we cannot reject the null of weak instruments. In fact,
even moving to the thirty percent worst case acceptable bias continues to result in failing to reject
the null. Therefore, this instrumenting strategy may result in poor performance and I continue to
select the results of table 4 as the preferred results.
6.2.2 Checking the Effect of Attitudes
Unobserved heterogeneity resulting from simultaneity between current period attitudes
and current period GPA is a threat to the identification of attitudes effect on performance. I use
Add Health data from wave II and instrument current period attitudes in wave II with own and
peer attitudes from wave I for the GPA model. For the saturated school sample, Add Health rec-
ollected friendship nominations in wave II.9 Wave II took place approximately one year after wave
I and covered the 1995-1996 school year. The sample size falls to 1, 400 observations after listwise
deletion of missing observations and constructing the directed graph for wave II peer networks.
I include the same set of covariates as in the main results of table 4. Time varying variables are
drawn from wave II responses. Additionally, the individual level time lags for GPA and attitudes
and peer average time lags for GPA and attitudes are included in some specifications of table 8.
Overall, table 8 shows a consistent story in which attitudes about school impact performance.
Time lagged attitude instruments can serve as appropriate instruments only if their influ-
ence on wave II GPA entirely runs through their impact on wave II attitudes and the errors are not
serially correlated. Controlling for lag GPA may bias its coefficient estimate up and other model
coefficients down if there is serial autocorrelation between periods (Bond 2002). Own and peer
8. Implemented in Stata with the user written package weakivtest.
9. Studying peer effects more specifically through the dynamics in peer groups is an interesting question for future
research. See Patachini, Rainone, and Zenou (2016) for a recent paper that explores such a question by studying the
impact of short term versus long term peers on later life educational attainment.
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attitudes in the first period may influence first period GPA, shaking an individual’s confidence or
simply impacting the level of knowledge they have to draw from in the next school year. By con-
trolling for wave I GPA this channel of time lagged attitude impacts on wave II GPA is controlled
out; however, it may also create other problems if the time period error terms are correlated. Add
Health does not contain a third wave for the high school period, thus a fully dynamic panel data
model cannot be explored to remove the bias in lagged GPA. Alternatively, I also consider in col-
umn 4 the spatial model for wave II with lagged attitudes and lagged peer attitudes but no current
period attitudes nor lagged GPA. In this case, the estimate on lagged attitudes avoids simultaneity
because of the timing, but serial autocorrelation may still yield the estimates unreliable.
Column 1 reports estimates for the wave II equivalent specification to the SDM results
for wave I with GPA as the dependent variable.10 The parameter estimate for own-attitudes is very
similar to the wave I estimate. The effect of current period attitudes decreases when including time
lagged GPA—seen in columns 2 and 3—but remains significant at the one percent level. The spec-
ifications in columns 3 including time lagged GPA and time lagged own and peer attitudes should
return an approximately zero effect for the lagged attitude variables, if they indeed form good in-
struments when controlling for lagged GPA. The results show evidence consistent with this point.
In column 4, omitting lagged GPA and current period attitudes but including lagged attitudes re-
turns a strongly positive estimate for the effect of lagged attitudes on GPA close to the estimate
for current period attitudes in column 1. Lagged attitudes is free of problems from simultaneity,
and if it is free from problems of serial autocorrelation, then the estimates in column 4 provide a
good indication that attitudes have a true effect on performance. This must be interpreted with
caution because I cannot rule out correlated heterogeneity between time periods.
Columns 5 and 6 report the results from using time lagged own and peer attitudes as in-
struments for wave II own attitudes where both specifications include the full set of model family,
peer, control, and school fixed effect variables. Both IV specifications pass the overidentification
test. Also, neither fail the weak instruments test. Column 5 includes time lagged GPA as a con-
10. The ρ term was negative but not significant in the wave II models, so I focus on the SDM for table 8.
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trol. The effect of attitudes is estimated to be positive and almost identical to its effect in column 2,
when including time lagged GPA in the spatial model with no instruments. In column 6, when
dropping lagged GPA but keeping all controls, peer variables, and school fixed effects the esti-
mated effect of current period attitudes rises sharply. Thus, if lagged GPA is biased upwards and
attitudes biased down from autocorrelation between time periods then the specifications including
it underestimate the impact of attitudes. The results in column 6, when omitting lagged GPA as a
control, may violate the exclusion restrictions (no evidence in the test statistics) or also suffer from
autocorrelation as well. At any rate, the story throughout table 6 is consistent. Attitudes continue
to be estimated with a positive and significant effect on GPA.11
Table 8. Period 2 GPA Models Including Period 1 and 2 Attitudes and Period 1 GPA
SDM ML IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attitudes (95-96) 0.214*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.280***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.037) (0.038)
Lagged GPA (94-95) 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.492***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Lagged Attitudes (94-95) -0.007 0.170***
(0.024) (0.023)
Lagged Peer Attitudes (94-95) 0.012 0.052
(0.028) (0.032)
Peer GPA (95-96) 0.169*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.170*** 0.147*** 0.219***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033)
N 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400
Likelihood -1271.346 -1072.629 -1072.504 -1292.236
Hansen J (p-value) 0.823 0.956
Montiel-Pflueger “Effective” F 268.129 304.652
Montiel-Pflueger Critical (tau=5%) 6.017 7.213
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of IV models are
robust to heteroskedasticity. Models 1-4 are the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) estimated by maximum likeli-
hood. Models 5-6 are instrumental variable models using period 1 own-attitudes and period 1 peer attitudes as
instruments for period 2 attitudes. All models are estimated with the set of key parental variables, controls, peer
average variables, and school fixed effects corresponding to those of the main GPA model specification.
11. I checked the IV results using the Add Health grand sample survey weights for wave 2 stratified by region. The
key results were unchanged, with results for wave II own-attitudes, wave I GPA, and peer GPA almost exactly the
same.
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6.2.3 Years of Educational Attainment
As another check for the effect of attitudes on education, I draw final years of education
from Add Health’s fourth wave, when the respondents are in their late twenties or early thirties.
All covariates are the same as in the main analysis of table 4 and drawn from wave I. Table 9 re-
ports the results for three specifications. The first estimates a spatial model including own and peer
attitudes but excluding own and peer GPA. In this case, own-attitudes is estimated to have a posi-
tive and strongly significant direct effect on years of education. Moreover, own-attitudes have posi-
tive and spill-over effects as well, though they are less precisely estimated. Specification 2 includes
both own and peer GPA in the GNS model. In this case, the spatial correlation term is negative
but not significant and the coefficient on average peer years of education is less precisely estimated
than it is in specification 3, which omits the spatial correlation term.
Table 9. Impact of Attitudes on Years of Educational Attainment
(1) (2) (3)
GPA Excluded GPA Included
β / SE Direct Indirect β / SE β / SE Direct Indirect




Attitudes 0.403*** 0.414*** 0.208* 0.232*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.016***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.113) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.003)
GPA 0.765*** 0.777*** 0.778*** 0.328***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.081)
Peer GPA No Yes Yes
Peer Attitudes Yes No No
Parental Attitudes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Peer Parental Attitudes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Controls Yes Yes Yes
School Level FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1594 1594 1594
Likelihood −2966.451 −2871.567 −2872.245
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Specification (1) and (3) report model coef-
ficients, direct effects, and indirect effects side by side. Standard errors for the direct and indirect effects are drawn as
before.
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In specification 3, own-attitudes still has a direct effect that is highly significant even with
GPA in the model. Thus attitudes about school impact educational attainment implying spill-
overs in attitudes within a school—which the estimated effect of peer attitudes on own-attitudes
in table 4 indicates exist—will have later direct effects on years of education. Direct effects and
spill-overs from changes in GPA are estimated to be present and large. Overall, attitudes impacts
final years of education even controlling for GPA. Any effects of attitudes on GPA will only mag-
nify the effect of attitudes on the years of educational attainment.
6.2.4 An Alternative to College Expectations: Parental Involvement
Here I explore an alternative measure for the family ideals on education. I use parental
communication with the adolescent about school as an alternative measure to the college disap-
pointment indicators that captures family involvement with the adolescent on school matters. This
variable is constructed from survey questions asking the respondent whether they have talked with
their mother and father about school work or grades and talked about things they are doing in
school in the last four weeks. The variable is a count of each “yes” response across four questions
(two about interactions with the mother and two about the father) that ranges from zero to four.
Family involvement may not be entirely the same as the ideals. It may also relate to the time the
family has to be involved or potentially be simultaneously determined with student performance,
whereas I have argued the ideals are likely to remain unaffected by current period performance.
Thus, family norms about educational effort may impact their involvement (especially if the par-
ents’ themselves gain identity utility from being involved or not), but involvement may also relate
to other factors implying it is likely endogenous. It is for this argument that I use parental college
disappointment as my preferred measure of the ideals transmitted making up the family educa-
tional norm. Nevertheless, considering family involvement provides an alternative measure that
has also been explored previously in the literature.
The endogeniety of family involvement to children’s education has been pointed out pre-
viously, but because of data limitations it has only been in the relatively recent past that economist
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have paid any attention to the matter.12 Those studies which have explored family involvement
have found much stronger and consistent effects on non-cognitive outcomes (Avvisati, Besbas,
and Guyon 2011). Although, Cabus and Ariës (2016) have found strong causal effects of family
involvement on test scores with an instrumenting strategy, and Avvisati et al. (2014) also found
some positive results on test scores in addition to strong effects on behavioral outcomes from in-
creases in family involvement in a field experiment. Thus, I expect family involvement to have a
positive effect on student attitudes and a small positive effect on GPA. In both cases, a downward
bias in the coefficient estimates for family involvement is expected based on the literature regard-
ing the matter. Moreover, if family involvement captures more than family ideals, then estimates
should be relatively unchanged when including both the college disappointment indicators and
the involvement variable. The model results reported in table 10 and the partial effects reported in
table 11 support these points.
In table 10, the GNS spatial model results for own-attitudes and GPA are reported includ-
ing the count of parental involvement. Columns 1 and 3 omit the parental college expectations
and include parental involvement and columns 2 and 4 include them with parental involvement.
The peer endogenous effect remains positive and significant for both attitudes and GPA and are
similar to their previous estimates in table 4.
12. See Avvisati, Besbas, and Guyon (2011) for a review article.
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Table 10. An Alternative to Parental College Disappointment: Parental Communication about School
Attitudes GPA
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Count of Parental/Respondent School Interactions
Own Parental Interactions 0.066*** 0.052*** 0.025** 0.021**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Peer Parental Interactions 0.021 0.017 -0.015 -0.015
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Parental College Disappointment Categories
Two Parents in Low -0.319*** -0.005
(0.076) (0.066)
One Parent in Low -0.195*** -0.088*
(0.059) (0.051)
One Parent in High 0.114** 0.087**
(0.049) (0.042)
Two Parents in High 0.237*** 0.075
(0.054) (0.047)
Peer Two Parents in Low -0.165 -0.168*
(0.107) (0.090)
Peer One Parent in Low -0.168* -0.005
(0.088) (0.075)
Peer One Parent in High -0.011 -0.128**
(0.072) (0.060)




Peer D.V. (Endogenous Effect) 0.323*** 0.311*** 0.461*** 0.447***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.037) (0.040)
ρ -0.124 -0.141* -0.275*** -0.257***
(0.079) (0.076) (0.047) (0.050)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Average Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2174 2174 2174 2174
Likelihood −2466.752 −2407.852 −2107.870 −2095.533
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Columns 1-4 of table 11 report the direct and indirect effects of the attitudes model and
columns 5-8 of the GPA model.13 For both dependent variables, family involvement is included
without and then with the family college disappointment indicators. In column 1, omitting college
disappointment indicators, family involvement is estimated to have a positive and significant di-
rect effect and indirect effect on attitudes, but these estimates are likely biased. Adding back the
college disappointment indicators in column 2 returns a similar result for the family involvement
13. Total effects are omitted for space.
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effects and the partial effect estimates for the disappointment indicators remain almost unchanged
from their estimates in table 5 of this chapter.
For GPA as the dependent variable, whether omitting the college disappointment indi-
cators or not the direct effects are significant and positive but small, while indirect effects are in-
significant and close to zero. Again, this is consistent with expectations based upon past research
on the effect of family involvement. Including the parental college disappointment indicators re-
turns estimates for their direct and indirect effects consistent with their estimates in table 6.
Table 11. Partial Effects with Parental Communication and Help with School Projects as an Alternative to
College Disappointment
Attitudes GPA
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Family Involvement 0.068*** 0.061** 0.053*** 0.047* 0.026** -0.008 0.022** -0.012
(0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.024) (0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.024)
Two Parents in Low -0.326*** -0.377** -0.005 -0.307*
(0.076) (0.152) (0.068) (0.161)
One Parent in Low -0.200*** -0.328** -0.093* -0.076
(0.061) (0.130) (0.053) (0.130)
One Parent in High 0.117** 0.032 0.091** -0.165
(0.050) (0.104) (0.045) (0.104)
Two Parents in High 0.242*** 0.076 0.079* 0.073
(0.054) (0.116) (0.049) (0.115)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Average Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2174 2174 2174 2174
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and drawn by simulation, as discussed
previously.
Overall, it appears excluding or including family involvement does not affect the results
for college disappointment as a measure of family ideals. Additionally, family involvement is found
to have larger effects on attitudes about school than on performance in school. Given the liter-
ature on family involvement, and specifically the results of Avvisati et al. (2014) and Cabus and
Ariës (2016), it is likely the effect of family involvement is underestimated. Therefore, whether
based upon college disappointment as a measure of family ideals or family involvement, families
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matter and changes can spill effects over school networks. Caution is still in order with respect to
conclusions on causality. I contend that the evidence here shows how family and peer effects are
intertwined, implying changes in family ideals and attitudes can have strong effects because they
influence not only the adolescent but others linked in a school social space.
6.2.5 Alternative Weight Matrix
The undirected graph, based on an assumption of friendship reciprocity, is used as a check
against bias from missing data. When constructing the spatial weights matrix with friendship
nominations defining the peer links, those with all missing friendship nominations are omitted
from the data. To recover a number of these observations, I consider an assumption of friendship
reciprocity, thus if person i names person j as their friend but j does not name i person j will still
receive a link for person i. The sample size for the analysis is now 2, 725. Only those who name
nobody and are named by nobody are omitted because of missing friendship nominations with
the undirected graph (approximately 300 respondents). It must be noted that the reciprocity as-
sumption increases the size of each adolescent’s peer group and may induce links where they do
not exist. One would expect this to result in a reduction of model fit.
Model results using the undirected graph are reported in tables 12 and 13. The undirected
graph is formed from the friendship nominations and the friendship reciprocity assumption. En-
dogenous effect estimates in table 12 are very similar to their estimates with the directed graph but
for the GNS attitudes model. The endogenous peer effect in this case is much higher as a result of
the more strongly negative estimate of the spatial correlation component ρ. The likelihood values
for the undirected graph models do fall compared to those in table 4, which is consistent with the
expectation that the reciprocity assumption will result in a poorer model fit of the data.
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Table 12. Spatial Models for GPA and Attitudes (W2)
GPA Attitudes
(SDM) (GNS) (SDM) (GNS)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Endogenous Effect 0.251*** 0.488*** 0.174*** 0.506***





Parental Attitudes on College
Two Parents in Low -0.034 -0.027 -0.341*** -0.320***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.069) (0.069)
One Parent in Low -0.063 -0.062 -0.161*** -0.137**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.054) (0.054)
One Parent in High 0.079** 0.080** 0.125*** 0.096**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045)
Two Parents in High 0.104** 0.101** 0.261*** 0.236***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.050) (0.050)
Controls
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.147*** 0.139*** 0.012 0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced 0.015 0.013 -0.063*** -0.065***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Highest Parental Edu 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.010 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Single Parent Household -0.017 -0.017 -0.073* -0.077*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043)
Number of Siblings in Home 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Female 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.072** 0.079**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.033)
Hispanic -0.075 -0.069 0.085 0.105
(0.067) (0.069) (0.080) (0.083)
Asian -0.012 -0.014 0.092 0.061
(0.081) (0.085) (0.096) (0.102)
Black 0.099 0.115 0.049 0.057
(0.082) (0.088) (0.097) (0.106)
Spanish Spoken in Home 0.147** 0.123** 0.022 -0.002
(0.060) (0.061) (0.071) (0.073)
Other Language Spoken in Home 0.095 0.059 -0.014 -0.050
Continued on next page
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Table 12 – continued
GPA Attitudes
(SDM) (GNS) (SDM) (GNS)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
(0.071) (0.073) (0.084) (0.087)
School Grade 0.034* 0.048** 0.032 0.039
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026)
Peer Average of Parental Attitudes
Two Parents in Low -0.134 -0.102 -0.134 -0.008
(0.094) (0.091) (0.111) (0.108)
One Parent in Low 0.012 0.033 -0.188** -0.122
(0.080) (0.077) (0.095) (0.091)
One Parent in High -0.100 -0.121* 0.111 0.084
(0.066) (0.064) (0.078) (0.075)
Two Parents in High 0.027 -0.022 0.105 0.018
(0.070) (0.068) (0.083) (0.081)
Peer Average of Controls
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.026 -0.017 0.033 0.031
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced -0.020 -0.019 0.023 0.044**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021)
Highest Parental Edu 0.010 0.004 0.045*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Single Parent Household 0.044 0.042 0.107 0.117*
(0.061) (0.059) (0.072) (0.069)
Peer Number of Siblings in Home 0.025 0.025 0.018 0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.026 -0.079* 0.010 -0.033
(0.042) (0.043) (0.050) (0.050)
Hispanic -0.032 -0.011 -0.036 -0.082
(0.097) (0.096) (0.116) (0.114)
Asian 0.049 0.010 0.031 -0.012
(0.106) (0.106) (0.125) (0.127)
Black -0.211** -0.200* 0.001 -0.037
(0.102) (0.105) (0.121) (0.126)
Spanish Spoken in Home 0.155* 0.104 0.268** 0.225**
(0.089) (0.089) (0.106) (0.105)
Other Language Spoken in Home 0.199* 0.153 0.267** 0.228*
(0.103) (0.100) (0.122) (0.117)
School Grade -0.033 -0.052** -0.039 -0.048
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029)
Constant 1.239*** 0.864*** -0.941*** -0.673***
Continued on next page
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Table 12 – continued
GPA Attitudes
(SDM) (GNS) (SDM) (GNS)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
(0.239) (0.200) (0.282) (0.214)
School Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2725 2725 2725 2725
Likelihood −2635.741 −2626.875 −3088.194 −3073.001
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. SDM = Spatial Durbin
Model, GNS = General Nesting Model
Table 13 provides the partial effects for the undirected graph for both the attitudes and
GPA models. Only the GNS results are reported for conciseness and because the GNS returns the
best fit of the data in both cases. Again none of the overall conclusions change. There are some
changes in significance to the parental college disappointment indicators. In the attitudes model,
the indirect effect for two parents in the low category is no longer significant—though the point
estimate remains negative and large—and the one parent low category continues to be significant
at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, indirect effects for the one parent high and two parent high
categories are now significant at the 10 percent level and strongly positive, whereas they were not
significant in table 5. In the GPA model, the effect of attitudes is consistent with that estimated
previously, while the one and two parent high categories are significant compared to the one par-
ent low and high significant categories from table 6.
In all, the conclusions remain. Family college expectations are estimated to significantly
impact own-attitudes and spill-over effects continue to be present from changes in those expecta-
tions. As before, some evidence still exists for family college expectations to directly impact GPA.
Peer attitudes impact own-attitudes and peer GPA impacts own-GPA. Again, own-attitudes
in turn have an affect on GPA that is both direct and spills-over across a school network. Thus,
changes in parental ideals (proxied by college expectations) impact performance through their im-
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pact on attitudes. These conclusions from using the undirected graph are consistent with the con-
clusions from using the directed graph.
6.3 Summary of Results
Own-attitudes about school are strongly affected by parental college expectations and peer
attitudes. Families play a role in producing attitudes. In the theory, this was modeled by family
transmission of ideals entering the production function for attitudes and motivated by the skill
development literature—reviewed in chapter two—which shows that noncognitive skills are mal-
leable into young adulthood. Moreover, the partial effects for the own-attitudes model showed ev-
idence for spill-overs from changes in family expectations. These spill-overs work partially through
the presence of an estimated social multiplier effect. The social multplier effect occurs because av-
erage peer attitudes are estimated to have a positive impact on own-attitudes. Thus, as family ed-
ucational expectations change an adolescent’s attitudes are affected and through their links in the
school network those effects can spread.
Effort in school is proxied by GPA. Average peer GPA is estimated to have a strong, posi-
tive relationship with own-GPA. The estimate for GPA peer effect is in line with those from previ-
ous studies employing the Add Health data. Own-attitudes is estimated to have a significant posi-
tive effect on GPA. This effect is as strong as the estimated effect from the ability proxy. A change
in own-attitudes is also estimated to have a spill-over effect on the GPA through social links in a
school network. Family expectations are estimated to have some small effects on GPA, but it ap-
pears that the family ideal effect works more through attitudes than through conforming effects
directly to GPA. Overall, families and peers affect performance in school through their impact on
own-attitudes and directly through other channels. The theory allowed for a conforming channel
seperate from own-attitudes. The evidence here is largely consistent with the theory.
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Table 13. Partial Effects for Attitudes and GPA Models with the Undirected Graph
D.V. = Attitudes D.V. = GPA
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Attitudes 0.187*** 0.151*** 0.338***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.031)
Two Parents in Low Category -0.348*** -0.315 -0.663*** -0.029 -0.222 -0.252
(0.073) (0.212) (0.217) (0.062) (0.168) (0.176)
One Parent in Low Category -0.149** -0.376** -0.525*** -0.067 0.011 -0.056
(0.059) (0.167) (0.172) (0.050) (0.144) (0.151)
One Parent in High Category 0.104** 0.260* 0.364** 0.087** -0.167 -0.080
(0.048) (0.146) (0.148) (0.041) (0.116) (0.122)
Two Parents in High Category 0.257*** 0.257* 0.515*** 0.109** 0.046 0.154
(0.051) (0.156) (0.158) (0.045) (0.127) (0.134)
Picture Vocabulary Test Scores 0.001 0.063 0.064 0.150*** 0.088** 0.238***
(0.021) (0.045) (0.046) (0.016) (0.043) (0.044)
Feel Other Students are Prejudiced -0.071*** 0.028 -0.043 0.014 -0.026 -0.011
(0.014) (0.038) (0.039) (0.011) (0.032) (0.034)
Highest Parental Education 0.005 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.026*** 0.029* 0.055***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
Single Parent Household -0.084* 0.164 0.080 -0.019 0.068 0.049
(0.046) (0.137) (0.144) (0.039) (0.111) (0.117)
Number of Siblings in Home 0.002 0.039 0.041 0.005 0.053* 0.058*
(0.014) (0.036) (0.036) (0.012) (0.031) (0.032)
Female 0.086** 0.007 0.093 0.215*** 0.020 0.234***
(0.036) (0.087) (0.079) (0.030) (0.072) (0.067)
Hispanic 0.114 -0.067 0.047 -0.075 -0.083 -0.158
(0.093) (0.191) (0.181) (0.072) (0.155) (0.152)
Asian 0.067 0.034 0.100 -0.015 0.008 -0.008
(0.114) (0.196) (0.166) (0.090) (0.156) (0.143)
Black 0.062 -0.022 0.040 0.124* -0.290* -0.165
(0.119) (0.182) (0.149) (0.095) (0.153) (0.132)
Spanish Spoken in the Home -0.003 0.453** 0.450** 0.133** 0.310** 0.443***
(0.077) (0.177) (0.174) (0.068) (0.156) (0.155)
Other Language Spoken in the Home -0.054 0.415** 0.361** 0.064 0.352** 0.416***
(0.094) (0.196) (0.184) (0.077) (0.163) (0.163)
School Grade 0.043 -0.061 -0.018 0.052** -0.059* -0.007
(0.029) (0.040) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.020)
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and drawn by simulation as noted previ-
ously. All models estimated with school fixed effects. Only the GNS model is presented for conciseness. LR tests
for models with the undirected graph indicated that the GNS with school fixed effects returns the best fit of the




Families and peers matter for adolescent educational success. Families impart expecta-
tions for education, which theoretically form ideals for education from the family group. Attitudes
about school are malleable and family transmission of ideals shape those attitudes. An adolescent,
taking part of a school social network can spread influence from their family’s educational expecta-
tions through transmission of educational ideals with their peer groups. From an identity point of
view, it is the peers an adolescent identifies with that matter most. Changes in attitudes can spread
over the school social space through the peer effects created within groups. Attitudes, in turn, im-
pact the amount of effort an adolescent gives in school thereby affecting their performance. Hold-
ing attitudes constant, ideals for education among families and peers may also provide a conform-
ing incentive. This can occur if failure to conform with the ideal creates costs by reducing identity
utility. In this dissertation, I draw on multiple literatures to frame these insights as research ques-
tions, to explore them in a formal theoretical model, to connect the theory with an spatial empiri-
cal model, and test the model with network data on adolescents from Add Health.
In chapter 2, I motive my dissertation from the identity, skill development, and peer ef-
fects literature and I contribute to the literature itself by synthesizing new research questions from
them. Those questions are as follows: does family influence reach across networks through the
presence of peer effects? Do social group effects create lasting influences? If so, is it through a con-
forming effect or a production of lasting traits? This dissertation has been in service to studying
the first question. The remaining questions set forward a research agenda and motivate future work
for the field.
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical treatment. I first explore a model of conflict between
one’s personal identity, or simply own tastes, and group ideals. The group offers benefits not avail-
127
able on the market. A person may move closer to their group to gain these benefits. Moving closer
to the group necessitates conformity. A person who does not agree with the prescribed actions
is faced with a tradeoff between utility from fulfilling their own tastes and benefits derived from
the group. In the case of interventions, a treated individual may show agreement with the inter-
vention yet do otherwise if it conflicts with their group and no replacement for the group bene-
fits can be offered. I extend and expand this model of conflict to the case to two groups—families
and peers—and specifically to the choice of effort in school for adolescents. In this framework, I
provide a concise model of family and peer inputs to the production of attitudes about school and
their provision of conforming incentives for effort. The framework allows families and peer groups
to conflict or be similar in their expectations leading to varying incentives for attitudes and effort.
Subsequent chapters introduce the data, methods, and empirical results. The partial effects
from a spatial econometric model provide a direct link to the equilibrium condition outlined in the
family and peer identity theory and easily allow testing for spill-over effects in a school social net-
work from changes in family expectations and adolescent attitudes. I use parental expectations for
college graduation as a proxy for family ideals on education and I use the average outcome of one’s
chosen peers (friends) to proxy prototypical behavior in the group forming the peer group ideal.
In the attitudes model, the average of attitudes in the peer group forms the prototypical attitudes
creating peer effects, and in the GPA model, average GPA forms the prototypical behavior.
Studying the spatial partial effects for adolescents in both the attitudes and the GPA mod-
els, suggest that families and peers are important to an adolescent’s educational attitudes and ef-
fort. An adolescent has a malleable characteristic, their attitudes about future education and their
current school. Attitudes impact own-performance and the performance of other adolescents in
the school. Indeed these effects from attitudes are estimated to be as strong or stronger than the
effects from an ability proxy. Families and peers contribute to the formation of attitudes about
school and impact performance in school through them. Changes in family expectations generate
spill-overs through the presence of peer effects in attitudes. While families appear to mostly in-
fluence the adolescent through their attitudes, peers are found to have influence on the attitudes
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and directly on performance. The theory allowed for both channels, one that shapes malleable atti-
tudes and another that incentivizes conformity regardless of the adolescent’s attitudes. The results
are consistent with the theoretical implication that positive changes to family expectations for ed-
ucation (ideals) can not only impact the individual but have strong effects across a school network.
Also, positive changes in attitudes among peers can benefit the individual and spill-over improving
outcomes in the network.
The results support the theoretical point that family and peer groups can create incentives
that combine or compete. The evidence supports the presences of social interaction effects, direct
effects from parental educational expectations, and indirect effects from parental educational ex-
pectations. Thus, they can combine through the presence of spillovers generated by changes in
parental educational expectations working through the social interaction effects holding all else
constant. Additionally, because of social interaction effects any other changes working opposite of
parental expectations will then create competing effects. These potentials should be taken into ac-
count, therefore working with both families and larger groups of adolescents in a school may help
avoid competing effects.
For adolescents, it is not too late for diversion from poor outcomes. It is well known in
the literature on skill development that adolescents are less movable on cognitive skills but remain
malleable on noncognitive skills. The results of this paper suggest ideals on education transmit-
ted from families and peers play a role in the choice of effort. Thus, targeting adolescent attitudes
combined with family programs may contribute to strong improvements in attitudes and effort.
Shifting adolescent ability may be out of reach, but shifting attitudes through families and peer
groups may not be.
There are some limitations of this study. The effect of attitudes on academics is checked in
the robustness section and shown to remain consistently positive; however, pinning down causal
effects from attitudes about school will benefit from future work with study designs around treat-
ments in school that target attitudes. The role of parental educational expecations, or parental ac-
tions in general, may be simultaneously determined with adolescent academic attitudes and perfor-
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mance along with other behaviors. I did not disentangle this possible source of bias. Future work
should consider this more closely. Missing data in friendship nominations is also a concern. Indi-
viduals with all missing nominations are removed from the data. To check against these deleted
observations, I checked the results using the undirected graph—with the friendship reciprocity
assumed—regaining many of the lost observations. The results were consistent; however, the reci-
procity assumption itself may be weak. Finally, I avoid a full panel data treatment with the two
periods of high school data that exist. Spatial panel models have been well developed for the sit-
uation where the spatial weights matrix does not change over time.1 The case of a weights matrix
that may change over time, such as a social network, is less developed. Therefore, at this time use
of cross-sectional data with network data and spatial econometrics has been standard in the litera-
ture.
I find spill-overs from studying friendship nominations, implying peer effects from those
one identifies with. Of course, sub-groups can exist within a school that are not very well con-
nected. Sub-groups may form around salient features, such as race, ethnicity, language, and so
on. If there are no, or few links, between sub-groups, then spill-overs that originate in one sub-
group will not reach the other. Network structure will impact the spread of own-attitude shocks
in a school network. Future research should consider this point. Knowledge of the spread of atti-
tudes in a network based on network structure can facilitate the design of interventions. Drawing
students for an attitudes treatment (if you will) with hopes of creating spill-over effects, may re-
quire institutional knowledge of the sub-groups within a school to be affective. My study does not
test whether spill-overs are mitigated in the presence of disconnected sub-groups, but it lays the
groundwork for future refinements to continue exploring combined family and peer effects.
Multiple extensions to this work are plausible. I do not attempt to uncover differences in
the family and peer identity effects across ethnicity or socio-economic status. Future work should
study whether spill-overs are broken between sub-groups of highly connected individuals who
share few links between sub-groups. In such a case, intervention design will need to draw mem-
1. See Elhorst (2014) for a review.
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bers from each group if the goal is to achieve positive spill-overs in the social network. It may also
prove fruitful to extend the theory and spatial models used here to study family and peer identity
effects among adolescents for other outcomes, such as behavioral problems. Families and peers
may play combined roles in the formation of a variety of traits such as team-work, timeliness, and
violence (indeed Heckman and Mosso (2014) show that families do), not just schooling attitudes,
that are important to a variety of outcomes and spread influence across networks. This paper can
also guide future work to investigate policy, field experiments, and intervention efforts in schools
around the mechanisms outlined here to provide stronger results on the causal effects of attitudes
and ideals. Finally, this paper informs future research design through its exploration of spill-overs.
Evaluations of social programs in schools, or any possible network, must be careful because un-
treated individuals may receive spill-over effects from the treated—even if they are not directly
linked—that render them a poor control group.
Family and peer groups form important social influences, and positive changes in social
incentives for education occurring in both groups will have significant effects for an adolescent
that can spread over schools. Importantly, this suggests that social programs which endeavor suc-
cessfully to improve ideals on education through improving attitudes about school may have posi-
tive influence for the treated and those not treated but linked in the network. Moreover, because
families provide a strong influence, programs that work both in the school with groups of adoles-
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